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The purpose of this study is to provide an overview of fiscal policies and PFM 
reforms in 7 countries in the Western Balkans and 12 countries in the CIS, includ-
ing major macroeconomic and poverty trends, fiscal policy, the size and role of the 
public sector, public expenditure management and its linkage to policy develop-
ment, the organization of budget processes on the central and local levels, the role 
of various actors and tools in PFM, including civil society and the international 
donor community.  
The period of 2003-2007 was characterized by an extraordinary high rate of 
economic growth, both worldwide and in the CEE/CIS region. This created mac-
roeconomic room for meeting numerous development challenges: reducing pov-
erty and inequality, improving the quality and coverage of public services, upgrad-
ing infrastructure, and advancing various reforms, including those related to PFM. 
However, the economic situation deteriorated dramatically in 2008 as a result of 
the global financial crisis, with deep recession hitting most of the countries in 
2009 and bleak perspectives for subsequent years.  
It remains to be seen whether the crisis situation will force governments to 
speed up necessary reforms. In the PFM area major tasks concern lengthening 
fiscal planning horizon and gradual movement toward performance oriented budg-
eting (the measure which can allow better expenditure targeting and decrease vola-
tility in expenditure allocation), increasing budget transparency and creating real 
room for civil society involvement into a budget process. However, the reforms 
must also involve a broadly defined governance sphere, i.e. improving transpar-
ency and accountability of government, modernization of civil service, decentrali-
zation, including building a genuine system of local and regional self-government, 
and other similar measures to improve quality of public services and social policy 
interventions. CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
 




i. The purpose of this study is to provide an overview of fiscal policies and PFM 
reforms in the CEE/CIS region, including in 7 countries in the Western Balkans 
and 12 countries in the CIS. In this study the, PFM agenda is understood in rather 
broad terms, including major macroeconomic and poverty trends, fiscal policy, 
the size and role of the public sector, public expenditure management and its link-
age to policy development, the organization of budget processes on the central 
and local levels, the role of various actors and tools in PFM, including civil soci-
ety and the international donor community. 
ii. The analytical approach used in this study is that of a cross-country compara-
tive analysis which focuses, by its definition, on similarities and differences 
across individual countries and sub-regions. This approach allows us to present 
major trends in fiscal policy and PFM in the entire analyzed region, the factors 
which determine these trends. It also allows us to see the relationship between the 
reforms (or their absence) and the quality of PFM, including those elements of 
PFM which are important for fulfilling UNICEF’s statutory mission. The com-
parative analysis also offers a natural benchmark for individual country analysis 
and assessment, i.e. whether countries differ from their neighbors, how much and 
why? 
iii. The analyzed group of countries is very heterogeneous in terms of their economic, 
social and geopolitical characteristics. The main dividing line goes between the 
Western Balkan and CIS sub-regions with differences related to historical and 
institutional legacies (former Yugoslavia vs. former USSR), geographical location 
and geopolitical interest (Western Balkans being closer to Western Europe and 
having an EU membership perspective), and level of economic and social devel-
opment. However, both sub-regions are also internally heterogeneous in almost 
every major characteristic– level of development, geography, history, institutional 
tradition or even chance for EU membership in case of Western Balkan subgroup. 
Generally, the intra-sub-regional differentiation is much deeper in the CIS than in 
the Western Balkans. If one looks at various specific characteristics, indicators 
and processes, the picture becomes even more blurred with various ad hoc group-
ings going across sub-regional boundaries. 
iv. The period covered by the analysis (2003-2007) was characterized by an extraor-
dinary high rate of economic growth, both worldwide and in the CEE/CIS region. 
This period and the preceding years created macroeconomic room for meeting 
numerous development challenges: reducing poverty and inequality, improving 
the quality and coverage of public services, upgrading infrastructure, and advanc-Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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ing various reforms, including those related to PFM. Individual countries used 
these opportunities to a various degree. For example, extreme poverty was re-
duced everywhere but remained a problem in Central Asia and other low-income 
CIS countries. Although the zone of economic and social vulnerability, i.e. the 
number of people that are just above the poverty line, decreased somewhat during 
the period of study (especially in the European part of CIS), it remained large in 
almost all of the countries in the region. Income inequalities did not diminish. 
v. However, the favorable economic situation started to change dramatically in 2008 
as a result of the global financial crisis, with recession forecasted for almost all 
countries in 2009 and bleak perspectives for subsequent years. Due to the struc-
tural characteristics and existing vulnerabilities, the economies of the region have 
been affected through many contagion channels such as weaker global demand 
(trade channel), a fall in commodity prices, the global liquidity squeeze (credit 
channel), the troubles of “mother” financial institutions in developed countries, 
increasing risk aversion, increased exchange rate volatility and decreasing de-
mand for labor migrants. More troubles like the necessity to rescue national fi-
nancial industries that have been weakened by both the recession and the conse-
quences of currency depreciation may come in the near future. As a result, sub-
stantial part of the gains in poverty reduction recorded until 2008 may easily be 
reversed, especially in the countries most seriously affected by recession and high 
inflation. 
vi. The economic boom helped improve fiscal balances by increasing government 
revenues. The public debt to GDP ratios declined everywhere as a result of the 
improved primary fiscal balances, rapid economic growth, appreciation of na-
tional currencies, low interest rates and debt reduction in low-income countries. 
Oil-exporting countries accumulated substantial reserve funds. However, the eco-
nomic and financial crisis has already deteriorated fiscal balances in all countries 
and reversed the previous favorable trend in debt-to-GDP ratios (sometimes dra-
matically as in the case of Ukraine). 
vii. High revenues until mid 2008 also allowed for the increase in public expenditures 
(in nominal and real terms) in many sectors, including healthcare, education, wa-
ter supply and other basic infrastructure, and social assistance. However, higher 
expenditures have not been automatically translated into better outcomes of indi-
vidual policies as both the targeting of public resources and the quality of govern-
ance in these sectors have remained unsatisfactory. On the contrary, the available 
indicators of public health, coverage and quality of education, access to improved 
water sources and sanitation, etc. demonstrate little visible improvement if any. 
viii. In most countries, expenditure policies have been driven by inertia and the inter-
ests of powerful lobbies (such as the rapidly growing group of relatively young CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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pensioners or public sector employees and management). The truly poor, children 
and youth have been largely neglected. The majority of the increased spending for 
public services is helping to continue the status quo rather than for reforms aimed 
at the rationalization of existing networks, increasing the quality of services, se-
curing equal access to public services for the poor, etc. Social policy expenditures 
are dominated by continuously increasing transfers to the public PAYG pension 
system and financing poorly targeted social entitlements to broad categories of the 
population (not necessarily the most socially vulnerable). It is unclear yet how the 
revenue shortfall caused by the financial crisis and the recession will affect ex-
penditure priorities. However, even if the crisis pushes governments to accelerate 
public sector and social policy reforms, their result will come with considerable 
time lag. 
ix. In addition, post-Yugoslav countries and the European part of the former USSR 
(especially Belarus and Ukraine) represent a very high level of public expendi-
tures (mostly social transfers) in relation to GDP, comparable with the highest-
spending countries of Western Europe, in spite of their significantly lower GDP-
per-capita levels. This may lead to the phenomenon of a premature and ineffective 
post-communist welfare state in the region which may be harmful for economic 
growth in the longer term (the same risk, by the way, relates to the EU NMS).  
x. So far reforms aimed at improving the targeting of spending and the efficiency of 
public services brought limited results. Even if initiated, they remained often in-
complete and inconsistent, subject to easy reversal and capture by special interest 
groups. Thus, insufficient prioritization and targeting remain a major unsolved 
problem of both public social services (like health and education) and social pol-
icy. They are also responsible, among other factors, for only a modest contribu-
tion of economic growth to poverty reduction and had no impact on reducing in-
come inequalities. 
xi. The quality of PFM depends a great deal on the organization of budget systems, 
i.e., (1) the division of responsibilities and government resources between differ-
ent levels and types of government bodies, (2) the system of budget planning and 
execution, (3) the availability of a clear policy framework for budget-related deci-
sion-making, and (4) the institutional setup of PFM systems, and (5) budget 
transparency and civil society involvement into budget processes.  
xii. In the analyzed region, the central government controls more than half of the 
General Government (GG) budget with a median share equal to 73%. This high 
share may have many explanations both of an economic and political character. 
The first group of factors includes (1) high government spending on social secu-
rity, defense, public order and safety and some other functions, which are mostly/ 
exclusively implemented by central governments; (ii) the small population of Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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many countries, which does not require the decentralization of those government 
functions (e.g., many components of education and health), which are usually 
delegated to the local level in larger countries, (iii) the prevalence of indirect 
taxes (usually collected by the central government) in revenue structure. 
xiii. As for political factors explaining the centralization bias, one could mention an 
administrative tradition left over from the Soviet period (particularly in the case 
of the former USSR) and fears of territorial/ethnic disintegration. The conse-
quences of this bias represent a challenge for the quality of public services and 
social policy, citizen participation, and government accountability and transpar-
ency, which can be executed easier at the local level than at the national level.  
xiv. In many countries of the region, substantial central government resources (some-
times more than 30%) continue to be channeled through extra-budgetary funds. 
Pension funds are the largest extra-budgetary units (in terms of resources). In 
some countries considerable resources are also concentrated in medical insurance 
funds. The insurance nature of payments from these funds is the main rationale to 
keep them separate. In practice, however, this rationale is often questionable as a 
majority of pension and other social security schemes have significant redistribu-
tion mechanisms, so they do not differ much from a regular budget. Another ra-
tionale for the creation of extra-budgetary funds is the intention to earmark some 
revenues for particular priority purposes (road construction, regional development 
etc.). However, the existence of extra-budgetary funds complicates the fiscal sys-
tem and makes it less transparent and inhibits the efficient redistribution of re-
sources within a GG budget. 
xv. Most countries continue various kinds of QFAs (in the range of 2-4% of GDP), 
with setting tariffs for electricity and gas below their cost-recovery level being the 
most frequent practice. Generally, QFAs decrease the transparency of fiscal pol-
icy and PFM and blur the government’s accountability in this sphere. Fiscal diffi-
culties and social vulnerabilities associated with the period of economic downturn 
may push governments to intensify QFAs again.  
xvi. Basic PFM reforms include establishing: (1) complete budget classification, (2) 
complete budget coverage and capital budget integration, (3) consolidated treas-
ury single accounts, and (4) adequate budget controls. Most of analyzed countries 
introduced the full classification of government revenues and expenditures by 
economic, functional, organizational, program and funding codes. Progress in 
consolidating various types of government resources (extra-budgetary funds, PIP 
and QFA) into budget documentation going through legislative scrutiny and the 
introduction of single treasury accounts is also visible. However, more should be 
done in this area. In particular, the operations of the majority of extra-budgetary 
units and even some operations included into the government budgets (especially CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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PIP-related) are not reflected on treasury accounts. The predictability and regular-
ity of payments has improved in comparison with the 1990s but remains far from 
ideal and may deteriorate again as a result of the current crisis. The same concerns 
expenditure sequestration and payment arrears which may return as a conse-
quence of revenue shortfall. 
xvii. The advanced PFM reforms include (1) medium-term budgeting (MTB) and (2) 
performance-oriented budgeting (POB). Practically all countries of the region 
have taken some steps towards MTB, but most of them are in the early stages of 
this process. The countries prepare comprehensive macro-fiscal frameworks, 
which are updated at least twice a year. This is the strongest element of the exist-
ing MTB systems. In countries which are actual or potential EU candidates or 
IMF program beneficiaries, macro-fiscal projections and the related budget esti-
mates are more likely to be kept updated. Many countries prepare multi-year ex-
penditure ceilings but in most cases they are very general and of an indicative 
character only, either by definition or because they are allocated to broad func-
tional areas and not to organizations that can be held accountable for meeting 
them. The out-year ceilings are usually changed from year to year without any 
explicit explanation, so they are of limited value for planning. For other MTB 
issues, like separating the costs of existing policies from new spending proposals, 
progress has been very limited. In general, the MTB frameworks have had little 
impact on the specific budget negotiations, which continue to have a one year 
focus. The shock caused by the financial crisis and the accompanying uncertainty 
shorten the actual planning horizon, sometimes even to one quarter or a few 
months. 
xviii. As in the case of MTB, most countries of the region are in the early stages of de-
veloping a POB. Only few of them are introducing elements of output oriented 
budgeting and have developed mechanisms where the funds provided are directly 
related to the results achieved. Almost all of the analyzed countries introduced 
programmatic budget classifications, but their quality varies considerably. In 
many cases, the programs are designed to describe an agency’s activities rather 
than its operational objectives. Some countries have developed reasonably com-
prehensive indicators for outputs but there are few outcome indicators. In many 
countries the term “outputs” is used but the indicators related to this term often 
describe activities rather than outputs. Many governments have problems in estab-
lishing a clear operational understanding of basic POB concepts in budget organi-
zations. In addition, officials in these organizations are reluctant to take responsi-
bility for results they do not control (because of the lack of sufficient operational 
autonomy and a limited time horizon for evaluation).  
xix. Common obstacles to advanced PFM reforms include capacity shortages, espe-
cially in line ministries, staff reluctance to adopt changes, underestimating the Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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amount of time and resources required, and in many cases, the existence of more 
pressing priorities or more basic reforms to be put in place. The advanced PFM 
reforms also require the availability of a consistent national medium-term policy 
framework. 
xx. Since the end of the 1990s/early 2000s, the WB, IMF and other international de-
velopment organizations have been promoting medium-term strategic planning in 
the form of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP). The majority of the coun-
tries of the region prepared PRSPs with the support of their development partners. 
In the second part of the 2000s, many of them began feeling that the focus on 
poverty implied by the very title of PRSP did not match their actual/aspired status 
of middle-income countries and too narrowly defined their development priori-
ties. So, the second generation of medium-term strategies often does not mention 
poverty reduction as such, but refers to a broader development agenda, while es-
sentially keeping key PRSP features. In most cases, PRSPs refer to medium-term 
country development strategies for 3-5 years but some refer to strategies with ho-
rizons as long as 13-15 years. However, the financial crisis may outdate many of 
these policy frameworks which have been built on too optimistic macroeconomic 
assumptions. 
xxi. The review of a dozen PRSP documents suggests that the effectiveness of na-
tional strategies in setting development goals and targeting children’s needs in 
particular is limited. The relatively open and broad-ranging form of these docu-
ments has both advantages (countries can take approaches that best fit their spe-
cific situation) and disadvantages (because they can omit sensitive issues or avoid 
making concrete commitments). In the case when specific commitments are 
made, they are usually very hard to verify, either because PRSP progress reports 
are irregular or because they fail to provide sufficiently detailed information. 
xxii. As for the transparency and openness of the budget process, governments often 
fail to give systematic budget information to both the legislature and general pub-
lic. In most countries, the budget proposal or series of proposals do not provide a 
comprehensive picture of the government’s fiscal position during the forthcoming 
year(s). The documents do not lay out the government’s policy goals and explain 
how the planned spending will assist in achieving them. Also many governments 
do not disclose detailed information on expected revenues, plans to borrow, pay-
ments arrears, etc. Ex-post information in annual budget reports is often incom-
plete. The same concerns mid-year reports when they are delivered to parlia-
ments. Very little is released to the general public. In most countries, governments 
do not make information publicly available that is produced for internal use or for 
donors. Only a few countries hold public hearings regarding budget issues. Gen-
erally, the role of civil society in the budget process is limited and very dependent 
on the nature of the political system in individual countries. In several countries, CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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even the role of the legislature in the budget process is limited, for example, by 
granting parliament too little time for discussing a government budget proposal.  
xxiii. Almost all countries received substantial donor assistance during the transition 
period of the 1990s and 2000s. The assistance helped support a broad program of 
reforms related to virtually all aspects of the economic, social and political devel-
opment of these countries, including fiscal policy and PFM. Donor interventions 
in the area of fiscal policy and PFM can be grouped into three categories: (1) di-
rect provision of resources for public expenditures through loans, grants and debt 
relief to governments; (2) policy conditionality accompanying financial aid to 
support required reforms; (3) technical assistance to governments in the imple-
mentation of PFM reforms. In spite of many problems in the sphere of aid deliv-
ery (such as the insufficient coordination of donor effort, country ownership of 
donor initiated programs, principal-agency problems in delivery of technical as-
sistance, etc.), the donor effort has had a positive impact on advancing PFM re-
forms especially in more technical and less politically sensitive spheres such as 
budget classification, reporting, consolidating government accounts, lengthening 
of the planning horizon, etc. The positive impact on aid programs and their condi-
tionality has been especially felt by countries which are actual or potential EU 
candidates (Western Balkans) or are dependent on aid resources in the long-term 
(several low-income countries). 
xxiv. The analyzed countries still face a substantial agenda of policy reforms in the 
forthcoming years which would guarantee them long-term fiscal sustainability 
and upgrade their PFM system, including better quality of public services and 
better prioritization and targeting of social programs. While being aware of all 
administrative difficulties related to the effective functioning of the addressed 
social assistance based on means testing the authors of this study believe this is 
the best strategy to concentrate scarce public resources (which has become even 
more scarce as result of the crisis) in the social policy area on support to the poor-
est households. Reforming wasteful public pension systems and elimination of 
various kinds of subsidies, quasi-subsidies, and broad based benefits in kind can 
create a fiscal room for more effective system of social assistance, including in-
terventions related to family and children basic needs.  
xxv. In the PFM area the key although uneasy reform tasks concern lengthening fiscal 
planning horizon and gradual movement toward POB (the measure which can 
allow better expenditure targeting and decrease volatility in expenditure alloca-
tion), increasing budget transparency and creating real room for civil society in-
volvement into a budget process. 
xxvi. However, the reforms cannot be limited to the narrowly defined fiscal, PFM and 
social spheres but they must involve a broadly defined governance sphere. The Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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support to governance reform should also become a priority task of an interna-
tional donor community (including UNICEF). Without improving transparency 
and accountability of government, modernization of civil service, decentraliza-
tion, including building a genuine system of local and regional self-government, 
and other similar measures it will be hardly to improve quality of public services 
and social policy interventions. Only such reforms can help in sustainable poverty 
eradication and help the most economically vulnerable (and at the same time usu-
ally the most politically powerless) groups of the population, including children 
and youth from poor families. 
xxvii. It remains to be seen whether the crisis situation and end of the era of rapid eco-
nomic growth (associated with an even more rapid inflow of government reve-
nues) will force governments to speed up necessary reforms. In the meantime the 
questions analyzed in this study require further analytical and diagnostic work 
both on regional and individual countries levels. CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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1. Introductory Remarks 
1. The purpose of the study is to provide the UNICEF in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) with a comprehensive 
analysis on the progress in the area of fiscal policy and Public Financial Manage-
ment (PFM) reforms in the region. The study can help UNICEF to upgrade its 
institutional capacity in conducting more effective and better-targeted interven-
tions related to their statutory child related goals based on the staff’s improved 
knowledge and understanding of PFM issues. It can be also useful for UNICEF’s 
programmatic work, for advocacy purposes and as a reference for PFM issues. It 
should help UNICEF offices to maintain informed dialogue with other key play-
ers in the PFM area, i.e., governments, international financial and development 
institutions, the European Commission, and bilateral donors. 
2. The PFM agenda is understood in this study in rather broad terms, including 
major macroeconomic and poverty trends, fiscal policy, the size and role of the 
public sector in the economy, public expenditure management and its link to pol-
icy development, the organization of budget processes at the central and local lev-
els of government, the roles of various actors and tools in the PFM process, in-
cluding civil society and the international donor community. A special emphasis 
is given to the analysis of those public expenditure components which are critical 
to the welfare of children and families in sectors such as education, health, social 
protection, water and utilities. The study also tries to elaborate on the issues that 
are critical for the UNICEF agenda such as poverty alleviation, the sustainability 
of social expenditures, intergovernmental fiscal relations and fiscal decentraliza-
tion, budgetary frameworks for possible institutional change in social service de-
livery, etc. 
3. The study covers the entire CEE/CIS region and the three sub-regions, i.e. the 
Western Balkans, the countries covered by the ENP (Eastern Europe), and Central 
Asia. The first group, i.e. the Western Balkans includes Albania, Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, Croatia, Kosovo
1, Macedonia
2, Montenegro, and Serbia. The second 
                                                 
1 Under UN Security Council Resolution 1244. 
2 For the purposes of this study we apply hereinafter the commonly used geographic names 
of the analyzed countries rather than their official names, i.e. Macedonia instead of the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Russia instead of the Russian Fed-Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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and largest group includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, 
Russia, and Ukraine. Finally, the third group includes the five countries of post-
Soviet Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uz-
bekistan. A total of 19 countries are subjected to comparative analysis in this 
study
3.  
4. For various analytical purposes, we also apply other country groupings according 
to the principle of “variable geometry” and use criteria such as GDP per capita, 
level of human development, demographic and ethnic factors, resource endow-
ment, institutional background and heritage, the role and interest of EU, and the 
progress in economic and political reforms. As a result, we often subdivide the 
former Soviet Union into three sub-regions: Eastern Europe (sometimes called 
Western CIS), the Caucasus and Central Asia. Sometimes we merge the two latter 
into Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA) as they share many common socio-
economic characteristics.  
5. The limited size of the study and the limited labor input planned in the ToR 
required searching for the most economic and efficient way of accomplishing the 
project’s ambitious objectives. Thus we used a cross-country comparative 
analysis which focuses, by definition, on finding similarities and differences 
across individual countries and sub-regions. This approach also helped us to pre-
sent major trends in fiscal policy and PFM in the analyzed region (CEE/CIS) and 
its three sub-regions. The approach allowed us to identify the factors which de-
termine these trends, and recognize the relationship between the reforms (or their 
absence) and the quality of PFM, including those elements of PFM which are im-
portant for fulfilling UNICEF’s statutory mission. The comparative analysis also 
offers a somewhat natural benchmark for individual country analysis and assess-
ment: in order to see how countries differ from their neighbors, how much and 
why? There would no be such benchmarking possibility if the analysis was based 
only on a collection of individual country case studies. Thus, the cross-country 
comparative approach adopted in this study can be justified not only by economy 
of time and limited resources devoted to this project but also, and most impor-
tantly, by its analytical convenience and effectiveness. 
6. However, the decision to use a cross-country comparative approach has various 
consequences for the study’s general design, structure, content, data sources and 
methodology. It requires a top-down analytical approach where the main focus is 
put on the cross-country and cross-sub-regional comparison instead of presenting 
                                                                                                                           
eration, Kyrgyzstan instead of the Kyrgyz Republic, Armenia instead of the Republic of 
Armenia, etc. 
3 Turkey being part of UNICEF CEE/CIS region was not included in the study because of 
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individual country stories (with all their historical and factual nuances). Neverthe-
less, individual countries’ developments do not disappear from the analysis com-
pletely: they are analyzed either as an illustration of a common trend or as an ex-
ample of divergence from this trend. We also highlight the cases of outstanding 
results in PFM reform and best practices in PFM on the one hand, and the absence 
of reforms or major failures in their implementation, on the other.  
7. The comparative cross-country analysis also requires some up-front work on data 
standardization, quantifying some qualitative characteristics and finding a simple 
way of presenting some of the more complex processes and developments. On the 
other hand, the thematic range and depth of cross-country comparative analysis 
has been in many cases limited by the availability or insufficient quality of com-
parative statistical data (or other information). In such cases we either present an 
incomplete comparison limited to countries where data sources/information are 
available or, if this is not excluded by methodological considerations, we try to 
find substitute data sources (usually from country reports/studies conducted by 
the IMF, World Bank or other international organizations). Sometimes we use 
both approaches simultaneously. Whenever necessary we provide information on 
existing data problems and the ways in which we have tried to solve them.  
8. The period covered by the analysis (2003-2007 as required by the ToR) was 
characterized by an extraordinary high rate of economic growth, both worldwide 
and in the CEE/CIS region. This situation started to change dramatically in 2008 
as a result of the global financial crisis. An economic recession (sometimes quite 
deep) was forecasted for almost all countries in 2009 and bleak perspectives for 
the near future. While it is too early to assess potential macroeconomic, fiscal and 
social consequences of both the financial crisis and the recession, we try to make 
some comments on their potential impact, especially in chapters 3 and 4. 
9. In preparing this study, we have used the available cross-country statistical data-
bases and various rankings such as the IMF World Economic Outlook Database, 
IMF International Financial Statistics, IMF Government Finance Statistics, World 
Development Indicators and World Governance Indicators of the WB, UNICEF 
TransMONEE database, EBRD economic and transition indicators, UNECE and 
UNCTAD statistical databases, EUROSTAT and European Commission statisti-
cal publications, Asian Development Bank data sources (a very useful source for 
the CCA sub-region), Freedom House Nation in Transit study (in respect to civic 
participation and transparency issues), Open Budget Index and Global Integrity 
Report, etc. Apart from these cross-country comparative databases and rankings, 
we have also made review of various kinds of analytical, programmatic, lending 
and policy documents such as IMF Country Reports, Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility lending programs, World Bank lending programs, Public Expen-
diture Reviews, Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys, PEFA assessments, re-Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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gional and country reports of the European Commission (for the candidate and 
neighboring countries), DFID, ADB and other donors, PRSP, MTEF and other 
national strategic, analytical and legislative documents.  
10. We also drew from our own personal and CASE network institutional experience 
in similar regional or sub-regional studies. Among others, we made use of the 
database for all transition and EU economies built under the Specific Targeted 
Research Project on “EU Eastern Neighborhood: Economic Potential and Future 
Development (ENEPO)” funded under the EU Sixth Framework Program, Prior-
ity 7 - Workpackage 1.  
11. The authors would like to express their gratitude to Boris Najman and Irena 
Topinska who helped to conceptualize this study in its early stages and collect 
information and statistics related to chapters 4 and 5. Pasquale d’Apice and Luigi 
Della Sala provided administrative and logistical support in the implementation of 
this project at CASE. Paulina Szyrmer helped in editing the final version of this 
study.  
12. The study greatly benefited from comments provided by peer reviewers, the staff 
of UNICEF CEE/CIS Regional Office in Geneva, participants of the UNICEF 
CEE/CIS Regional Child Well-being Workshop held at Issyk-kul area in Kyr-
gyzstan on April 21-23, 2009 and the UNICEF CEE/CIS Regional Workshop on 
“Governance, Public Finance Management and Social Policy for Better Outcomes 
for Children” held in Istanbul, May 25-26, 2009. However, the authors of this 
study assume full responsibility for its content, opinions and conclusions which 
are their own personal views and not necessarily those of UNICEF, CASE or any 
other institutions.  
13. The study analyzes major aspects and components of fiscal policy and PFM in 
CEE/CIS and is structured as follows: Chapter 2 presents basic characteristics of 
the CEE/CIS region and groups the analyzed countries according to various eco-
nomic, social, political, geographic and institutional criteria. Chapter 3 contains 
an overview of the macroeconomic and fiscal performance of the analyzed coun-
tries and Chapter 4 continues this topic providing an in-depth analysis of public 
expenditure policies with special attention given to social policy and social ser-
vice expenditures and their effectiveness. Chapter 5 addresses the institutional and 
instrumental side of PFM systems: the degree of fiscal decentralization and inter-
governmental fiscal relations, quasi-fiscal operations, major characteristics of the 
budget planning and execution system, the role of strategic framework docu-
ments, budget reporting, transparency and accountability, internal and external 
control, and the role of various institutional actors, including civil society. Chap-
ter 6 analyzes the role of international donors in PFM reforms. Chapter 7 presents 
a summary of findings and both policy and analytical recommendations. CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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2. Basic Characteristics of the 
Region and Criteria for Country 
Grouping 
14. The purpose of this chapter is to provide basic characteristics of the analyzed 
region and understand its degree of heterogeneity. The criteria used for these 
characteristics and subsequent country grouping according to the principle of 
variable geometry include:  
•  Geographical location: proximity to Western Europe and access to sea; 
•  Resource endowment; 
•  Institutional heritage; 
•  Exposure to armed conflicts; 
•  Transition progress and contemporary political systems; 
•  Categorization according to income grouping and level of human devel-
opment; 
•  Direction of development (potential influence of relations with the EU). 
For most of the characteristics, we implement principal components analysis, and 
take the first principal component which explains the largest variation in the ana-
lyzed indicators for ranking the countries. This gives a first approximation of the 
various possible criteria of country groupings, subject to subsequent qualitative 
analysis in this and the following chapters. 
 
 
2.1.  Geographical location 
 
15. In earlier studies, countries of the region were distinguished based on their 
proximity to ‘thriving market economies’ (De Melo et al., 1997). This proximity 
was associated with an incentive for EU accession and, hence, ‘imports’ of mar-
ket institutions and better access to EU markets. Only six analyzed countries – 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Russia – 
have borders (land or sea) with Western Europe, i.e. EU old member states. How-Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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ever, after the EU Eastern enlargement, this criterion can be reinterpreted in terms 
of neighboring with the EU, which added Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, 
and all Western Balkans to the list of ‘proximate’ countries (see Table A.2.1 in 
the Statistical Annex). 
16. Another feature that may influence country’s development is whether or not it is 
landlocked. Half of the region is landlocked (see Table A.2.1). At the same time, 
a difference should exist between countries ‘locked’ in the EU and in Asia. Thus, 
the countries can be grouped based on three location attributes: proximity to the 
Western Europe, proximity to the EU, and access to the sea. Results based on the 
principal components analysis are presented in Table 2.1 (principal component 
‘location’ explains 67.1% of variables’ variation).  
17. In terms of locations, the region can be divided into three groups: 
•  Countries close to the EU with access to the sea (exception –Macedonia, 
which is landlocked). This group can be divided into two sub-groups: 
neighbors of Western Europe and non-neighbors); 
•  Countries bordering the EU and landlocked (Belarus and Serbia); 
•  The landlocked countries of Caucasus and Central Asia. 
 
 
2.2.  Resource endowment 
 
18. Resource endowment is another important attribute which determines develop-
ment. According to this criterion, we distinguish three groups of countries: rich 
(all the countries which have large supplies of natural gas and oil), moderate (en-
dowed with other natural resources like metal ores), and poor (De Melo et al., 
1997). Country groups are presented in Table 2.1.  
 
 
2.3.  Institutional heritage 
 
19. Institutional heritage is characterized by ‘market memory’ (number of years under 
central planning), and experience of being an independent state (De Melo et al., 
1997). The first ‘variable’ distinguishes West Balkan countries (less than 50 years CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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under central planning
4) and former Soviet Union, FSU (70 years and more) with 
one exception (Moldova, 51 years of central planning). The same difference is 
true for another variable: most countries analyzed in this study were part of larger 
sovereign entities (Soviet Union and Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) 
and only one country from the region (Albania) was independent prior to 1989; 
The Western Balkans were part of the federal and quite decentralized state of 
Yugoslavia, so for the purposes of this study they could be treated as partially 
independent before 1989. Russia is treated as independent, as it was a core repub-
lic in the former Soviet Union, and has a status a successor state of the Soviet Un-
ion; all other FSU countries are considered non-independent before 1989. 
 
Table 2.1. Natural resource endowment 
Poor (0)  Moderate (1)  Rich (2) 
Albania Georgia Azerbaijan 
Armenia Ukraine  Kazakhstan 
Belarus Uzbekistan  Russia 
Bosnia & Herzegovina   Turkmenistan 
Croatia    
Macedonia    
Kyrgyzstan    
Moldova    
Montenegro    
Serbia    
Tajikistan    
Source: De Melo et al. (1997). 
 
20. As a result, the principal components analysis (Table A.2.2 in the Statistical 
Annex; principal component ‘institutional heritage’ explains 88.5% of variables’ 
variance) reveals two major groups (independent or partially independent coun-
tries with better ‘market memory’ vs. FSU states) and one ‘transitional’ group 




                                                 
4 Actually post-Yugoslav countries were only subject to the classical central planning for a 
few years (between 1945 and early 1950s). Through the remaining time (almost 40 years), 
they experimented with various elements of the so-called labor self-government and mar-
ket socialism. Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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2.4.  Armed conflicts and internal unrest 
 
21. Almost all countries of the region have suffered from armed conflicts and internal 
unrest. This relates to Russia (North Ossetia, Ingushetia, and Chechnya), Southern 
Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia), almost all Central Asian countries (ex-
cept Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan), and all former Yugoslav countries except 
Montenegro (see Table A.2.3 in the Statistical Annex). 
 
 
2.5.  Transition progress and political systems 
 
22. Measuring transition progress involves two dimensions: (i) the economic transi-
tion from a planned to market economy (using EBRD transition indicators) and 
(ii) the political transition from authoritarian to democratic political systems (us-
ing Freedom House democratization indexes).  
23. In terms of the economic reform, countries can be divided based on the EBRD 
reform index (a simple average of nine transition indicators). There are those 
which exceeded 3 in 2008 (8 countries), those with an EBRD reform index be-
tween 3- and 3 (5 countries), and with EBRD reform index below 3- (5 countries). 
In the first group, Croatia is closest to the new EU members in terms of progress 
in market reforms (its progress even exceeds that of Bulgaria and Romania). In 
the least reformed group, three countries out of five – Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
and Belarus – have an EBRD reform index of less than 2+ (see Table 2.2).  
24. Another important characteristic is the speed of economic transition. It can be 
measured as years with close-to-market economy (EBRD reform index of 3 and 
higher). Croatia is the leader here, having spent 12 years with an EBRD index of 
3 or more. Croatia is followed by Macedonia (5 years), Armenia and Georgia (4 
years each), Kazakhstan and Russia (3 years), Ukraine (2 years) and Albania (1 
year).  
25. In terms of democratization, the countries in the region represent all types of 
political regimes except ‘consolidated democracies’ according to Freedom House 
classification. In 2008, six countries of the region (Central Asia + Belarus) were 
rated by Freedom House as ‘consolidated authoritarian regimes’. Five countries 
(Western Balkans minus Bosnia and Herzegovina) were deemed ‘semi-
consolidated democracies’. Three countries have hybrid regimes, and the remain-
ing four are ‘semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes’ (Table 2.2).  
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Table 2.2. Market reforms and political systems 










Croatia 3.64  3.52  2.00  12 
Macedonia 3.86 3.18 1.38  5 
Albania 3.82  3.04  1.19  1 
Ukraine 4.25  3.07  0.98  2 
Serbia 3.79  2.85  0.94  0 
Montenegro 3.79  2.82  0.89  0 
Georgia 4.79  3.07  0.66  4 
Bosnia & Herze-
govina  4.11 2.78 0.64  0 
Armenia 5.21  3.18  0.56  4 
Moldova 5.00  3.00  0.42 0 
Russia 5.96  3.04  -0.11  3 
Kyrgyzstan 5.93 2.93  -0.25  0 
Kazakhstan 6.39 3.00 -0.42  3 
Azerbaijan 6.00 2.63  -0.72  0 
Tajikistan 6.07  2.37  -1.14  0 
Uzbekistan 6.86 2.15  -1.94  0 
Belarus 6.71  2.00  -2.07  0 
Turkmenistan 6.93  1.44  -3.01  0 
Note. * 3–4 – semi-consolidated democracy, 4–5 – hybrid regime; 5–6 – semi-consolidated 
authoritarian regime, 6–7 – consolidated authoritarian regime; ** countries are ranked 
from 1 (planned economy) to 4+ (standards of developed industrial economy); *** years 
spent with EBRD reform index of 3 and higher. 
Source: http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=438&year=2008, 
http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/tis.xls, own estimates. 
 
26. Political and economic reforms usually go together. The correlation coefficient 
between these two variables for the analyzed region is -0.69, i.e. the closer a 




2.6.  Income grouping and level of human development 
 
27. According to the World Bank Atlas method (2008 data) countries of the region 
include low-income countries (3) which have a per capita Gross National Income 
(GNI) that is less than USD 935 (measured in current international dollars or PPP-
based), lower-middle income countries (9) which have a per capita GNI between Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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USD 936 and 3705, and upper-middle income countries (6) which have a per cap-
ita GNI between USD 3706 and 11455. However, respective dummy variables do 
not reflect the intra-group dispersion of incomes, so it can be helpful to use the 
size of per capita GDP to group countries by income level.  
 















Croatia 3  14318  0.862  2.08 2.73 
Montenegro 3 8909  0.822  1.51  1.11 
Serbia 3  9141  0.821  1.50  1.14 
Belarus 3  9759  0.817  1.44  1.20 
Kazakhstan 3 9779 0.807  1.30 1.06 
Russia 3  13182  0.806  1.29 1.72 
Macedonia 2  7899 0.808  0.29 0.71 
Albania 2  5815  0.807  0.27  0.29 
Bosnia & Her-
zegovina  2 6501  0.802  0.20  0.35 
Ukraine 2  6269  0.786  -0.02  0.08 
Armenia 2  4328  0.777  -0.15  -0.43 
Georgia 2  4038  0.763  -0.35 -0.68 
Azerbaijan 2  6061  0.758  -0.42  -0.36 
Turkmenistan 2  4585  0.728  -0.85  -1.07 
Moldova 2  2713  0.719  -0.98  -1.57 
Uzbekistan 1  2155  0.701  -2.26  -1.93 
Kyrgyzstan 1  1820  0.694  -2.36  -2.10 
Tajikistan 1  1675  0.684  -2.50  -2.27 
Notes. * 3 is for upper-middle income countries, 2 is for lower-middle income countries, 
and 1 is for low income countries; ** calculated based on income level and HDI; *** cal-
culated based on per capita GDP and HDI. 
Source: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/CLASS.XLS, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/02/weodata/WEOOct2008all.xls, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDI2008Tables.xls, own estimates. 
 
28. Another measure of development level is the UNDP Human Development Index 
(HDI). According to this index, countries of the region are divided into two 
groups: there are 9 countries with a high level of human development (HDI of 
0.80 and higher) and another 9 countries with a medium level of human develop-
ment (HDI between 0.50 and 0.799. Evidently, the second group is too broad to 
be used for country classification, but in combination with the income level it can 
show better results.  CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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29. As shown in Table 2.3, the following groups can be distinguished on the basis of 
principal component analysis (principal components ‘development 1’ and ‘devel-
opment 2’ explain 92.9 and 94.1% of variance of the respective variables): 
•  Upper-middle income countries with a high level of human develop-
ment; 
•  Lower-middle income countries with a high level of human develop-
ment; 
•  Lower-middle income countries with a medium level of human devel-
opment; 
•  Low income countries with a medium level of human development. 
 
 
2.7.  Linkages between groups 
 
30. All principal components and country groups from sections 2.1 – 2.6 are interest-
ing in terms of their impact on development. In order to evaluate this impact and 
to look at the possible interrelationship between its determinants, we estimate cor-
relations between all variables (principle components and dummies for armed 
conflicts and natural resource endowment). The results are presented in Table 
A.2.4 in the Statistical Annex.  
31. The level of development (measured as ‘development 2’) is influenced by the 
following variables: 
•  Location (neighboring with the EU and access to the sea) is positively 
correlated with development level; 
•  Institutional heritage (a smaller number of years under a centrally 
planned economy and a tradition of independence) is positively corre-
lated with development level; 
•  Reforms and the speed of reforms (measured as years under a market 
economy) are positively correlated with development level. 
32. Other significant correlations involve: 
•  Institutional heritage and natural resource endowment - countries poorly 
endowed with natural resources are less likely to be captured by authori-
tarian regimes. Also, an abundance of natural resources delays reforms – 
but this correlation has arisen because of the political reforms compo-
nent, while resource endowment and economic reforms seem to be un-
correlated; Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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•  Institutional heritage and location, which reflects the difference between 
the FSU and CEE; 
•  Reforms and location – countries with better geographical position (in 
term of proximity to the EU) tend to have a better reform record. 
33. Summing up, the Western Balkan countries have a better chance of being more 




2.8.  Potential influence of the relations with the EU 
 
34. Countries of the region may benefit from different instruments of cooperation 
with the EU. Additionally, the Western Balkan countries are treated by the EU as 
candidates or potential candidates for accession (see Table 2.4). EU accession 
negotiations boost political and economic reforms, and, consequently, the devel-
opment of the accessing countries. 
 
Table 2.4. Western Balkans (subject to the Stabilization and Association process) 
Country  Perspective of the EU accession  Forecasted EU 
joining date 
Albania  Potential candidate country (SAA signed on 
June 2006)  2016 
Bosnia & Herzegovina Negotiating on SAA  2018 
Croatia  Recognized candidate (SAA signed in 2001, 
applied for membership in 2003)  2011 
Macedonia  Recognized candidate (SAA signed in 2001, 
applied for membership in 2004)  2014 
Montenegro  SAA signed on October 2007, applied for 
membership on December 2008  2017 
Serbia  SAA signed on April 2007  2018 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Future_enlargement_of_the_European_Union. 
 
35. Six FSU countries in Eastern Europe and Caucasus region are subject to the 
European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) while Russia has a similar arrangement 
with the EU called four Common Spaces between EU and Russia. Among the 
ENP countries, Belarus does not have a bilateral action plan with the EU yet. In 
all active ENP countries but Azerbaijan, one can find a clear relationship between CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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the bilateral Action Plans with the EU and market reforms (EBRD reform index is 
3- and higher)
5.  
36. Cooperation between Central Asia and the EU is implemented within the frame-
work of the ‘Strategy for a New Partnership’ adopted in 2007. PCA between the 
EU and countries of the regions entered into force in 1999 (with Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan). The PCA with Tajikistan was signed in 2004 but 
the ratification process has not been finished yet. The PCA with Turkmenistan has 
not been ratified by the EU because of the very low progress in democratization. 
All countries of the region are non-democratic, but two of them – Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan – are quite advanced in terms of market reforms. Overall, the devel-
opment potential of this sub-region is lowest among the analyzed countries. 
 
Table 2.5. ENP countries 
ENP 
partner 









Armenia  July 1999  March 2005  Autumn 2006 13.11.2006  14.11.2006 
Azerbai-
jan  July 1999  March 2005  Autumn 2006 13.11.2006  14.11.2006 
Belarus  PCA ratification procedure suspended since 1997 
Georgia  July 1999  March 2005  Autumn 2006 13.11.2006  14.11.2006 
Moldova  July 1998  May 2004  End 2004  21.02.2005  22.02.2005 
Russia  December 
1997  Cooperation on formation of EU-Russia Common Spaces 




2.9.  Conclusions 
 
37. The analysis conducted in this chapter leads to the conclusion that the main 
dividing line can be drawn between the Western Balkan and CIS sub-regions due 
to the various roles of the “EU factor” (Western Balkan countries are considered 
actual or potential EU candidates while CIS countries are unlikely to obtain this 
status anytime soon), geographic location and historical/ institutional background. 
It is also clear that the second and third factors influence the first one, i.e. the 
membership perspective granted to Western Balkan countries by the EU.  
                                                 
5 However, this does not necessarily mean causality relationship between the two vari-
ables.  Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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38. However, both major sub-regions are not internally homogenous in terms of 
development levels, availability of natural resources, geographical location, po-
litical regimes, reform progress, relations with the EU and other factors. The in-
tra-sub-regional differentiation is even deeper in the CIS than in the Western Bal-
kans and appears more complex, i.e. using various criteria may suggest various 
internal country groupings. For example, when grouped according to geographic 
location and “depth” of potential relations with the EU (i.e. eligibility to become a 
participant of the ENP framework or equivalent), the European part of the CIS 
(including the Southern Caucasus) can be distinguished from Central Asia. 
Grouping according to other criteria breaks across this geographic/ geopolitical 
criterion. If one uses various detail indicators related to economic, social and in-
stitutional development s/he may obtain many common characteristics for the 
Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA), sometimes also including Moldova
6. Thus, in 
the following chapters we will use variable grouping criteria, especially in respect 
to the CIS sub-region, depending on the nature and specifics of the analyzed 
topic. 
                                                 
6 In the early 2000s, international donors used the concept of CIS-7, which included the 
three low-income countries of Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), all 
three Caucasus countries and Moldova. However, this grouping also appears outdated now, 
with Azerbaijan enjoying the effects of the oil boom. Other factors also make this group 
less homogeneous than before.  CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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3. Macroeconomic and Structural 
Determinants of Public Finance 
39. The purpose of this chapter is to present the macroeconomic and structural factors 
which determine the fiscal performance of the analyzed countries and, therefore, 
their fiscal potential to address policy goals related to families and children. 
 
 
3.1.  Recent growth performance and growth perspectives 
 
40. As shown in Table 3.1, the countries of the analyzed region demonstrated high 
rates of growth throughout the 2000s. Until 2008, European CIS remained the 
second fastest growing region in the world, after emerging Asia. Oil and gas ex-
porting economies demonstrated the highest growth rates, followed by other CIS 
countries, the Western Balkans and the new EU member states.  
 
Table 3.1. GDP at constant prices (national currency), annual percent changes 
Economy  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Western Balkans* 
Albania  5.8 5.7 5.8 5.5 6.3 6.8 
Bosnia  &  Herzegovina  3.5 6.3 3.9 6.9 6.8 5.5 
Croatia  5.0 4.3 4.2 4.7 5.5 2.4 
Macedonia 2.8  4.1 4.1 4.0 5.9 5.0 
Montenegro  2.5 4.4 4.2 8.6  10.7  7.5 
Serbia  2.4 8.3 5.6 5.2 6.9 5.4 
CIS oil and gas exporters* 
Azerbaijan  10.5 10.4 24.3 30.6 23.4 11.6 
Kazakhstan 9.3  9.6  9.7 10.7 8.9 3.2 
Russia  7.3 7.2 6.4 7.7 8.1 5.6 
Turkmenistan  17.1 14.7 13.0 11.4 11.6  9.8 
CIS Europe Non-natural resource exporters* 
Armenia  14.0 10.5 14.0 13.2 13.8  6.8 
Belarus  7.0 11.5 9.4 10.0 8.6 10.0 
Georgia  11.1 5.9  9.6  9.4 12.4 2.0 
Moldova  6.6 7.4 7.5 4.8 4.0 7.2 
Ukraine  9.6  12.1  2.7 7.3 7.9 2.1 Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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Economy  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
CIS Central Asia Non-natural resource exporters* 
Kyrgyzstan  7.0 7.0 -0.2 3.1 8.5 7.6 
Tajikistan  10.2  10.6  6.7 7.0 7.8 7.9 
Uzbekistan  4.2 7.7 7.0 7.3 9.5 9.0 
Memorandum items 
European  Union  1.5 2.6 2.2 3.4 3.1 1.1 
Central  and  Eastern  Europe  4.9 7.3 6.0 6.6 5.4 2.9 
CIS  and  Mongolia  7.8 8.2 6.7 8.4 8.6 5.5 
Note. Yellow field - IMF staff estimates. 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2009. 
 
41. The record-high growth rates resulted from several overlapping factors, some of 
which had a one-off character. After a period of severe transition-related output 
decline in the 1990s (which was magnified in many countries by the conse-
quences of civil wars and armed conflicts with their neighbors), the post-
communist economies entered a period of rapid output recovery and catching-up 
growth. This was thanks to governments employing simple efficiency reserves, an 
increasing demand for money balances, efficiency gains brought on by the eco-
nomic reforms of the 1990s and a favorable external environment. It is worth re-
membering that almost all emerging market economies benefited from a global 
boom at that time. The boom was a result of market-oriented transition and policy 
reforms conducted in many important developing countries and regions (China, 
India, South East Asia, Latin America, part of Africa), global trade liberalization 
as well as the expansionary monetary policies of the US and other major central 
banks. The latter led to the building up of large global imbalances and the creation 
of numerous assets bubbles, which caused a financial crisis on a scale hardly seen 
in the last 60 years.  
42. When the global boom came to an end in 2007 and the assets bubbles burst, 
nearly the entire world entered a phase of recession, with post-communist econo-
mies being among the most heavily affected, although not immediately (with a 
time lag from six months to one year after the US and Western Europe). As seen 
in Table 3.1, some countries have already recorded a considerable growth decel-
eration in 2008 (for example Croatia, Kazakhstan, Georgia and Ukraine). In the 
first quarter of 2009, most of the transition economies recorded a GDP decline 
(which was sometimes quite substantial as in the case of Ukraine) and they are 
expected to record negative growth rates for all of 2009. Numerous vulnerabilities 
related to structural distortions (such as export monoculture based on basic com-
modities), low competitiveness, weak institutions, a poor business climate, deeply 
rooted corruption, and unfinished reforms which were well masked in the pros-CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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perity era come back again as the key challenges to be addressed by economic 
policy in the near future.  
43. While the length and ultimately, the depth of the current recession are hard to 
predict there is no doubt that for many analyzed countries it will mean at least a 
partial reversal of the development gains accomplished in the last decade. In addi-
tion, it remains quite clear that both the global economy and the analyzed group 
of countries will not return to their previous rapid growth paths any time soon. 
 
 
3.2.  Poverty and income inequality 
 
44. A cross-country comparison of poverty levels is not a methodologically easy task. 
National (relative) poverty lines are useless, reflecting radically different ap-
proaches to the composition of consumer baskets and poverty definitions. Com-
monly used international poverty indicators (such as the percentage of the popula-
tion living on less than USD 1 a day)
7 do not say too much in middle-income 
economies because they relate to small shares of the population (see Table A.3.1 
in the Statistical Annex). However, using an absolute – as opposed to a relative – 
poverty line allows us to focus on those who are deprived of the most basic needs, 
rather than those who may be deprived relative to their better off fellow citizens. 
It also allows us to determine time trends and compare across countries, both of 
which would be difficult if we were using a relative notion of poverty.  
45. The World Bank (2000) argued that a higher poverty line is needed in the Europe 
and Central Asia (ECA) region, given its cooler climate which necessitates addi-
tional expenditures on heating, winter clothing and food. A line of USD 2.15 a 
day was therefore decided upon and subsequently used as a closer approximation 
for basic material needs in ECA (WB, 2000). A higher threshold of USD 4.30 a 
day was also used to capture the “economically vulnerable”, i.e. to measure the 
proportion of the population that is not suffering absolute material deprivation but 
which could become vulnerable in the event of an economic downturn (WB, 
2005a).  
46. For the purpose of this study we used indicators from PovcalNet, a product of the 
World Bank's Development Research Group
8. The recently updated poverty esti-
                                                 
7 The "USD 1 a day" poverty line has been historically based on the poverty lines com-
monly used in low-income countries. The latest line is USD 1.25 a day in 2005 prices, 
which is the mean of the national poverty lines in the poorest 15 countries. 
8 http://go.worldbank.org/A8URN8FWB0.  Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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mates combine the 2005 PPP exchange rates for household consumption from the 
2005 World Bank International Comparison Program with data from 675 house-
hold surveys across 116 developing and transition countries spanning the period 
of 1981-2005.  
47. The majority of the CEE/CIS population living below the world ‘absolute’ 
poverty line (USD 1.25 a day) is concentrated in four Central Asian countries 
(Table A.3.1). Kazakhstan is an exception here. Still, deep poverty is also present, 
although on a smaller scale in the lower-income European CIS countries – Arme-
nia, Georgia and Moldova. Following an oil boom, Azerbaijan managed to reduce 
its poverty between 2001 and 2005
9; Armenia was also able to reduce poverty 
levels during the same period. 
48. During the first half of the 2000s, all of the CIS countries achieved a considerable 
reduction in the depth of poverty (poverty gap) which captures the mean aggre-
gate income or consumption shortfall relative to the poverty line across the whole 
population and provides information regarding how far households are from the 
poverty line. An important step was marked by the reduction of poverty severity 
(squared poverty gap) which takes into account not only the distance separating 
the poor from the poverty line, but also inequality among the poor. That is, a 
higher weight is placed on those households who are further away from the pov-
erty line. The progress, however, was uneven. Some CIS countries such as Azer-
baijan, Armenia, Moldova, Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmeni-
stan reduced their poverty gaps almost twice. At the same time, the progress in 
Georgia and Uzbekistan was not so impressive.  
49. The application of a USD 1.25 threshold to the Western Balkan region provides a 
different picture (please note that Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro are not covered 
by the database). In general, these countries are characterized by very low head-
count poverty indices, which make them similar to lower-income EU NMS like 
Bulgaria and Romania rather than the CIS. Albania represents a different trend: an 
increase in poverty headcount as well as in poverty gap and severity of poverty.  
50. If we assume a higher poverty line (USD 2.15 a day) which is considered to be a 
more appropriate measure of poverty in the region, we will obtain a substantially 
different picture (shown in Table A.3.2. in the Statistical Annex). Over half of the 
population of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and almost 75% in Uzbekistan fall below 
this line, despite a substantial improvement since 2002. The same is also true for 
about one third of the population of Armenia, Georgia and Moldova. In the West-
ern Balkans, poverty levels are lower and confined to a few pockets, with the ex-
                                                 
9 Even given the rapid economic growth in Azerbaijan, the data on sweeping poverty and 
inequality reduction as well as the effectiveness of social assistance programs raise serious 
doubt (see Habibov & Lida Fan, 2006).  CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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ception of Albania and, to some extent, Bosnia and Herzegovina, where poverty 
has even expanded in 2000s. The headcount poverty indicators in Ukraine, Bela-
rus, and Bosnia and Herzegovina look similar to those in Slovakia and Poland, 
while poverty levels in Russia and Macedonia are close to the indicator observed 
in Bulgaria.  
51. This poverty line allows for a better illustration of cross-country differences in the 
depth and severity of poverty. Poverty in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Croatia, Ma-
cedonia and (as of recently) in Azerbaijan is quite shallow, while in Armenia, 
Georgia, Moldova, and Central Asia (except Kazakhstan) it is deep and severe. 
This means more resources will be required to normalize the situation and to fi-
nance the social measures needed for poverty reduction. In fact, the decade of 
2000s demonstrates that high growth rates in the region have resulted in an 
across-the-board substantial reduction of poverty; still, in the countries with se-
vere and deep poverty (the low-income CIS economies) the progress was slower.  
52. Table A.3.3 in the Statistical Annex demonstrates that a reduction in the number 
of people living below the absolute poverty line was not always accompanied by a 
similar trend related to those living between USD 2.15 and 4.30 per day. In Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, the number of economically vulnerable increased markedly; 
in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Kazakhstan the reduction was 
much less substantial than in the case of absolute poverty. By contrast, higher-
income countries of the region – Croatia, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine - reduced 
economic vulnerability substantially. It is worth mentioning the fact that the rap-
idly growing oil-exporting economies – Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan – 
have low or moderate absolute poverty at USD 2.15 a day, but very sizable pov-
erty at USD 4.30 a day. The high prevalence of poverty at USD 4.30 level in these 
countries is a reflection of their high vulnerability to economic downturns, which, 
as the 1998 financial crisis in Russia has shown, could easily lead to a doubling of 
absolute poverty during a given year (WB, 2005a). The same may happen as a 
result of the recent financial crisis and recession, which is quite heavily hitting 
countries such as Ukraine or Russia. 
53. Figure 3.1 and Table A.3.4 in the Statistical Annex demonstrate that inequality is 
highly interrelated with poverty persistence. Countries with high and persistent 
poverty rates have at the same time high inequality in income/ consumption dis-
tribution (Georgia, Moldova, Central Asia with the exception of Kazakhstan). 
This is demonstrated by two indicators – the Gini coefficient and income/ con-
sumption distribution between the lowest and the highest income deciles –whose 
high values indicate a large gap between the poor (extremely poor) and non-poor.  
 Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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For notes and sources, see Table A.3.4 in the Statistical Annex. 
 
54. The period of rapid economic growth in the 2000s either did not markedly reduce 
inequality (Ukraine, Kazakhstan) or resulted in higher inequality (Russia, Geor-
gia, Central Asia except Kazakhstan, most of the Western Balkans except Croa-
tia), even accounting for the temporal lag. In fact, only a few countries (Croatia, 
Armenia, and Belarus) managed to reduce inequality during the analyzed period. 
In contrast, current Gini coefficients for Russia, Georgia, Macedonia and Uzbeki-
stan are comparable to those observed in Benin, Djibouti or Cambodia. In coun-
tries where income disparities are large, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to 
quickly increase the incomes of poor families without some reduction in income 
differentials.  
55. It is still unclear how the recent financial and macroeconomic crisis will affect 
income distribution. In comparison with the period of financial crises in the late 
1990s, one might expect a further increase in inequality which would make the 
economic situation of the poor even more dramatic. However, even if inequality 
does not increase further, social policy will face the challenge of helping the in-
creasing number of poor with increasingly limited resources. 
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3.3.  Inflation 
 
56. Most transition countries experienced high inflation or even hyperinflation in the 
early 1990s. In the 2000s, inflation has not been a big problem in the Western 
Balkans (except Serbia) but it has not reached a sustainable one-digit level in the 
CIS (except Armenia) - see Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2. Consumer price index, annual growth rate, end of period 
Economy  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Western Balkans 
Albania  3.3 2.2 2.0 2.5 3.1 2.2 
Bosnia  &  Herzegovina  0.5 0.6 4.3 4.6 4.9 3.8 
Croatia  1.7 2.7 3.6 2.0 5.8 5.8 
Kosovo       10.4  0.5 
Macedonia 2.7  -2.1 1.6 3.0 6.7 4.1 
Montenegro  6.2 4.2 1.8 2.0 6.3 7.2 
Serbia  7.8 13.7  17.7 6.6 11.0 8.6 
CIS (Europe) 
Armenia  8.6 2.0 -0.2 5.2 6.6 5.2 
Azerbaijan  3.6 10.4 5.5 11.4  19.5  15.4 
Belarus  25.4  14.4 7.9  6.6 12.1  13.3 
Georgia  7.0 7.5 6.2 8.8  11.0  5.5 
Moldova  15.7 12.6 10.1 14.1 13.1  7.3 
Russia  12.0 11.7 10.9  9.0  11.9 13.3 
Ukraine  8.2  12.2 10.3 11.6 16.6 22.3 
CIS (Central Asia) 
Kazakhstan 6.8  6.7  7.5 8.4  18.8 9.5 
Kyrgyzstan  5.6 2.8 4.9 5.1  20.1  20.1 
Tajikistan  13.7 5.7  7.1 12.5  19.8  11.8 
Turkmenistan  3.1  9.0 10.4 7.1  8.6 12.0 
Uzbekistan  7.8  9.1  12.3 11.4 11.9 14.4 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2009. Data for Kosovo: IMF 
(2009). 
 
57. The relative disinflation success of Western Balkan countries originated from their 
currency pegs to the Euro (or directly using the Euro as a national currency in Mon-
tenegro and Kosovo), which gained strength in the analyzed period of 2003-2007. 
On the contrary, most of the CIS currencies followed the weakening US dollar 
which resulted in importing inflation (together with the effect of high international 
commodity prices and capital inflows). The two countries which went against their 
sub-regional monetary policy patterns (Serbia and Armenia) indirectly confirm the 
above finding. Serbia chose the flexible exchange rate regime in order to run a more 
accommodative monetary policy and to be able to devalue its currency (dinar) and, Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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as a result, recorded higher inflation compared to its neighbors. Armenia moved to 
partial floating in order to follow a direct inflation targeting and keep (successfully) 
inflation on a lower level than other CIS countries.  
58. The surge of commodity prices between 2006 and mid-2008 reversed the previous 
disinflation trend in almost the entire region but with more serious inflationary 
consequences for the CIS than the Western Balkans. The culmination of this trend 
was recorded in the summer of 2008 when commodity prices reached their high-
est levels and the USD/EUR exchange rate hit bottom. In some CIS countries 
(Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan) the annual inflation approached the level of 
30% in the summer months of 2008.  
59. The global financial crisis, worldwide recession and strengthening US dollar 
contributed to easing inflationary pressure in the region, starting from the fourth 
quarter of 2008. However, an individual country inflation record depends very 
much on its exchange rate policy. In countries which accepted a devaluation/ de-
preciation of their currencies, the disinflation path is much slower than in those 
continuing previous pegs to the EUR or USD. 
 
 
3.4.  Fiscal deficit and its financing 
 
60. A complete and fully comparable fiscal dataset for all analyzed countries does not 
exist
10. In this situation we present two tables – one that is comparable but incom-
plete based on GFS statistics (Table 3.3) and another based on various secondary 
sources (Table 3.4), which is complete but is not fully comparable across coun-
tries. As both tables reflect approximately the same trends, they allow us to draw 
some conclusions regarding fiscal deficits and their dynamics.  
61. The size of general government (GG) balances has been determined by several 
factors, including:  
•  Rapid GDP growth (see Section 3.1); Gray et al. (2007) found that an 
improvement in the fiscal balance of 1 percentage point of GDP is asso-
ciated, on average, with a 0.4–0.5 percentage point increase in the rate of 
GDP growth, or a compounded gain over 10 years of about 4.6 percent-
age points of GDP;  
•  High oil and gas prices in the case of major exporters (see Section 3.8);  
                                                 
10 The IMF Government Financial Statistics (GFS) database covers only 11 countries while 
the World Bank World Development Indicators database – 12. In both cases data series are 
not complete. CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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•  Size of official external assistance for the poorer countries and debt ser-
vicing.  
62. As seen in Figure 3.2, the fiscal position in many of the analyzed countries was 
better than the average figures for the EU and EU NMS, which could be attributed 
to their rapid economic growth in the 2000s. However, the global financial crisis 
has dramatically reversed this favorable cyclical tendency, reducing revenues and 
forcing governments to increase expenditures.  
63. By 2007, 11 countries, including major oil and gas producers (Russia, Kazakh-
stan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan), generated sizeable GG surpluses 
that helped in debt reduction and, in the case of energy exporters, in the accumu-
lation of oil stabilization funds (sizable in the cases of Kazakhstan and Russia, 
smaller in Azerbaijan and Belarus). Other countries, however, ran GG deficits, 
which were sizable in the cases of Albania, Croatia, Armenia, Georgia, Tajikistan 
and Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and, to a certain extent Croatia. These countries 
achieved substantial progress in deficit reduction at the end of the analyzed period 
but their overall balance still remains negative. Tajikistan and, to smaller extent, 
Moldova recorded a substantial deterioration of their fiscal balances (see Figure 
3.2 and Table A.3.5 in the Statistical Annex). In Moldova, the scale of this dete-
rioration amounted to 2 percentage points of GDP over the period of 2003 – 2007 
and it reflected an increase in debt servicing payments to official creditors follow-
ing the Paris Club agreement in May 2007
 (DG ECFIN, 2007a). 
 
Table 3.3. GG cash surplus/deficit, per cent of GDP (GFS data) 
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Western Balkans 
Albania   ..  ..  ..  -3.50 -3.33 -3.52 
Croatia    -3.14 -3.85 -3.89 -2.80 -1.80 -1.12 
CIS Europe 
Armenia   ..  -0.65  -0.79  -0.72  -0.26  .. 
Belarus   ..  -0.60  0.59  0.19  1.69  .. 
Georgia   ..  -0.88  0.80  1.40  1.70  0.31 
Moldova   0.53  2.42  0.34  1.39  -0.46  -0.17 
Russia   1.24  1.72  5.22  10.21  8.67  .. 
Ukraine   0.53  0.01  -3.41  -1.33  -1.01  -0.25 
CIS Central Asia 
Kazakhstan   0.18  -0.49  -0.02  2.11  1.87  1.66 
Kyrgyzstan   ..  ..  ..  ..  -0.49  .. 
Tajikistan   ..  -10.49  -13.28  ..  ..  .. 
Note. Data in italics indicates that data are preliminary or provisional. 
Source: IMF Government Finance Statistics Online. 
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For notes and sources, see Table A.3.5 in the Statistical Annex. 
 
64. Due to their limited access to international borrowing markets, the analyzed 
countries use mostly domestic financing (see Table A.3.6 in the Statistical An-
nex)
11. However, foreign borrowing played an important role in Ukraine (prior to 
the 2008 crisis), Moldova (loans from international organizations in 2007), Geor-
gia (foreign government credit), and Armenia (international organizations in 
2006). In the Western Balkans, foreign sources are not as significant as in the 
European CIS. With the financial crisis hitting emerging markets, the external 
sources of private financing are drying up. On the other hand, the IMF and World 
Bank obtained additional resources to support emerging market economies in dis-
tress
12 (see Chapter 6 on the role of both institutions). 
 
                                                 
11 Comparable time series on the structure and sources of general government deficit fi-
nancing can be derived from the governments’ “Statements on sources and uses of cash” 
(contained in the GFS database) but they cover only a part of the sample countries. Thus, 
to identify sources of deficit financing, we used the GFS database, identifying net cash 
inflow from financial activities and subdividing it by domestic and foreign inflows. In 
addition, GFS data allowed exploring the roles of various institutional agents, both domes-
tic and foreign, in balancing general government net cash flows. 
12 As of June 30, 2009, 7 countries were subject to IMF programs: Armenia, Belarus, Geor-
gia, Kyrgyzstan, Serbia, Tajikistan and Ukraine – see 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/extarr11.aspx?memberKey1=ZZZZ&date1key=2020-
02-28. CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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3.5.  Public debt 
 
65. Declining fiscal deficits allowed all of the countries to noticeably reduce their 
public debt (see Figure 3.3). By the end of 2007, the average debt-to-GDP ratio in 
most countries more than halved as compared with 2003 and reached very low 
levels in the oil and gas exporting countries. Public debt in the majority of non-
oil/ non-gas economies also stayed at a relatively low level and did not exceed 
30% or so of GDP. This improvement has been largely driven by strong macro-
economic performance since 2002, evidenced by high real GDP and export 
growth, currency appreciation, and record-low interest rates on international mar-
kets. In addition, some previously highly indebted countries (for example, Arme-
nia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) obtained debt relief from their official creditors 
(CIS-7, 2004).  
 


































* Data for 2006. For notes and sources, see Table A.3.7 in the Statistical Annex.  
 
66. In 2007, only in Kyrgyzstan and Albania did the proportion of public debt to GDP 
stay in the range of 50 - 60%, followed by Croatia and Tajikistan (in the range of 
30 - 40%). All other countries recorded levels below 30% of GDP, and in case of 
oil and gas exporters, below 10%. On average, the public debt to GDP level in 
both the Western Balkans and the CIS was well below OECD and EU averages.  Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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67. The sovereign debt market was easily accessible in the early and mid 2000s due 
to excessive global liquidity, low international interest rates, and low risk premia. 
However, this changed quite dramatically in the second half of 2008 when the 
global financial crisis hit emerging market economies. This caused sudden capital 
outflows, higher risk premia and a higher cost of borrowing, a fall in commodity 
prices, a diminishing inflow of remittances and a depreciation of most currencies 
in CEE/CIS. As a result, debt-to-GDP ratios in many countries are expected to 
increase dramatically in 2009-2010, reversing most of the previous gains. For ex-
ample, in Ukraine, this ratio is expected to increase from 15% in 2007 to over 
40% in 2009. Some countries may be unable not only to finance new deficit but 
also to rollover existing debt obligations. Even when the current crisis ends it is 




3.6.  Levels and dynamics of total public revenues and expenditures 
 
68. As seen in Figure 3.4,
13 the shares of both GG revenues and expenditures in GDP 
were either stable or even increased (Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and, to a lesser 
extent, Belarus). This occurred despite extraordinarily high rates of economic 
growth, which meant very expansionary fiscal policies and an increasing size of 
government (but also improved administrative capacity for collecting revenue in 
comparison with the 1990s). Russia was the only exception: the total GG expendi-
tures declined by some 16 percentage points of GDP between 2002 and 2006.  
69. The size of public spending varies across the analyzed countries and is positively 
correlated with (1) per capita income and (2) proximity to Europe (Gray et al., 
2007). A worldwide pattern is that the share of primary GG expenditures in GDP 
is positively correlated with per capita GDP (measured in PPP terms) – the so-
called Wagner law. Figure 3.5 provides a more complete cross-country picture of 
total GG expenditure based on sources other than IMF GFS data.  
70. Total public expenditures during the observed period ranged from almost one-half 
of GDP in Croatia (and other post-Yugoslav countries like Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, Serbia and Macedonia) to less than one fourth of GDP in Armenia, Kazakh-
stan, and Tajikistan. The latter figures are not only far below what is common in 
EU countries (generally above 40% of GDP), but even in Russia (30-35%).  
                                                 
13 A comparable dataset on public revenue and expenditure is incomplete. The best source, 
i.e. the IMF GFS contains data (sometimes incomplete) for only 11 countries. CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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Albania Croatia Armenia Belarus Georgia  Moldova  Russia Ukraine  Kazakhstan  Kyrgyzstan  Tajikistan* 
GG Expenditures 2003 GG Revenues 2003 GG Expenditures 2006 GG Revenues 2006
 
* Data for 2003 and 2004. 
Source: IMF Government Finance Statistics Online. 
 



































Source: All countries except Kosovo: WHO online database 
(http://www.who.int/nha/country/en/), and own computations. Kosovo: World Bank 
(2008), Kosovo. Health Financing Reform Study, Tables 2.1 and 4.2 adjusted to WHO 
tables; GDP & budget 2000-2003: Fact Sheet Kosovo (May 2003), www.unmikonline.org, 
and own computations. 
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71. Overall, however, governments in the analyzed countries tend to be large by 
international standards. With the exception of the low-income CIS countries, the 
average size of public sector spending in the region is above that of other coun-
tries at similar levels of per capita income, and well above the high-growth coun-
tries outside the region. According to Gray et al. (2007), most of the Western Bal-
kan and middle-income CIS countries lie above the international trend line, and 
only the low-income CIS countries lie below it. 
72. The large size of governments partly reflects socialist legacies, especially a 
history of state-sponsored provision of welfare security throughout the life cycle 
(see Chapter 4). On the other hand, in countries where post-communist social 
safety nets collapsed in early the years of transition (as result of armed conflicts 
or hyperinflations), social spending increased again in recent years, partly due to 
population ageing that put pressure on higher spending for pensions and health. In 
Western Balkan countries, more generous social protection schemes tend to mir-
ror those in higher-income EU countries rather than the more modest programs in 
the CIS middle-income countries (Gray et al., 2007). 
 
 
3.7.  Structure of public revenues 
 
73. Total GG revenues, including grants, ranged from approximately 48% of GDP in 
Belarus to about 19% of GDP in Armenia in 2006-2007 (Table 3.4)
14. On aver-
age, total GG revenues are higher in the Western Balkans (where their percentage 
in GDP is close to many of the EU member states) than in the European CIS 
countries. In most countries analyzed, the share of total GG revenues in GDP 
tends to grow overtime due to a broadening tax base (including resource-based 
taxes) and improvements in tax collection.  
74. There is also considerable variation within sub-regions (by a factor of two): in the 
Western Balkans it ranges from 46% of GDP in Croatia to 25.6% of GDP in Al-
bania; in the middle-income CIS it ranges from 21.8% of GDP in Kazakhstan to 
48% of GDP in Belarus; while in the low-income CIS countries the range is from 
19.9% of GDP in Armenia to 41.8% of GDP in Moldova.  
75. The share of tax revenues in total revenues is generally lower in comparison with 
EU countries (see Table 3.4), varying from 53.6% in Ukraine to 82.0% in Kazakh-
stan. The share of tax revenues relative to GDP is substantially smaller compared to 
the EU average (39.6% in 2005), especially in Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakh-
                                                 
14 IMF GFS database provides comparable cross-country data for 13 countries only.  CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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stan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. In most countries, non-tax revenues and grants 
(from foreign donors) account for a considerable part of GG revenues.  
 
Table 3.4. Structure of GG revenue (on the basis of government operations) 
% GDP  % of total revenues 






















2005 24.9 17.7 4.4  0.8  2.0 71.2  17.6 3.0  8.1  Albania 
2007 25.8 18.9 4.2  0.1  2.5 73.2  16.5 0.5  9.8 
2005 42.1 23.6 12.4  0.4  5.6 56.2  29.5 1.0 13.3  Bosnia & Her-
zegovina**  2007 45.4 25.6 13.4  0.2  6.2 56.3  29.6 0.4 13.7 
2003 45.0 27.1 13.8  0.0  4.1 60.3  30.7 0.0  9.0  Croatia 
2007 46.1 26.7 13.5  0.2  5.7 57.9  29.4 0.4 12.4 
Serbia & Mon-
tenegro  2002 43.2 28.2 11.0  1.0  3.1 65.1  25.4 2.2  7.3 
CIS Europe 
2003* 21.7 14.4  2.8  3.2  1.3 66.6  12.7  14.6 6.2  Armenia 
2006 19.9 14.8 2.3  0.6  2.2 74.4  11.3 3.2 11.2 
2003 45.8 33.8 10.6  0.0  1.4 73.8  23.2 0.0  3.0  Belarus 
2006 48.2 34.0 11.7  0.0  2.5 70.5  24.3 0.0  5.2 
2004 23.1 15.6 4.1  1.3  2.1 67.5  17.7 5.5  9.3  Georgia 
2007 29.3 21.6 4.2  0.6  2.8 73.8  14.5 2.1  9.6 
2003 34.1 20.7 7.2  0.0  6.2 60.8  21.0 0.0 18.2  Moldova 
2007 41.8 25.7 9.6  1.8  4.7 61.4  23.0 4.3 11.4 
2003** 40.1 22.5  8.4  0.0  9.2 56.2  20.8 0.0 23.0  Russia 
2006 40.4 26.5 5.6  0.0  8.2 65.7  13.9 0.0 20.4 
2003 38.0 20.5 11.2  0.1  6.3 53.8  29.4 0.2 16.5  Ukraine 
2007 42.2 22.7 13.1  0.0  6.5 53.6  31.0 0.0 15.3 
CIS Central Asia 
2003 21.5 20.5 0.0  0.0  1.0 95.5 0.0  0.0  4.5  Kazakhstan 
2007 21.8 17.9 0.0  0.0  3.9 82.0 0.0  0.0 17.9 
Kyrgyzstan 2006  21.9  16.6  0.0  0.2 5.0  75.9  0.0 1.1  23.0 
2003 17.3 12.8 1.7  0.3  2.5 74.1 9.7  1.8 14.4  Tajikistan 
2004 17.9 12.7 1.8  0.7  2.8 70.7 9.8  3.7 15.8 
Note. Revenues are reported on the cash basis of reporting unless indicated otherwise, * 
Data are provisional or preliminary, ** Accrual basis of reporting. 
Sources: Revenue data - from IMF Government Finance Statistics Online; GDP data - 
from IMF World Economic Outlook database. 
 
76. The proportion of indirect taxation
15 to GDP is relatively high by international 
standards and close to the EU average (ca. 14% GDP) in Albania, Georgia, Kyr-
gyzstan, Russia, and Ukraine (see Table 3.5). Only a few countries remain below 
                                                 
15 Taxes on goods and services and taxes on international trade and transactions (codes 
114+115). Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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this threshold, including Armenia, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. In the first two, 
relative collection of excise tax (Armenia) and VAT (Kazakhstan) decreased over 
the analyzed period. The share of taxes on international trade and transactions was 
especially high in Russia (taxes on exported oil and gas). Countries of the former 
Yugoslavia introduced VAT much later in comparison with other transition 
economies, some of them (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia) only 
in the decade of 2000s. The high reliance on “classical” indirect taxes (VAT and 
excise) can make budgets relatively more immune against the negative conse-
quences of economic downturn observed in 2009. The same cannot be said, how-
ever, about resource taxation where government revenues collapsed quite dra-
matically as a result of declining oil and gas prices.  
 
Table 3.5. Structure of tax revenues in per cent of GDP (latest year available)  































2007 2007 2007 2002 2006 2006 2007 2007 2006 2007 2007 2006 2004 
111 
Taxes on income, 
profits, and capital 
gains   
3.9 1.4 6.8 5.9 3.8 7.8 6.4 5.2  10.3 9.9 7.7  3.1  1.7 
1111  Payable by indi-
viduals   1.5 0.6 3.6 5.5 1.3 3.1 3.1 2.5 3.5 5.0 1.7  1.6  1.1 
1112 
Payable by corpo-
rations and other 
enterprises  
2.4 0.6 3.2 0.5 2.5 4.2 3.3 2.8 6.4 4.9 6.0  1.3  0.6 
112 Taxes on payroll and 
workforce   0.0 1.3 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3  0.0  0.0 
113  Taxes  on  property    0.0 0.5 0.4 1.9 0.2 1.6 0.6 0.4 1.0 0.2 0.6  0.5  0.2 
114 Taxes on goods and 
services   13.4 22.3 18.7 16.2 6.1 18.6 14.1 18.3 6.7 10.9 5.5  10.6  9.1 
1141  General taxes on 
goods and services  9.0   13.8 10.8 5.6  13.9 11.6 14.2 5.6  8.3  4.9  9.2  7.4 
11411  Value-added  taxes 9.0    13.7 0.0 5.6 9.3  11.6 14.2 5.6 8.3 4.9  8.0  5.7 
11412  Sales  taxes    0.0    0.1 8.2 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.7  1.7 
11413 
Turnover and other 
general taxes on 
goods and services 
0.0    0.0 2.6 0.0 4.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.4  0.0 
1142  Excises    2.9    4.4 4.8 0.5 3.6 2.5 2.6 1.0 1.5 0.5  1.1  0.9 
115 
Taxes on interna-
tional trade and 
transactions  
1.0 0.0 0.6 2.5 0.6 2.6 0.3 1.7 8.6 1.6 1.2  2.5  1.6 
1151  Customs and other 
import duties   1.0 0.0 0.6 2.5 0.6 1.8 0.3 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.0  2.5  1.6 
1152  Taxes  on  exports    0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 7.1 0.0 0.1  0.0  0.0 
1153  Profits of export or 
import monopolies  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 
1154  Exchange  profits    0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 
116  Other  taxes    0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 4.0 2.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6  0.0  0.0 
Note. * Accrual basis of reporting. 
Source: IMF Government Finance Statistics Online. CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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77. Direct tax collection was relatively high in middle-income CIS countries, as well 
as in Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, although in none of these countries did it 
reach the EU average (ca. 13% of GDP). In all other countries, it remained at a 
low level and ranged from 1.8% of GDP in Tajikistan to 7% of GDP in Georgia.  
78. Social security contributions are particularly important as a source of GG reve-
nues in the Western Balkans (in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia) as 
well as in several middle-income CIS countries such as Belarus and Ukraine, 
where respective shares in GDP recently attained the EU average (ca. 12% of 
GDP). In Moldova, these shares also grew recently, approaching the European 
level. In the remaining countries, these percentages are extremely low or non-
existent, while Russia recently recorded a decrease.  
 
Table 3.6. Labor Taxes in CIS and Western Balkans, 2006 
Social security contributions  Economy  Tax 




Albania   33.4  30.4   11.5  1.6  
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(FBH)   34.9  14.5   25.5  0.0  
Croatia   40.3  17.2   20.0  10.0  
Macedonia 41.4  47.1   0.0  13.8  
Serbia & Montenegro 
(Serbia)   42.2 17.9    17.9 14.0   
CIS Europe 
Armenia   38.5  22.0   15.0  10.0  
Azerbaijan   29.8  22.0   4.0  10.4  
Belarus   35.5  39.6   1.0  9.0  
Georgia   26.7  20.0   0.0  12.0  
Moldova   32.4  28.0   5.0   8.5  
Russia  31.0  26.0   0.0  13.0  
Ukraine   39.2  38.0   3.5   12.5  
CIS Central Asia 
Kazakhstan   28.2  17.0   10.0   6.0  
Kyrgyzstan  31.6  21.0   8.0   9.2  
Tajikistan   29.6  27.0   1.0   9.6  
Uzbekistan   38.0  25.0   2.5   20.0  
Note. FBH = Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is one of two entities that con-
stitute Bosnia and Herzegovina. The other entity, Republika Srpska, is not covered in this 
table as data are not available. 
a Data refer to effective rates on average wage. 
Source: Gray et al. (2007). 
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79. Social security contributions added to the personal income tax creating a so-called 
tax wedge, presented as a percentage of total labor cost
16. The size of the tax 
wedge determines labor market flexibility and influences, indirectly, the size of 
the informal economy. According to Table 3.6, it is the highest in Western Balkan 
countries, especially in Serbia, Macedonia and Croatia and quite high in Armenia, 
Ukraine and Uzbekistan. On the other end, in Georgia, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan 
its size is below 30% of total labor costs.  
80. In recent years, many CIS and SEE countries have undertaken reforms of their 
social security systems with the explicit aim of reducing the tax wedge on labor 
and improving labor market incentives. Their examples are presented in Box 3.1.  
 
Box 3.1. Examples of social security reforms 
Albania. In 2006, Albania reduced social security contributions by 9 percentage points, 
including a 6 percentage point reduction in pension contributions (to 23.5%) and a 3 per-
centage point reduction in unemployment insurance (to 2%). The cut in contributions was 
coupled with a substantial rise in pensions (20% for rural and 5% for urban pensions). 
The government is prepared to cover any emerging deficit, which will mean a partial 
switch from a contribution financed - to general revenue - financed system. 
Armenia. Like in many low-income countries, Armenia suffers from ineffective revenue 
collection due to poor administrative capacity. To address this problem contribution col-
lection was moved from the social security system to general tax administration. The 
effect of this change was significant: in 2005, when the reform was implemented, social 
security payments increased by 34% (compared with growth in nominal GDP of 18%).  
Croatia. Croatia has gradually reduced the tax wedge on labor through a substantial re-
duction in both social security contributions and PIT rates. Social security contributions 
paid by the employer were reduced to 17.2% in 2004, whereas those paid by the em-
ployee to 20% in 2004. Simultaneously, the effective PIT rate (for a worker with the av-
erage wage) was cut to 10% in 2004. In 2004 the pension contribution accounted for 20% 
of worker gross wage and was paid only by the employee. A further 2.5 percentage point 
reduction in social security contributions was achieved by moving the child benefit out of 
the social insurance system and switching to general tax financing. There has been no 
reduction in the health insurance contribution rate (15% of gross wage), although cur-
rently it is paid only by the employer. Similarly, unemployment insurance (1.7%) was not 
reduced, but it is currently paid only by the employer, with the total rate unchanged. 
Overall, Croatia has maintained a roughly even split between the employer and employee 
shares in social security contributions, in contrast to other countries where social security 
contributions are still largely paid by the employer. 
Georgia. In 2004, Georgia simplified and consolidated its social security system and in-
troduced a unified 20% social security contribution paid only by the employer. The re-
form entailed a 3 percentage point reduction in the total social security contribution (in-
cluding the elimination of a 1% unemployment insurance contribution paid by the   
 
                                                 
16 Defined as gross wage plus employer’s social security contributions; gross wage is the 
net wage plus the employee's social security contributions and the personal income tax.  CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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employee) and a consolidation of various contributions (pension, health, unemployment) 
into a single one. Reduction in the contribution rate was coupled with measures to im-
prove the system’s efficiency. Nonetheless, the social security system requires budgetary 
transfers to cover the gap between expenditures and revenues. In addition to lower tax 
rates, a substantial liberalization of the labor code, which went into effect in 2006, en-
ticed many firms to move from the informal to the formal sector. As a result, social secu-
rity revenues have increased. 
Kyrgyzstan. In 2005, Kyrgyzstan moved away from contribution financing to general tax 
financing of unemployment and other social security benefits (but not pensions). The 
Employment Fund and the Social Insurance Fund were eliminated, and the responsibility 
for paying the relevant benefits was taken over by the government budget. This allowed 
the government to lower the rate of social security contributions paid by the employer 
from 25 to 23%. The rate paid by the employee remained unchanged at 8%. 
Source: Gray et al. (2007). 
 
81. In the mid-2000s, other revenues, i.e. revenues from government services
17 and 
from state-owned enterprises
18 ranged from 0.97% of GDP (Kazakhstan, 2007) to 
8.24% of GDP (Russia, 2006). They were also high in Ukraine, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Croatia, and Moldova. In the decade of 2000s, dependence on foreign 
grants as a source of government revenues decreased radically in the region. In 




3.8.  Oil and gas related revenues 
 
82. Oil and natural gas production and export play very important roles in the eco-
nomic development of at least four CIS economies: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Rus-
sia and Turkmenistan. The share of revenues from fossil fuel exports in GG reve-
nues in Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan remained high throughout the whole 
analyzed period and tended to grow in line with the improvements in the terms of 
trade until mid-2008 (see Table 3.7).  
                                                 
17 This includes sales by market establishments, administrative fees, incidental sales by 
non-market establishments, and imputed sales of goods and services covering, but is not 
limited to revenues from government services (GFS Manual, 2001).  
18 This item incorporates income received when a unit places a financial asset or a tangible 
nonproduced asset that it owns at the disposal of another unit, and includes types of prop-
erty income such as interest, dividends, withdrawals from income of quasi-corporations, 
property income attributed to insurance policyholders, and rent (GFS Manual, 2001).  
19 The available database does not cover Kosovo, where the importance of foreign grants is 
probably still higher.  Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
 
CASE Network Reports No. 92  56 
Table 3.7. Oil exporters: GG oil revenue, % of GDP and total revenue. GG non-oil 
fiscal balance (% of non-oil GDP) 
   Russia   Azerbaijan¹ Kazakhstan  Turkmenistan  
% GDP  6.5  10.1  7  .. 
% General govt revenue 21.3  37.8  28.6  ..  2004 
General govt non-oil 
fiscal balance  -2.9 -13.2  -6.5  -9.9 
% GDP  10.4  9.8  10.6  .. 
% General govt revenue 31.1  39  37.7  ..  2005 
General govt non-oil 
fiscal balance  -5.1 -12.9  -7.4  -12.3 
% GDP  11.3  14.2  10.2  .. 
% General govt revenue 32.7  50.8  37.1  ..  2006 
General govt non-oil 
fiscal balance  -4.5 -31.3  -4.3  -7.4 
% GDP  9.2*  15.8*  9.5  .. 
% General govt revenue 26.6  53.4*  32.1  ..  2007 
General govt non-oil 
fiscal balance  -5.5*² -31.7*  -6.6*  -6.4* 
Note. * Preliminary estimates; ¹ Central government revenue. Includes SOCAR tax credits 
for energy subsidies; excludes VAT and excise taxes on oil and gas; ² Excludes on-off tax 
receipts from Yukos. 
Sources: Data on GG non-oil fiscal balance are from REO-MECA (2008), IMF (2007; 
2008a, 2008b, 2008c). 
 
83. By comparing the data on government non-oil fiscal balances of oil and gas 
exporting countries (Table 3.7) with GG budget balances presented in section 3.5, 
we can clearly see that their budget surpluses were predominantly oil-driven. Rus-
sia’s strong headline fiscal surplus was achieved on the back of high energy 
prices, and in spite of the fiscal expansion before the 2007-2008 electoral cycle. 
At the same time, Russia’s non-oil deficit widened in 2006 to nearly 7% of GDP, 
from less than 6% in 2005. Azerbaijan, the second major energy exporter, contin-
ued its fiscal expansion until 2008. The GG surplus increased further in 2006 (to 
more than 3% of GDP), but this result was achieved at a time when fiscal revenue 
increased by 88%! Also, the assets of the Azerbaijan State Oil Fund, where part 
of the oil windfall was accumulated, rose much slower than nominal GDP and, at 
the end of 2006, its size in relation to GDP amounted to 7%, down from about 
11% the year before. At the same time, a similar oil fund in Russia increased at a 
much faster pace and exceeded 9% of GDP (DG ECFIN, 2007a). In Belarus, the 
government saved most of the fiscal windfall generated by exports of refined oil 
products in its own stabilization fund (called the National Development Fund), in 
view of the expected (and confirmed) end of the special arrangements with Russia 
on exports of oil products.  CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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84. The collapse of international oil prices in the third quarter of 2008 radically 
changed the fiscal outlook of oil producing countries. REO-EU (2009, Table 2, p. 
8) estimates and forecasts Russia’s GG balance is going to change from +4.3% in 
2008 (already down from +6.8% in 2007) to – 6.2% in 2009. In the case of Ka-
zakhstan, the GG surplus already went down from +7.2% in 2006 to +1.1% in 
2008 and is expected to deteriorate further to -2.0% in 2009. In Azerbaijan a cen-
tral government (CG) surplus of 22.4% of GDP in 2008 will be replaced by a 
deficit of 1.5% of GDP. In Turkmenistan, the CG surplus will deteriorate from 
+11% to 5% of GDP (REO-MECA, 2009, Table 6, p. 41). So far Russia seems to 
be the most seriously affected among the four analyzed countries, and the Oil 
Stabilization Fund it accumulated in the 2000s may have to be totally spent in 
2009-2010. Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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4. Structure and Dynamics of 
Public Expenditures 
85. This chapter contains an analysis of how a government’s resources are spent, and 
answered questions such as: What are the sectoral and intra-sectoral priorities? To 
what extent can they help to reduce poverty? Do they help reduce or increase ine-
quality? Do they target those who are truly in need? Do they address the sources 
of poverty and inequality or only their symptoms? Which population groups are 
preferred? What is the political economy of public expenditure policies? 
 
 
4.1.  Structure of expenditures by sector 
 
86. The structure of government expenditure can be analyzed using either an eco-
nomic or functional classification. The first classification identifies the types of 
expenses incurred for the production (or purchase from a third party) of goods and 
services and their distribution (or cash transfer) to households so they can pur-
chase the goods and services directly. These include the compensation of employ-
ees, the use of goods and services, and the consumption of fixed capital, all of 
which relate to the costs of production undertaken by the government itself. They 
also include subsidies, grants, social benefits, and other miscellaneous expenses 
related to transfers in cash or in kind and purchases of goods and services from 
third parties for delivery to other units (see Tables A.4.1 and A.4.3 in the Statisti-
cal Annex). The functional classification provides information about the purpose 
for which expenses are incurred (Tables A.4.2 and A.4.4 in the Statistical Annex). 
Box 4.1 provides comments on data constraints in this type of analysis.  
87. Both the economic and functional breakdown of expenditures clearly demon-
strates that social benefits are the major spending item in most countries under 
review. They are defined as transfers in cash or in kind to protect the entire popu-
lation or specific segments from various social risks. The examples include un-
employment compensation or publicly financed pensions. They are classified ac-
cording to the type of scheme governing their payment, which are: social security, 
social assistance, and employment social insurance schemes. As a rule, the larger CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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the size of government (relative to GDP), the larger the share of public resources 
spent on social benefits (the correlation is R= 0.71 for the latest year available).  
 
Box 4.1. Data constraints in expenditure analysis 
The information on GG expenditure structure provided in Tables A.4.1 and A.4.2 gener-
ates several comments in respect to availability and comparability of data sources: 
•  In some countries, budgetary reforms are still unfinished and national statistics do not 
correspond to the IMF GFS standards; thus, direct comparison could be misleading 
for these countries, even when the data is derived from the GFS database (e.g. data on 
environmental protection expenditure).  
•  For the above reasons, the investments (or capital expenditures) component in the GG 
expenditure structure by economic type (Table A.4.2) is not, strictly speaking, compa-
rable across countries. Since the data on GG capital expenditures are not available 
from the GFS database, they were substituted by their closest proxy, net acquisition of 
non-financial assets.  
•  Several countries do not have budgetary statistics in the GFS database, so for these 
countries data has been derived from the IMF/World Bank country reports. The latter, 
as a rule, do not contain all the necessary expenditure data to cover all social-related 
outlays. Thus, a more detailed structure of expenditures could only be presented for 
countries covered by the GFS database.  
•  For several countries not covered by GFS datasets, data on GG expenditures are struc-
tured (in WB/IMF reports) according to varying national classifications, or provided 
as a percentage of GDP only. This made it difficult to present complete budget ex-
penditure structures, especially when classified by function. 
•  Data on budget expenditures on communal services, such as water and sanitation in-
frastructure (Housing & Community Amenities), do not necessarily reveal real cash 
flows in this under-reformed sector, at least in CIS countries. An interpretation of this 
expenditure data requires an in-depth knowledge of the performance and reform status 
of this sector in each individual country. Because of limited cross-country and over-
time comparability, we rely mainly on real sector indicators (if available) and on 
qualitative and anecdotal evidence (see Section 4.4). 
 
88. However, there are differences between countries (see Table A.4.1). Three 
countries (Croatia, Serbia, and Ukraine) are close to the EU-27 average of 19.1% 
of GDP in 2007
20, and a few others either exceed or are close to the10% of GDP 
level (Bosnia & Herzegovina, Belarus, Montenegro, Moldova, and Russia). In the 
Caucasus and Central Asia CIS, social benefits account for far less than 10% of 
GDP.  
89. The above picture is somewhat blurred because in some countries, payments of 
pension benefits by autonomous and non-autonomous pension funds are treated as 
                                                 
20 Eurostat. Government Finance Statistics. Summary tables. Data 1996 – 2006. 2007 
edition. Luxembourg, 2007 (KS-EK-07-001-EN-N). Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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transfer payments and thus are not recorded as “Social benefits”. Correspond-
ingly, within “Employer social benefits”, outlays on pensions and other retirement 
benefits are in some cases treated as reductions in liabilities rather than social 
benefits expenses. This is the case, for example, for “Social security benefits” in 
Albania and Bosnia & Herzegovina, and for “Employer social benefits” in Arme-
nia, Georgia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.  
90. The second largest expenditure item is compensation of employees, including 
employers’ social contributions (actual and imputed). Table A.4.1 suggests that 
this item is highly correlated with the total government size (R=0.81). The highest 
share is recorded in Montenegro (12.7% of GDP), followed closely by Serbia 
(12.1%), Bosnia & Herzegovina (11.7%), Croatia (11.3%), Ukraine (10.4%), and 
Belarus (10.4%), which are all close to the EU-27 average (10.7% of GDP in 
2006). At the other end of the analyzed spectrum, are the Caucasus countries, Ka-
zakhstan and Tajikistan, where compensation of employees does not exceed 4% 
of GDP.  
91. Use of goods and services (referred to in EU government finance statistics as 
“Intermediate consumption”) is the third most important category of government 
expenditure. In the EU-27, it accounted for 14% of total government expenditure 
and 6.4% of GDP in 2006. As Table A.4.1 suggests, in more than half of the ana-
lyzed countries, this share exceeds the EU 27 average, while the corresponding 
proportion to total government expenditure is higher than the EU average in al-
most all countries for which information is available, except Albania and Croatia 
(Table A.4.3).  
92. The high share of subsidies in the overall budget expenditures reflects the slow 
progress in budgetary reform and sectoral reforms, for example, the slow privati-
zation of infrastructural sectors (like housing and communal services). This is the 
case in Russia and Belarus, where the share of subsidies in GDP amounted to 
4.7% of GDP and 8.1% of GDP respectively. They do not exceed 3% of GDP in 
Georgia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Tajikistan, Croatia, Serbia, and Ukraine. They 
less than 1% of GDP (which is an average EU-27 indicator) in Albania, Azerbai-
jan, Armenia, Montenegro, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Macedonia.  
93. The share of net acquisitions of fixed assets (acquisitions less disposals) in the 
total government expenditures in all analyzed countries (except Ukraine) is much 
higher than the EU-27 average for the gross capital formation item (5.4% of 
total expenditure in 2006). The possible explanation can relate to the specific role 
of the state budget in the process of acquisitions, disposals, and consumption of 
fixed capital in transition countries. The similarly high proportion of this item can 
be observed in Romania, the Baltic countries and the Czech Republic (more than CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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11%), while the old EU members record much lower levels – below 4% in Aus-
tria, Germany, Belgium and Denmark (Paternoster et al., 2006).  
94. The functional breakdown of government expenditures provides an additional 
dimension of comparative analysis. Tables A.4.2 and A.4.4 reveal high shares of 
expenditures on social protection
21 in Ukraine (in the range of 19-20% of GDP) 
followed by Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Belarus and Moldova. With 
the exception of Ukraine, all of the above countries are close to the EU-27 aver-
age (18.8 % of GDP in 2004)
 22. The remaining countries record lower propor-
tions, with Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan staying in the range of 2-4% 
of GDP.  
95. Compared to the EU-25 (3.7% of GDP in 2004; see Trends, 2006), all European 
CIS countries except Ukraine record high expenditures on general public ser-
vices
23. Moreover, in the mid 2000s, this item further increased. The remaining 
countries demonstrated a low level of these expenditures and/or a considerable 
decrease during the analyzed period.  
96. In 2007, expenditures on defense (military and civil defense, as well as foreign 
military aid and defense R&D) varied from 8.8% of GDP (over 30% of the total 
government expenditure) in Georgia to 0.5% GDP (1.2% of total government 
spending) in Moldova. Compared with the EU-25 average (1.6% of GDP in 
2004), substantially higher levels were recorded in Russia (2.6% GDP and 8.0% 
of total expenditure) and the Caucasus countries. 
97. Expenditures on public order and safety encompass mainly police and fire 
services, law courts and prisons. In the EU-15, they accounted for 1.7% of GDP 
in 2004. Most of the countries analyzed in this report demonstrate higher levels of 
this expenditure.  
98. Expenditures on economic affairs include, for example, various support pro-
grams to industry or agriculture, subsidies and public infrastructure spending in 
the mining, manufacturing, agricultural, energy, construction, transport, commu-
nication and other service industries. In the EU-25, they amounted to 3.9% of 
GDP in 2004. As was mentioned above, due to the unfinished reform process, the 
CEE/CIS countries record much a higher level of these expenditures. This con-
                                                 
21 This item includes outlays on sickness and disability, old age, survivors, family and 
children, unemployment, housing, other forms of social exclusion, and R&D on social 
protection 
22 Europe in figures — Eurostat yearbook 2008 (KS-CD-07-001-EN-C). 
23 Expenses related to executive and legislative bodies, financial and fiscal affairs, external 
affairs, foreign economic aid, general services, basic research, and expenses related to 
debt.  Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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cerns especially Albania, Croatia and Serbia in the Westerns Balkans region, and 
Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and Azerbaijan in the CIS.  
99.  Health and education constitute the second and third most important items, after 
social protection, in total GG expenditures. Contrary to the EU-25 average where 
health expenditures are the second most important item (6.4% of GDP in 2004), 
in the majority of the CEE/CIS countries, education expenditures represent a 
higher share of GDP than health. Public expenditures on health remain higher 
compared to those on education only in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, and Rus-
sia (see Tables A.4.2 and A.4.4). Health related outlays
24 in all of the analyzed 
countries are considerably lower (relative to GDP) than the EU average. In gen-
eral, the Western Balkan countries (Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia) 
are characterized by relatively higher shares of health expenditures; in the Euro-
pean CIS countries they are lower; and even much lower in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia (below 3% of GDP).  
100.  Expenditures on education (pre-primary, primary, secondary, post-secondary 
non-tertiary, tertiary, R&D related to education) are also considerably lower in 
most of the analyzed countries than in the EU-25 (5.3% of GDP in 2004). Only 
Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kyrgyzstan and Croatia re-
cord somewhat higher levels.  
101.  Expenditures on housing and community amenities include housing and 
community development, water supply and street lighting. In general, the ana-
lyzed countries demonstrate high levels of outlays relative to GDP in this cate-
gory, which far exceed the average EU-25 level (1.0% of GDP in 2004), with the 
exception of Armenia and Azerbaijan.  
102.  Expenditures on environmental protection cover waste management (including 
waste water), pollution abatement, protection of biodiversity and landscapes, as 
well as associated R&D expenditure. This item is the smallest one in all countries 
for which data are available, below the EU-25 average (which was 0.7% of GDP 
in 2004). However, the recorded amounts are probably underestimated for meth-
odological reasons.  
103.  In the majority of the analyzed countries, government spending on recreation, 
culture and religion are lower or close to the average of the EU-25 level (ca. 1% 
of GDP). Only Croatia and Belarus record higher levels of financing. 
 
                                                 
24 This includes government spending on medical products, medical appliances and 
equipment, outpatient services, hospital services, public health services and R&D in 
health.  CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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4.2.  Public spending on education, health, social protection, water and 
utilities and intra-sectoral expenditure structure 
 
104.  The analyzed set of countries is diverse in terms of proportions of government 
spending on social protection, health and education. Several groups can be sin-
gled out: 
•  Countries with a high overall level of government expenditures and a 
relatively high level of social expenditures as a proportion of GDP (West 
Balkans excluding Albania, Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine). This is also 
true for health and education expenditures. 
•  Countries with low government expenditures, which have, at the same 
time, low proportions of social protection, health and education expendi-
tures in GDP (Caucasus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan). 
•  Albania and Russia, which represent an intermediate position. 
 
4.2.1.  Health 
 
105.  As discussed in Section 4.1, public expenditures on health vary between ca. 6% of 
GDP in Croatia and Montenegro and less than 1% of GDP in Azerbaijan.
25 Gray 
et al.(2007) confirm that public spending on health is closely associated with per 
capita income and is more stable over time than education spending: i.e. richer 
countries allocate a larger proportion of GDP while poorer countries tend to spend 
less. The age structure of the population (proportion of population of 65+) and 
some institutional characteristics (for example, a higher ratio of inpatient care 
spending) are also positively correlated with the share of health spending in GDP.  
106.  In most of the countries where government expenditures on health are low, they 
are supplemented with private sources of financing, which increase the overall 
level of health expenditure, sometimes even close to the EU-27 average (8.2% of 
GDP in 2006
26) as in the case of most West Balkan countries.  
107.  In the European CIS countries, private resources allowed for an increase in total 
health expenditures by 30-50%. However, only Georgia managed to reach EU 
levels of health expenditures as a percentage of GDP, due to the considerable pri-
                                                 
25 In this section, when analyzing health spending, we rely mostly on WHO data, which are 
harmonized for international comparability. Official national statistics may use alternative 
methods of data computation. 
26 WHO National Health Accounts (June 2008). More information at 
http://www.who.int/nha/country/en/ Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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vate resources involved (close to 80% of the total). In two other Caucasus coun-
tries, in spite of the similar share of private resources, the total proportion of 
health spending to GDP remained lower. In Central Asia, the share of additional 
private resources was generally lower compared to the Caucasus (with the excep-
tion of Tajikistan), and the total health expenditure to GDP ratios remained at low 
levels (1/2 - 2/3 of EU average).  
108.  Table A.4.5 in the Statistical Annex suggests that donor aid did not constitute a 
substantial addition to domestic resources for healthcare provision, except for in 
Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (and Moldova in the early 2000s) and it has 
been declining in most countries. So the major sources of health funding include: 
social health insurance (SHI), i.e. compulsory contributions in the form of payroll 
taxes; other GG revenues (direct and indirect taxes), out-of-pocket payments (paid 
directly by the patient at the point of service), and voluntary health insurance pro-
vided by either public or private providers.  
 
 
Table 4.1. Total and GG expenditures on health  
Total expenditure on 
health as % of GDP 
GG expenditure on 
health as % of GDP  
GG expenditure on 
health as % of total ex-
penditure on health  Country 
2001 2002200320042005200120022003200420052001200220032004 2005 
West Balkans 
Albania 6.1  6.3 6.3 6.8 6.5 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.8 2.6 38.5 36.1 37.6 40.6  40.3 
B&H 6.9  7.7 8.1 8.6 8.8 3.7 4.8 5.6 5.1 5.2 54.3 62.6 68.6 58.9  58.7 
Croatia 8.6  7.8 7.5 7.7 7.4 7.0 5.8 6.2 6.2 6.0 81.4 74.2 82.1 80.7  81.3 
Kosovo
*  … 4.7 4.7 6.2 6.8 … 2.2 3.5 3.4 3.2 …  46.8 74.5 54.8  47.1 
Montene-
gro
1  8.0 7.9 8.2 8.0 8.0 5.8 5.7 6.1 5.8 6.0 72.3 72.1 74.7 72.3  75.5 
Serbia
1,2 7.3  8.3 8.3 8.0 8.0 4.8 5.9 6.0 5.7 5.8 66.0 70.7 72.4 71.6  71.9 
Mace-
donia  7.4 8.0 8.2 8.0 7.8 5.3 5.7 5.9 5.7 5.5 72.0 71.4 72.4 70.8  70.4 
European CIS 
Belarus 6.9  6.6 6.5 6.2 6.6 5.0 4.7 4.8 4.6 5.0 72.6 71.1 73.7 73.4  75.8 
Moldova   6.1  6.4 6.8 7.4 7.5 3.0 3.3 3.5 4.2 4.2 48.7 51.8 51.0 56.8 55.5 
Russia 5.7  6.0 5.6 5.2 5.2 3.3 3.5 3.3 3.1 3.2 58.7 59.0 58.8 59.6  62.0 
Ukraine 6.1  6.6 6.8 6.5 7.0 3.1 3.5 3.8 3.7 3.7 50.3 53.0 56.2 56.8  52.8 
Caucasus 
Armenia 6.7 5.6 5.8 5.7 5.4 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.8 23.7 24.4 26.2 30.0  32.9 
Azerbai-
jan  4.6 4.7 4.2 4.0 3.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 19.0 17.1 20.5 22.0  24.8 
Georgia 7.8  8.7 8.5 8.5 8.6 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.7 18.0 16.3 15.0 15.4  19.5 
Central Asia 
Kazakh-
stan  3.4 3.6 3.6 3.8 3.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.5 57.0 53.8 55.4 60.4  64.2 CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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Total expenditure on 
health as % of GDP 
GG expenditure on 
health as % of GDP  
GG expenditure on 
health as % of total ex-
penditure on health  Country 
2001 200220032004200520012002200320042005200120022003 2004 2005 
Kyr-
gyzstan  4.8 5.4 5.4 5.7 6.0 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.3 2.4 41.1 39.6 37.9  39.7  39.5 
Tajikistan 4.6  4.5 4.5 4.4 5.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.1 20.7 20.2 20.4 21.4 22.8 
Turk-
menistan   4.5 4.0 4.4 4.5 4.8 3.3 2.7 3.1 3.0 3.2 72.3 67.9 69.6  66.6  66.7 
Uzbeki-
stan  5.7 5.6 5.3 4.9 5.0 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.4 45.0 44.7 44.8  46.1  47.7 
Notes. 
1 After Montenegro’s Declaration of Independence on 3 June 2006, health expendi-
tures previously reported for the Confederation of Serbia and Montenegro have been parti-
tioned accordingly between two countries. 
2 The estimates do not include Kosovo. * Kos-
ovo: Total expenditure on health = Public + Private-out-of-pocket + Donors. 
Sources: Calculated based on WHO online database 
(http://www.who.int/whosis/database). Data for Kosovo are from WB (2008d); GDP & 
budget for 2002-2004: Fact Sheet Kosovo (May 2003), www.unmikonline.org. 
 
109.  Budget remains the major official source of health care financing in Ukraine, with 
80% coming from local budgets and the remaining 20% from the state (central) 
budget. Most other countries fall into the SHI group. However, in low-income 
countries this mechanism failed to protect the system from considerable shortages 
in funding and, for example, in Albania, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, out-of-pocket 
spending remains the major source of financing, long after the introduction of 
SHI.  
110.  Out-of-pocket expenditures are in the form of either co-payments or co-insurance 
paid for services partially covered by mandatory health insurance and designed to 
discourage unnecessary health care consumption, or in the form of full cash pay-
ments paid by the uninsured or for services that lie outside the benefit package. 
Co-payments can help improve the efficiency of health care; on the other hand, 
excessive reliance on out-of-pocket spending limits access to health services for 
the poor and may deter poverty reduction. This has happened in the Caucasus re-
gion which represents the highest proportion of out-of-pocket expenditures.  
111.  In addition to the officially recognized out-of-pocket expenditures, one must add 
the informal payments to providers of public health care, for example, payment 
for admission to public hospital (in spite of legal guarantees of availability of 
hospital services for free). Informal payments, which are actually a form of cor-
ruption, generate an incentive for providers to discriminate among patients based 
on their ability to pay which undermines the quality of and access to health care 
for those who cannot pay the expected bribe. 
 Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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Table 4.2. Per capita total expenditure on health (PPP international dollars) 
Per capita total expenditure on 
health 
Per capita government expenditure 
on health  Country 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
West Balkans 
Albania  246 269 293 340 353  95  97  110 138 142 
B&H  460 545 610 709 779 250 341 418 417 457 
Croatia  860 852 880 974  1001  700 632 722 786 813 
Montenegro
1  79 83 96 96  106  57 60 71 69 80 
Serbia
1,2  270 332 356 395 395 178 235 258 283 284 
Macedonia 440  485  522 544 569 317 346 378 385 401 
European CIS 
Belarus  347 358 389 428 515 252 254 287 314 390 
Moldova    88  105  123  149  170  43 54 63 85 94 
Russia  424 478 492 505 561 249 282 289 301 348 
Ukraine  283 331 384 427 488 142 175 216 243 258 
Caucasus 
Armenia    181  177  215  242  270  43 43 56 73 89 
Azerbaijan 123  140  142  152  193  23 24 29 33 48 
Georgia  185  224  250  276  318  33 37 37 43 62 
Central Asia 
Kazakhstan 172 200 225 263  306 98 108  125 159 197 
Kyrgyzstan 74 85 92  106  113  31 34 35 42 45 
Tajikistan  40 44 49 54 67  8  9  10 12 15 
Turkmenistan  207 185 214 230 308 150 125 149 153 205 
Uzbekistan  150  154  153  156  171  68 69 68 72 82 
Notes. 
1  After Montenegro’s Declaration of Independence on 3 June 2006, Serbia and 
Montenegro became separate states. Health expenditures previously reported for the for-
mer Confederation of Serbia and Montenegro have been partitioned accordingly. 
2 Without 
Kosovo. 
Source: WHO online database. 
 
 
Table 4.3. Expenditures on health, rates of growth (in %) 
Per capita total expen-
ditures on health (PPP 
international $) 
Total expenditures on 
health, % of GDP 
GG expenditures on 
health, % of GDP  Country 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2002 2003 2004 2005 2002 2003 2004 2005 
West Balkans 
Albania 112.5  128.9 136.2 107.0 103.3 100.0 107.9 95.6 96.8 104.2116.5  94.9 
B&H 128.4  142.6 127.6 109.5 111.6 105.2 106.2 102.3 128.7115.3 91.2  102.0 
Croatia 116.2  116.9 112.8 104.2 90.7 96.2 102.7 96.1 82.7 106.4100.9  96.8 
Montene-
gro  111.5 141.9 121.8 111.6 98.8 103.8 97.6 100.0 98.5 107.5 94.4 104.4 
Serbia 156.0  129.8 117.1 106.5 113.7 100.0 96.4 100.0 121.8102.4 95.3  100.4 
Macedonia 118.1  125.3 113.3 105.2 108.1 102.5 97.6 97.5 107.2103.9 95.4 96.9 CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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Per capita total expen-
ditures on health (PPP 
international $) 
Total expenditures on 
health, % of GDP 
GG expenditures on 
health, % of GDP  Country 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2002 2003 2004 2005 2002 2003 2004 2005 
European CIS 
Belarus 114.1 121.6 124.6 138.8 95.7 98.5 95.4 106.5 93.7 102.1  95.0  109.9 
Republic of 
Moldova   122.7 125.9 144.1 118.4 104.9 106.3 108.8 101.4 111.6104.6  121.2 99.0 
Russia 119.5 117.7 127.7 130.7 105.3  93.3 92.9 100.0 105.8 93.0 94.1  104.0 
Ukraine 122.9 122.0 123.6 143.8 108.2  103.0 95.6 107.7 114.0109.3  96.6  100.1 
Caucasus 
Armenia 93.5 123.3 128.3 129.4 83.6 103.6 98.3 94.7 86.1 111.2  112.5  103.9 
Azerbaijan 109.4 105.7 113.5 147.6 102.2  89.4 95.2 97.5 92.0 107.1  102.2  109.9 
Georgia 118.5 115.6 131.1 126.8 111.5  97.7 100.0 101.2 101.0 89.9 102.7  128.1 
Central Asia 
Kazakhstan 115.7 127.1 145.3 135.8 105.9 100.0 105.6 102.6 99.9 103.0 115.1 109.1 
Kyrgyzstan 113.3 117.6 125.0 112.0 112.5  100.0 105.6 105.3 108.4 95.7 110.6  104.7 
Tajikistan 112.5 122.2 127.3 128.6 97.8 100.0 97.8 113.6 95.5 101.0  102.6  121.1 
Turkmeni-
stan  113.6 134.7 114.9 134.5 88.9 110.0 102.3 106.7 83.5 112.8 97.9 106.8 
Uzbekistan 80.8 95.2 115.0 113.0 98.2 94.6 92.5 102.0 97.6 94.9 95.1  105.6 
Source: WHO online database. 
 
112.  Voluntary health insurance, as data in table 4.2 indicates, plays a less important 
role in healthcare financing. Only in Russia it is offered as an alternative to man-
datory SHI and is significant for at least a part of population. In other cases, this 
source of financing can be either complementary, and cover the cost of co-
payments for specific population groups, or be supplementary, and cover health 
care services not included in the standard benefits package.  
113.  Disparities in financing can be best seen when comparing per capita expenditure 
on health (see Table 4.2). They range from 1,001 USD in PPP terms in Croatia, 
which is still only half of the EU-27 average (PPP USD 2,261 in 2006), to 67 
USD in Tajikistan, which amounts to less than 3% of the EU average. Apart from 
Croatia, only in three countries does per capita expenditure exceed 25% of the 
average in the EU-27 (Bosnia & Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Russia). These 
figures are lower than in Bulgaria, but correspond to those of Romania and Esto-
nia. Two more countries (Belarus and Ukraine) exceed the 20% of EU average by 
20%. Six countries fall into the range of 12 - 18% (Serbia, Albania, Georgia, 
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Armenia), while others do not exceed 10% of the 
EU-27 average. Geographically, the Western Balkans and European countries 
(except Moldova and Montenegro) as well as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are 
characterized by relatively higher values of per capita expenditures compared to 
the Caucasus and the remaining Central Asian countries.  Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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114.  Table 4.3 demonstrates that the rates of health expenditure growth exceeded the 
record- high rates of GDP growth not only in low income Central Asian countries 
but also in Georgia, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and Bosnia & Herzegovina. It 
remains to be seen how health expenditures will react to the expected GDP de-
cline in 2009. Even if they do not follow output decline proportionally (as a result 
of spending inertia and existing legal commitments), they will stop growing and 
their actual structure may deteriorate as a result of ad hoc budget sequestrations. 
 
4.2.2.  Education 
 
115.  The available UNESCO data allows us to conclude that trends and levels of 
public education spending as a % of GDP vary widely both within analyzed group 
of countries (see Section 4.1) and from year to year (see Table 4.4)
27. In 2001-
2006, the lowest education expenditures relative to GDP were recorded in Geor-
gia and Armenia. Albania, Serbia and Macedonia were very close to this mini-
mum. Surprisingly, major oil exporters (Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan) also 
demonstrated modest levels of spending. On the contrary, the highest figures were 
recorded in Belarus and Ukraine.  
116.  Table 4.4 suggests that Belarus, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have 
demonstrated a considerable increase in public expenditures on education in the 
analyzed years, surpassing GDP growth rates. In Central Asia, however, the 
demographic factor (a growing share of younger population) could play an impor-
tant role here. Similarly to health expenditure, it is unclear at the moment to what 
extent they will follow GDP and GG revenue decline during the economic down-
turn.  
117.  In some lower-income countries, resources directed to the education sector have 
been supplemented with substantial donor financing
28. Table A.4.6 in the Statisti-
cal Annex suggests that donor aid accounted for 10% (Moldova, 2006) to nearly 
20% (Georgia, 2006) of the total expenditures on education. The raw data on aid 
in constant 2006 USD also suggest that foreign aid could play a significant role in 
Macedonia, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan. In most countries, donor aid goes mostly 
to post-secondary education. This is particularly true for the Western Balkans 
(excluding Albania in 2006), European CIS (excluding Moldova in 2006) and the 
                                                 
27 Data coverage on the education sector is more limited in comparison to health (see 
GMR, 2008). In particular, this relates to private expenditures on education.  
28 Unfortunately, due to data limitations, we can provide only a few examples of the rela-
tive importance of this source. CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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Caucasus (excluding Azerbaijan in 2005). On the contrary, Central Asia received 
a higher proportion of donor aid directed to basic and secondary education. 
118.  Table A.4.7 in the Statistical Annex shows cross-country disparities in expendi-
ture per student at current USD in PPP terms. There is a trend for catching-up to 
the average (all-level education) financing but this has not necessarily been trans-
mitted down to every education level in each country. In Croatia, Belarus, Ka-
zakhstan and Tajikistan, public expenditures per student in tertiary education de-
creased, perhaps being substituted by household expenses. On the other hand, in 
most countries, tertiary education absorbs more public resources than basic and 
secondary levels. In Albania, the proportion between tertiary education and aver-
age expenditure (for all levels) is approximately 3:1. However, in Moldova, 
spending rates per student are nearly the same across all level of education; the 
reverse proportion (lower spending for tertiary education) is true for Kazakhstan. 
 
Table 4.4. Public expenditure on education  
As per cent of GDP  Growth rates, % to previous year  Country 
2000200120022003200420052006 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
West Balkans 
Albania 3.1 3.1 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.2 3.0 101.0 89.2 108.7 104.5  100.0  93.8 
B&H  -  -  -  -  -  -  -        
Croatia -  4.5 4.4 4.5 4.5 -  -    97.8 102.3 100.0     
Kosovo  -  -  -  -  -  -  3.5       
Montenegro  -  -  -  -  -  -  -        
Serbia 3.4 3.4 3.8 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.5 100.0 111.8 92.1 100.9  95.6  103.7 
Macedonia 3.2 3.1 3.3 3.3 2.4 3.0 2.9 97.2 105.2 101.7 71.6 126.9 96.4 
East European CIS 
Belarus 6.2 6.5 6.6 6.5 5.2 5.4 5.5 105.0 102.9 98.5 80.1  103.5  101.2 
Moldova 4.5 5.0 5.7 5.6 5.4 5.8 -  111.3 114.3 97.6 96.8  107.6   
Russia 2.9 3.1 3.8 3.7 3.5 3.8 -  106.9 122.6 97.4 94.6  108.6   
Ukraine 4.2 4.7 5.4 5.6 5.3 6.3 6.3 112.3 116.1 103.1 94.8  118.9  99.6 
Caucasus 
Armenia  2.6 2.3 1.9 2.1 2.5 2.7 2.7 88.1 83.8 110.3 115.8 109.1 100.1 
Azerbaijan 3.9 3.5 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.0 2.7 90.9 90.0 104.2 104.9  86.3  89.3 
Georgia 2.2 2.5 2.2 2.1 2.9 2.5 3.0 114.5 90.3 92.8 142.5  84.4  121.0 
Central Asia 
Kazakhstan 3.3 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.3 2.3 - 93.9 96.8 100.0 76.7 100.0   
Kyrgyzstan  3.0 3.4 3.9 3.9 4.0 4.2 4.7 111.6 114.1 101.4 101.3 106.8 110.8 
Tajikistan 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.8 3.5 3.4 104.8 107.7 91.6 119.1  124.6  96.9 
Turkmenistan 6.5 5.6 4.9 5.1 5.4 5.3 -  87.1 86.1 104.7 105.7  99.6   
Uzbekistan  6.7 6.8 6.7 6.3 -  -  -  101.5 98.7 94.1    
Sources: All countries except Kosovo: TransMONEE 2008 database, www.unicef-irc.org. 
Data on Kosovo: Kosovo Quarterly Economic Briefing, World Bank, October-December 
2007, p 2. Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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119.  In all countries for which comparable data are available (see Table A.4.8 in the 
Statistical Annex), current expenditures, mostly salaries, dominate all other items. 
Interestingly, the share of salaries tends to grow over time in all countries and all 
levels of education. In Croatia, this is done at the cost of capital expenditures, 
while in Belarus at the cost of other current expenditures. In both countries, the 
share of capital expenditures is rather low. On the contrary, lower-income coun-
tries (e.g. Moldova and Kazakhstan) tend to maintain (or even increase) the pro-
portion of capital investments. This may partly reflect differences in demographic 
trends (an increasing number of students in lower-income countries). As concerns 
tertiary education, the picture is mixed: only Croatia demonstrated a sharp reduc-
tion of capital expenditures whereas other countries maintained or increased them.  
 
Table 4.5. Student-teacher ratio in primary and secondary general education 
Primary education (ISCED 1) Secondary general education  
(ISCED levels 2 and 3A)  Country 
2000/01 2006/07  2000/01  2006/07 
Western Balkans 
Croatia 18.3  16.4  12.6  10.2 
Kosovo ...  ...  12.6  10.2 
Serbia 19.9  17.0  16.7  13.4 
Macedonia 21.9  18.4  16.4 13.2 
European CIS 
Belarus 17.7  16.1  9.4  8.0 
Moldova 20.5  16.3  14.0  11.8 
Russia 17.3  17.1  11.7  8.8 
Ukraine ...  ...  10.6  8.7 
Caucasus 
Armenia 14.0  ...  9.2  ... 
Azerbaijan 17.7  12.0  8.8  8.5 
Georgia 16.8  ...  8.4  ... 
Central Asia 
Kazakhstan 18.7  16.5  11.6 10.2 
Kyrgyzstan ...  24.3  ... 16.6 
Tajikistan 21.8  21.6  17.4  17.0 
Uzbekistan 21.7  18.2  11.7 11.8 
Source: TransMONEE 2008 database, www.unicef-irc.org. 
 
120.  One of the possible reasons why salaries dominate expenditures in primary and 
secondary education is the small number of students per one teacher as compared 
to other countries with similar per capita incomes (Table 4.5). In 2000, the aver-
age student-teacher ratio amounted to 40 in low income countries, 22 in middle 
income countries, and 21 in upper middle income countries (WB, 2005b). Exces-CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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sive employment of teachers is also evident when one compares CEE/CIS figures 
with the EU-25 average numbers of students per teacher, which was 15 in 2003 
(with the highest value in UK, 20.0 pupils per teacher, followed by France and 
Slovakia at 19.4)
29.
 As the literature suggests, these quantitative indicators are in 
line with the quality of schooling results and reflect, to a certain extent, the inade-
quate qualifications of teachers who experience difficulties in teaching multiple 
subjects at the early levels of schooling. This is the case of many low-income 
countries. Among others, it was observed by the WB (2005b) in Kosovo, where in 
2003, 22.2% of teachers in primary schools were underqualified, and 28.1% of 
teachers in secondary schools. There are also other reasons for excessive em-
ployment related e.g. to dispersed types of settlements, especially in distant rural 
areas and the slow pace of rationalizing school networks. 
 
4.2.3.  Intra-sector structure of expenditures (education and healthcare) 
 
121.  The aggregate expenditure data in education and healthcare tell us very little 
about the level and quality of service delivery and actual policies carried out in 
these sectors. To deepen our analysis we try to analyze the intra-sector structure 
of spending in this sub-section
30.  
122.  The available breakdown of public expenditures between major healthcare 
services (outpatient services, hospital services, and public health services – see 
Box 4.2 for detailed definitions) does not provide a clear picture in respect to the 
prevailing policies. Data presented in Table A.4.9 of the Statistical Annex cover 
only a few countries and selected years, and seem to suffer from methodological 
problems related to healthcare institutional reforms. For example, moving towards 
the SHI model caused a statistical shift towards a third category, i.e. public health 
services, at the cost of two others. Furthermore, the available data disaggregation 
cannot give us any specific insight into meeting child healthcare needs. Neverthe-
less, even the scarce data available plus numerous country studies suggest that 
hospital services continue to absorb most of the available public resources for 
healthcare, at least in the former USSR where the hospital network has been his-
torically over-extended and largely ineffective. This means that outpatient ser-
vices and public health programs (many of which target children) remain dis-
criminated against in allocation decisions. Poor families with large numbers of 
                                                 
29 Eurostat Yearbook 2005. 
30 Due to data constraints, the analysis of intra-sector expenditure structure is limited to 
health and education.  Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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children also suffer from the necessity to pay for (very often unofficially) elemen-
tary health services.  
123.  In the education sector, public funds seem to equally support the poor and non-
poor but there can be large disparities in the quality of schooling depending on the 
population’s income level and residence (large cities vs. countryside) not covered 
by the available statistics. As Table A.4.9 in the Statistical Annex suggests, a con-
siderable share of public education spending in most countries is directed to pri-
mary and secondary education which hypothetically could help improve basic 
indicators of education attainment. However, the cross-country variation in this 
respect is great. Kazakhstan and Russia display a prevalence of primary education 
in the structure of public education expenditures, whereas in Belarus, Moldova 
and Ukraine, spending on secondary education is relatively more significant. Pub-
lic subsidies to tertiary education remained at relatively high levels in most of the 
countries but they have not noticeably increased since 2002. This is in line with 
the data on public spending per student (as discussed in Section 4.2.2) which sug-
gest that resource allocation is still biased against primary and lower secondary 
education in many countries (Thomas et al, 2000). 
 
Box 4.2. Definition of major healthcare services 
Outpatient services include medical, dental and paramedical services delivered by practi-
tioners and auxiliaries. The services may be delivered at home, in individual or group 
consulting facilities, dispensaries or the outpatient clinics of hospitals and the like. Outpa-
tient services include the medicaments, prostheses, medical appliances and equipment 
and other health-related products supplied directly to outpatients by practitioners and 
auxiliaries. 
Hospital services: Hospitalization is defined as occurring when a patient is accommo-
dated in a hospital for the duration of the treatment. Hospital day-care and home-based 
hospital treatment are included, as are hospices for terminally ill persons. 
Public health services include services delivered by special teams to groups of clients, 
most of whom are in good health, at workplaces, schools or other non-medical settings, 
public health services not connected with a hospital, clinic or practitioner, public health 
services not delivered by medically qualified doctors, or public health service laborato-
ries. Expenditures on public health services constitute the sum of provision of public 
health services, administration, inspection, operation or support of public health services 
such as blood-bank operation (collecting, processing, storing, shipping), disease detection 
(cancer, tuberculosis, venereal disease), prevention (immunization, inoculation), monitor-
ing (infant nutrition, child health), epidemiological data collection, family planning ser-
vices etc., preparation and dissemination of public health information. 
 
124.  The World Bank report on reforms in higher education financing in CEE (Can-
ning et al., 2006)
 documented that after the transition began, participation rates in 
tertiary education began to rise immediately, fueled by evidence that a university CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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degree offered a greater chance of employment in an increasingly uncertain labor 
market. At the same time, public outlays for tertiary education remained mostly at 
previous levels or even decreased. As a result, private provision of higher educa-
tion services expanded in most countries. A greater reliance on private financing 
of tertiary education can help free up the needed public funding for primary and 
secondary education.  
125.  In many analyzed countries, fiscal constraints force governments to attract 
additional resources to solve the problem of maintaining the desired level of edu-
cation by adopting various strategies – e.g. charging tuition fees in public educa-
tion and encouraging the development of private schools. Fees can increase edu-
cational spending per student enrolled and improve equity by targeting public 
subsidies to students from poor families. Selective charges on some learning in-
puts can increase the effectiveness of service delivery. However, the literature 
suggests that in practice the poor remain disadvantaged. Public expenditures on 
health and education are usually captured by non-poor households (WDR, 2004), 
leaving aside the needs of poor families with children that constitute a consider-
able proportion of poverty profile in the countries under review. Thus considera-
tion of children’s interests in the intra-sector reallocation of public expenditures is 
closely related to the effectiveness of the pro-poor targeting of these services. 
 
4.2.4.  Social protection 
 
126.  Most of the analyzed countries - apart from Albania, Kosovo, Azerbaijan, and 
Central Asia – suffer from negative growth and ageing populations, which will 
result in growing public expenditures on health and social security, which are al-
ready quite substantial. Only a small proportion of resources is allocated to social 
assistance (see Table 4.6 and Section 4.3). 
 
Table 4.6. GG expenditure structure of social benefits (% of the total) 







2005 0.00  91.05  8.95 
2006 0.00  93.20  6.80  Albania 
2007 0.00  93.95  6.05 
2005 0.00  99.58  0.42 
2006 0.00  99.79  0.21  B&H 
2007 0.00  99.73  0.27 
2003 80.09  18.45  1.46 
2004 70.94  28.16  0.90  Croatia 
2005 70.36  29.01  0.64 Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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2006 69.77  29.92  0.31  Croatia 
2007 70.12  29.45  0.44 
Serbia 2007  71.28  28.72  0.00 
European CIS 
2003 89.54  1.77  8.68 
2004 89.78  10.22  0.00 
2005 91.40  8.60  0.00 
2006 92.65  7.35  0.00 
Belarus 
2007 91.57  8.43  0.00 
2004 0.00  100.00  0.00 
2005 4.70  95.30  0.00 
2006 6.05  93.95  0.00 
Moldova 
2007 97.10  1.79  1.11 
2003 80.33  19.67  0.00 
2004 79.41  20.59  0.00 
2005 74.43  18.92  6.64 
2006 67.44  26.70  5.86 
Russia 
2007 65.32  29.40  5.28 
European CIS (continued) 
2003 87.91  11.81  0.28 
2004 83.01  16.99  0.00 
2005 89.56  10.44  0.00 
2006 93.08  6.92  0.00 
Ukraine 
2007 90.96  9.03  0.00 
Caucasus 
2003 99.94  0.06  0.00 
2004 80.00  20.00  0.00 
2005 75.32  24.68  0.00 
2006 81.15  18.85  0.00 
Armenia 
2007 81.03  18.97  0.00 
2003 53.50  30.87  15.63 
2004 60.37  39.63  0.00 
2005 72.96  27.04  0.00 
2006 69.16  30.84  0.00 
Georgia 
2007 47.92  52.08  0.00 
Central Asia 
2003 65.32  34.68  0.00 
2004 66.54  33.46  0.00 
2005 64.60  35.40  0.00 
2006 64.29  35.71  0.00 
Kazakhstan 
2007 61.77  38.23  0.00 
Kyrgyzstan   2006  42.24  57.76  0.00 
Tajikistan 2003  92.31  7.69  0.00 
Note. Russia - accrual basis, all other countries – cash basis. 
Source: Own calculations based on IMF GFS database. CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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127.  Overall, the analysis of HBS and LSMS data shows that public social transfers 
have limited impact on child poverty reduction; however, pensions do have an 
impact in many countries, reducing child poverty by up to 10 percentage points, 
while the effect of social assistance is generally negligible, as a result of too nar-
row targeting and small size of social benefits. Simulations based on microdata 
point to the potential child benefits have in reducing child poverty rates and gaps 
with even modest amounts providing substantial returns (Bradshaw et al., 2008; 
Chzhen, 2009).  
128.  The most common approach of targeting social benefits applies proxy means tests 
based on very narrow eligibility criteria and high requirements to applicants in 
providing documentation. The objective is generally to bring the extremely poor 
up to the food poverty line. The consequence is low coverage of the poor while 
the administration of benefits is costly and puts high demands on staff capacity. 
129.  To be effective in reducing child poverty and fostering social inclusion, benefits 
need to achieve good coverage of poor populations, be adequate to make a differ-
ence in living standards, be accessible for eligible persons and easy to administer. 
These arguments speak in favor of universal child benefits. They are, however, 
fiscally costly and mean spending limited budget resources also for support of 
middle-and higher-income families. This is also the case of other broad based so-
cial benefits scheme such as public pension systems, disability or unemployment 
benefits.  
130.  Limiting child benefits to those groups of families who are at a higher than 
average poverty risk (depending on national child poverty profiles) may decrease 
somewhat scale of expenditure mistargeting. However, implementation of selec-
tive child benefit schemes may encounter the similar problems of limited adminis-
trative capacity as in the case of targeted social assistance.  
131.  Generally, targeting remains the weakest point of public transfer allocation, and 
the main focus of debates around social protection reforms, especially in the 
European CIS countries (Russia, Belarus and Ukraine). The demand for better 
targeting increases dramatically as result of the ongoing economic and financial 
crisis: fiscal space for social support schemes becomes even more limited, while 
demand for social assistance grows rapidly. The question is how targeting mecha-
nisms can be simplified, ensure good coverage and therefore become more effec-
tive in reaching poor and vulnerable populations. 
 Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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4.2.5.  Public spending on water and utilities
31 
 
132.  In the decade of rapid economic growth, social sector expenditures (on social 
security, health and education) increased faster relative to other productive spend-
ing (i.e. infrastructure, agriculture) as documented by case country and regional 
studies (Wilhelm & Fiestas, 2005). These changes were partially provoked by 
recent policy initiatives (PRS launched by the World Bank and IMF) that have 
encouraged countries to identify and track expenditures that are pro-poor, often 
concentrating attention on social spending. The MDG also encouraged social sec-
tor spending by broadening anti-poverty objectives (Leipziger et al., 2003).  
133.  Former centrally planned economies inherited more infrastructure stocks than 
typical for countries at similar levels of per capita income. The results of policy 
reforms designed to enhance the operational efficiency, financial sustainability 
and commercial orientation of the infrastructural sector have generally been better 
in the CEE countries than in the SEE or low-income CIS countries (with the ex-
ception of Armenia, which has followed some good practices in this sphere). In 
the 2000s, many countries have outgrown their infrastructure capacities, espe-
cially in power generation, transmission and distribution. In addition, the outdated 
technical design and years of under-maintenance, including neglect of environ-
mental impact now require large-scale rehabilitation and investment projects. 
However, their financing is beyond the capacities of public authorities alone (es-
pecially during the economic downturn).  
134.  The responsibility for managing most types of social infrastructure was trans-
ferred to municipal governments. However, it is unclear whether municipalities 
have the capacity to enforce financial and operational discipline and to provide 
appropriate levels of financial support. Creditworthy municipal governments are 
beginning to look for opportunities to borrow on domestic or international capital 
markets for water and other infrastructure investments, provided that basic utility 
performance is satisfactory (Gray et al., 2007).  
135.  Financial constraints of public authorities and management efficiency considera-
tions call for greater private sector participation in infrastructure, which has 
grown rather slowly. In the analyzed countries, privately owned and operated wa-
ter systems are the exception rather than the rule. A water concession is under 
way in one city in Albania. Management contracts
32 are more common and have 
been used in Albania, Armenia, and Ukraine. The Armenian (Yerevan) experi-
                                                 
31 Similarly to many other cases described above, we faced a lack of comparable detail 
data on public spending on water, utilities. Thus, we can rely on literature sources only. 
32 Under a management contract the private operator receives a fee with incentives for 
achieving good performance, but does not finance investment. CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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ence has been so good that the government has decided to make a lease for the 
subsequent arrangement, implying broader responsibility for the private partner 
(Gray et al., 2007). However, private sector participation is unlikely to materialize 
and succeed unless the policy framework ensures financial viability and promotes 
fair competition. In any case, the private sector is unlikely to provide all of the 
necessary funding and the provision of infrastructure services will remain an im-
portant responsibility of the public budget.  
136.  Privatization of assets can partly free the public sector from investment responsi-
bilities but this requires introducing market-oriented tariffs. However, in many 
countries infrastructure tariffs remain state-regulated and very often set below a 
cost-recovery level for social reasons. This requires, in turn, allocating budget 
resources to subsidize tariffs and investments, predominantly at the local govern-
ment level. Significant hidden costs or implicit subsidies remain in most CIS 
countries, especially in the electricity and, to a lesser extent, in the water sector, 
and they create contingent liabilities for the government budget (see Section 5.4 
on quasi-fiscal operations). The total hidden subsidies to water supply declined in 
Georgia between 2001 and 2005 from 1.62% to 0.57% of GDP, but increased in 
Ukraine from 0.11% of GDP in 2000 to 0.32% of GDP in 2003. In Armenia, it 
first increased from 0.88% of GDP in 2001 to 1.59% in 2003 but then decreased 
to 0.69% of GDP in 2005. In many countries, dealing with unaccounted losses, 
low collection rates, and tariffs below a cost-recovery level remains a priority for 
both the sectoral and broader public finance reform agendas. 
 
 
4.3.  Social spending vs. service coverage and quality indicators 
 
4.3.1.  Literature findings on the efficiency and effectiveness of spending 
 
137.  The literature offers different views on the appropriate level of public spending 
and its impact on sector outcomes and poverty reduction (Wilhelm & Fiestas, 
2005). Generally, empirical studies confirm the Wagner law, i.e. that public 
spending as a share of GNP increases with higher GDP per capita levels. Herrera 
& Pang (2004) measured the efficiency of public spending in health and educa-
tion using data from 140 countries and concluded that countries with higher ex-
penditure levels and large wage bills (as a % of total budget) show lower effi-
ciency scores. An earlier study on spending efficiency by Afonso, Schuknecht & 
Tanzi (2003) exploring public sector performance in 23 OECD countries con-Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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cluded that countries with small public sectors accomplished the highest overall 
performance of their spending.  
138.  Specific country conditions such as urbanization, demography, and regional 
poverty patterns can also play an important role in the efficiency of public expen-
ditures. Herrera and Pang (2004) found that countries with high levels of urbani-
zation show higher efficiency scores for public spending, while high HIV/AIDS 
prevalence and inequality tend to go hand in hand with less efficient spending.  
139.  Expenditure policy interventions can be complementary across sectors. First, the 
benefits of higher expenditure on a particular sector may not be fully realized 
unless expenditure in other sectors is increased. For example, Leipziger et al. 
(2003) found that better access to basic infrastructure services (water and sanita-
tion) played an important role in improving child health outcomes, a finding that 
we see confirmed in most of the case studies related to the analyzed countries. 
There is a very close correlation between the percentage of population with access 
to improved water sources and child mortality rates (for the analyzed group of 
countries, the correlation coefficients amounted to (-) 0,88 and (-) 0,83 for 2000 
and 2006 accordingly; the same concerns other countries)
33. Similarly, the con-
struction of rural roads is critical for access to education (Van de Walle, 2000) 
and education investment may enhance the marginal return on irrigation projects 
(Van de Walle, 1996).  
140.  The outcomes depend on the sequencing of the spending packages as well. During 
the analyzed period, an increase in healthcare spending was observed in many 
countries, while the resources for infrastructure and agriculture mostly remained 
stable or even declined, detrimentally affecting the performance of the health sec-
tor.  
141.  Spending priorities within individual sectors are also important. WDR (2004) 
points out the necessity of better targeting of services. Although governments de-
vote about a third of their budgets to health and education, relatively little is spent 
on those services that should reach the poor.  
142.  Institutional quality (rules and their enforcement) plays an important role in 
translating public spending (including social expenditures) into social outcomes 
and service coverage. Dollar & Kraay (2002) show that low-income countries 
with better governance tend to have faster growth and reduced inequality com-
pared to poorly governed countries. High quality public sector institutions (e.g., a 
professional and results-oriented civil service) go along with improved public-
service delivery due to enhanced capacity, better incentives for public service 
                                                 
33 Calculations were done on the basis of the World Bank World Development Indicators 
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providers, and more accountability. In some countries, transferring responsibili-
ties for service delivery to lower tiers of the administration or communities has 
had a positive impact on public service delivery, but this is not always the case. 
Poor quality of services, on the other hand, disproportionately hurts the poor and 
limits their future earning abilities due to lack of skills or health. These considera-
tions stress the importance of good understanding of the nature and capacity of 
existing institutions, which are country and sector specific and, thus, require an 
equally specific public policy response. Although the analyzed countries are char-
acterized by diverse levels of institutional development and various qualities of 
budgetary procedures (see Chapter 5), in most of them weak governance and 
budgetary management negatively affect the effectiveness of public resource use, 
despite private sector provision, both in health and education.  
143.  Finally, the impact of public expenditures comes with a time lag. While well-
targeted transfer schemes usually have a direct and immediate impact on the poor 
by raising their income, targeted investment in education has a lagged effect via 
improved educational attainment, thus increasing the chances of the poor to par-
ticipate in economic growth in the future. Targeted infrastructure investments can 
have both a direct immediate effect on income as well as an indirect lagged effect 
via a human capital formation (Paternostro et al., 2005). 
 
4.3.2.  Assessing the sufficiency and effectiveness of public spending 
 
144.  It is commonly accepted that assessing the sufficiency, effectiveness, and equity 
of public social services’ delivery requires looking both at supply-side factors (the 
overall amount of resources allocated to public social services, and the adminis-
trative capacity to spend efficiently), and at demand-side factors (household needs 
differentiated by income, socio-demographic, national, educational and other 
characteristics).  
145.  During the financial crisis and economic downturn, the sustainability of public 
spending in the social sector depends on the government’s capacity to collect 
taxes, on donor support, and on improvement in efficiency of current spending. 
The potential welfare gains associated with the provision of health and education 
services are very often limited by their poor quality (as evidenced by poor health 
outcomes and large number of teachers with inappropriate level of skills). In the 
area of social protection, public social transfers have so far moderate a fairly large 
impact on poverty reduction.  Poverty reduction effects are mostly related to basic 
pensions which are categorical and cover broad groups of the population, while 
targeted means-tested social assistance has much more limited impact on poverty Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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rates (because of its generally marginal role in the actual welfare systems in the 
analyzed countries).  
146.  Several EU NMS focused primarily on targeted social assistance. For example, 
Bulgaria targets 83% of those identified as poor; Romania 85%, and Lithuania 
80%. Actually, some Western Balkans and CIS countries also implemented tar-
geted social assistance programs as part of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Pro-
grams (PRSPs) but the quality of this targeting is regarded as inadequate. For ex-
ample, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is estimated that barely 30% of the social 
benefits reach those who need help the most
34. In Russia, targeted social assis-
tance accounted for only 0.4% of GDP in 2002, while the rest of financing was 
non-targeted, and over 70% of the population de jure were eligible for social 
benefits of some kind (Alexandrova & Struyk, 2007). Similarly, the ADB (2007) 
report on CCA countries stressed the low quality of social assistance targeting. 
Similarly to Russia, many social benefits in these countries are connected to the 
status of the person such as being a veteran, or disabled. These include lower 
prices for utilities, income tax breaks, or free public transport or health services. 
However, this sort of targeting does not necessarily reach the neediest.  
147.  Many studies suggest that more public spending on education is not always 
associated with better educational outcomes and the relationship between public 
spending for education and measures of educational attainment is weak - see e.g. 
Flug et al. (1998), Landau (1986), Mingat & Tan (1992; 1998) and Noss (1991). 
Instead, other variables have been found to be important in explaining education 
attainment, including per capita income (Flug et al., 1998; Mingat & Tan, 1992), 
the age distribution of the population, and family background or parental educa-
tion (Appleton & Mackinnon, 1996). Using sophisticated meta-analytical tech-
niques, Hedges and Greenwald (1996) concluded that per student expenditure, 
teacher experience, and teacher-student ratio are positively related to student out-
comes. They also found that the effect of per student expenditure was large and 
educationally important.  
148.  Although many factors other than public money, including family background 
and peer influence, affect educational outcomes, the level and, particularly, the 
efficiency of public spending also matter. The analyzed countries vary in their 
levels of efficiency, with some of them scoring better and others doing much 
worse. Common problems (for most of the transition economies) include exces-
sive numbers of teachers, combined with inflexible rules in respect to teacher 
salaries and employment (leading to the low remuneration of individual teachers, 
which de-motivates them). Public spending is often skewed towards salaries and 
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away from complementary inputs such as books and supplies, and there is a heavy 
reliance on a relatively expensive technical and vocational education at the secon-
dary level, inherited from the communist era while the trend in other countries is 
to move toward increasing integration of technical and vocational education with 
the general education streams.  
149.  The region could benefit from well-designed policy reforms, including a move-
ment to financing on a per capita basis to promote the consolidation of underused 
facilities
35, accompanied by a loosening of labor and wage regulations to facilitate 
the restructuring of expenditures. In some countries this has already been initiated 
but positive results will not come immediately. Budget constraints also do not 
help speed up reforms. Public administration reforms have not introduced POB on 
a wider scale yet (see Chapter 5), and a focus on the quality of service has not 
reached the education sector.
 As student performance is not part of the budgeting 
criteria, school management staff members do not have a strong incentive to pro-
vide quality education (ADB, 2007).  
150.  Taking into consideration additional fiscal constraints caused by the economic 
downturn, the share of public funds channeled to education cannot be increased 
easily. In some cases, the decentralization of school financing and management to 
regional/local governments can promote accountability, although this depends on 
the quality of governance at various levels of government and the concrete design 
of the decentralization initiative. A greater reliance on private delivery of educa-
tion services and on private financing, particularly at the tertiary level, can also 
help (Gray et al, 2007). On the other hand, pre-school education is potentially 
vulnerable, especially in those countries where it is financed predominantly from 
public funds, as is the case in Kazakhstan
36. The most important issue here is to 
handle the reform of a school system without excluding vulnerable groups from 
quality education.  
151. The excessive healthcare infrastructure (mostly hospitals) inherited from the 
communist era, which is poorly adjusted to insufficient public financing became a 
key obstacle to the effective provision of public healthcare services. Similarly to 
education, the reform initiatives in the healthcare sector aimed to increase the effi-
                                                 
35 However, sometimes this leads to over-reporting of the number of enrolled students.  
36 Kazakhstan made one-year preschool education mandatory and free of charge in the 
early 2000 as its fiscal situation improved. Before independence, the Central Asian repub-
lics had comprehensive child care and kindergarten systems often financed and managed 
by state enterprises. The disappearance of these enterprises left a huge vacuum in early 
child care and education: the government had no fiscal capacity, and parents were poor and 
inexperienced in child care. Therefore, now the majority of children enter primary school 
unprepared. As a result, the first grade has to serve as preschool, adding unnecessary bur-
den to the already overcrowded basic education curriculum (ADB, 2007). Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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ciency of public spending. However, only a few countries managed to adjust their 
healthcare systems to the budget constraints without losing the relatively high 
healthcare standards from the communist period. While it is problematic to provide 
any single indicator illustrating the cross-country effectiveness of health care ser-
vices, some of the West Balkan economies (especially Croatia) seem to perform 
noticeably better. In some instances this is also true for Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia.  
152.  The indicators of child mortality worsened or stagnated on a dramatic level, and 
micronutrient deficiencies that could cause irreversible cognitive damage became 
prevalent to an alarming degree, especially in CCA. However, as the ADB (2007) 
report argues, reestablishing the state run system is not the solution, because gov-
ernments are neither able to sustain it, nor is such an inflexible system desirable.  
153.  The WHO also registered a considerable deterioration in fighting communicable 
diseases, an increased general mortality rate as well as a significantly increase in 
the incidence of water borne diseases. The latter is caused by the deterioration of 
water quality in both urban and rural areas. Hence the indicators of access to im-
proved sources of drinking water are in fact less of an issue than the quality of the 
drinking water, especially in Central Asia and Azerbaijan. After many years of 
intensive farming in arid areas and neglecting infrastructure maintenance, the 
quality of water does not meet required standards (ADB, 2007).  
154. In the low-income countries of CIS and Western Balkans, financial constraints and 
the widespread neglect of maintenance during the late communist and early transi-
tion years has left much of the housing and communal infrastructure stock (includ-
ing water and sanitation facilities) in a dismal state (Gray et al, 2007). According to 
the ADB (2007) report, in many CCA cities central heating systems no longer func-
tion. The system maintenance is not affordable for municipalities, and so far it has 
not been possible to introduce fees for these services. As a result, many families 
rely on electrical heating in winter, which poses a significant strain on the electrical 
systems. The capital cities have at least scheduled access to electricity, but rural 
areas are often left without access to power in winter. Like electricity, gas is often 
in short supply in winter with services being available mostly in the capital. In 
smaller cities, the supply of gas is marginal at best; in rural areas it is often not even 
possible to buy bottled gas for cooking purposes (Gray et al, 2007).  
155.  In the water sector, problems of access, reduced reliability, and less frequent 
service have emerged, especially outside capital cities. In Armenia and Georgia, 
the capital cities are more than twice as likely to have full water service as other 
urban areas (WB, 2006). However, much progress has been made in recent years 
in both countries, and continuous water supply was available to more than 50% of 
the population in 2005. In Central Asia, consumers incur significant time costs CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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and inconvenience in coping with poor water and sanitation services; many col-
lect water from rivers, irrigation channels, and wells (ADB, 2007). 
 
4.3.3.  Achieving Millennium Development Goals 
 
156.  To measure progress achieved over time in various socially related subsectors, we 
have used the latest available Millennium Development Goals (MDG) indicators 
(see Table A.4.10 in the Statistical Annex). In education sphere, transition 
economies, including the analyzed group of countries, are doing better compared 
with other developing countries, but they have a long way to go to match the de-
veloped world. In education, universal attainment of primary education was gen-
erally achieved during the Soviet period. According to net enrolment ratios in pri-
mary education (Target 2.A: “Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys 
and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling”), two 
groups of countries can be distinguished:  
•  Macedonia, Croatia, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan exceed the average indi-
cators for the developed economies, and  
•  A numerous group (comprising almost all the countries under review) is 
characterized by indicators that are somewhat lower than the developed 
countries’ average, with the distance to the chosen benchmark being in 
most cases minimal. 
The only country that falls outside of this range is Azerbaijan where total net en-
rolment ratio in primary education is considerably lower as compared to the refer-
ence average. According to another indicator characterizing Target 2A (propor-
tion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach the last grade of primary education), al-
most all countries (except Albania) are also above or approximately at the level of 
the developed nations’ average.  
157.  As regards gender equality in education, it varies from country to country, with 
Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan
37 having lower attainment levels for girls 
than for boys, which is the reverse of the situation in other analyzed countries 
(ADB, 2007).  
158.  The most alarming situation in the health area concerns child and maternal 
mortality. Only the Western Balkan countries managed to maintain their values at 
levels comparable to the developed economies’ averages (in some cases this is 
also true for Belarus, Ukraine and Russia), whereas other CIS countries (espe-
cially CCA) lag well behind. The under-five mortality rate far exceeds the devel-
                                                 
37 In case of Uzbekistan this relates to upper secondary and tertiary levels of education.  Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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oped nations’ average in almost all countries analyzed, with the exception of 
Croatia and Belarus: in Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia and Kazakhstan, the corre-
sponding indicators are 4-5 times higher than the benchmark; in Kyrgyzstan, Uz-
bekistan, and Turkmenistan the difference amounts to between 7 and 9 times; in 
Tajikistan it is 11 times, and in Azerbaijan, child mortality is 14.6 times higher 
than in comparison countries.  
159.  Infant mortality rates (0-1 year) per 1,000 live births are also dramatically high. 
Rates in Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia and Kazakhstan are 4 - 6 times greater than 
the developed country average. In Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, it 
is 7 to 9 times greater, in Tajikistan it is 11 times greater, and in Azerbaijan, the 
rate is 15 times greater. Maternal mortality ratios per 100,000 live births in Rus-
sia, Moldova and Uzbekistan are 2 - 3 times higher than in developed countries, 
in Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Albania they are 6 - 9 times, in Turkmenistan, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and in Tajikistan they are 13-17 times higher.  
160.  Among the indicators reflecting progress on Target 6.C (“Have halted by 2015 
and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases”), the rise 
of tuberculosis (TB) cases and related deaths is clearly the most fearsome in CIS 
countries since their independence. These indicators are considerably higher (as 
compared to the developed economies) in all the countries reviewed, although in 
the Western Balkans the situation is less alarming compared to the CIS. Espe-
cially high rates of TB are registered in prisons.  
161.  Still, despite the bleak health picture, most of the analyzed countries maintain 
special targeted governmental programs which result in high proportions of 1 
year-old children being immunized against measles, which in most cases is com-
parable with the level achieved in developed countries.  
162. Indicators of access to improved drinking water sources and sanitation facilities are 
generally worse compared to developed countries. The most difficult situations can 
be observed in Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan (in terms of ac-
cess to drinking water), and Moldova, Azerbaijan, Russia and Macedonia (in terms 
of need for improved sanitation). The rural populations in Tajikistan and Azerbaijan 
have the most difficulty accessing improved drinking water, while the proportion of 
rural households lacking improved sanitation is the highest in Macedonia, Ukraine, 
Moldova, Russia, Uzbekistan, Armenia and Azerbaijan. CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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5. Budget Systems 
163.  The quality of public finance management systems in the analyzed countries 
depends very much on the organization of their budget systems. The following 
aspects of budget systems seem to be of particular importance for the effective-
ness, efficiency and transparency of government operations: (i) division of re-
sponsibilities and government resources between different levels and types of 
government bodies, (ii) system of budget planning and execution, (iii) availability 
of clear policy framework for budget-related decision-making, (iv) institutional 
setup of PFM systems, and (v) budget transparency and civil society involvement 
into budget processes. The organization of governments and government budgets 
and their inter-relationships is analyzed in sections 5.1-5.4. Section 5.5 is devoted 
to the issues of policy-budget linkages and the procedures of budget preparation 
and execution. Section 5.6 provides a summary of strategy/policy frameworks 
available in the countries of the region. The issues of budget reporting, transpar-
ency and participation of civil society are discussed in sections 5.7-5.8. 
 
 
5.1.  Organization of government budgets 
 
164.  The analyzed countries, despite their common institutional origins (all but 
Albania were the part of either the USSR or FSRY), now demonstrate a great va-
riety of types of public finance organization. This variety can be explained by the 
differing country sizes, varying levels of economic development, the extent of 
heterogeneity in terms of population and administrative-territorial units, govern-
ment revenue structure and other factors. 
165.  Nevertheless, the organization of their budget systems can be illustrated by Figure 
5.1. Following definitions provided by the GFS Manual (2001), central govern-
ment includes all government units and agencies controlled by a central authority 
which are covered by or financed through the central budget or extra-budgetary 
funds at the central level. The term “extra-budgetary funds” generally refers to 
sets of government units and transactions that are not included in the annual 
budget presentation. 
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rural municipality)
 
Source: Authors based on GFS Manual (2001). 
 
166. Sub-national governments include all government units at the level of province 
(state, region, oblast’) or at the level of the smallest geographic areas distinguished 
for administrative and political purposes (district, rayon, urban/rural municipality). 
Apart from their budgets, sub-national governments may also have their extra-
budgetary units (in much fewer cases though). In line with the IMF GFS (2007), 
sub-national governments are referred to below as local governments
38. 
167.  According to SNA, GG includes all units of central and local governments, all 
social security funds at each level of government and all extra-budgetary nonmar-
ket, and non-profit institutions that are controlled and mainly financed by gov-
ernment units. Apart from GG, the public sector in every country includes also the 
central bank and public financial (e.g., government-owned development banks) 
and nonfinancial (e.g., energy or utility companies) corporations/enterprises. 
While, generally speaking, central banks and public corporations are outside of 
the public finance area, they may have important links with government functions 
and budgets and may implement so-called quasi-fiscal operations (and therefore 
also need to be considered in the PFM context). 
 
 
5.2.  Central government budget 
 
168.  In all countries, taxes are the main source of central government revenues (from 
49% of total revenues in Ukraine to 74% in Armenia) followed by social contri-
                                                 
38 However, in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the IMF consolidates the finances of 
the Brčko district, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska to-
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butions (from 12% in Armenia to 35% in Ukraine
39), other revenues
40 (from 0.3% 
in Moldova to 24% in Russia) and external grants (from 0 in Belarus, Kazakhstan 
and Russia to 6% in Georgia). 
 
Figure 5.2. Structure of central government revenues, 2006 
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Source: IMF GFS (2007). 
 
169. In all countries of the region, the central government controls more than half of the 
GG budget (Figure 5.2
41) with the median share of central government being equal 
to 73%. This rather large percentage may have many explanations including (i) rela-
tively high government spending on social security, defense, public order and safety 
and some other functions, which are mostly/ exclusively implemented by central 
governments (see also Table 5.1), (ii) the small population of many countries, 
which does not require the decentralization of those government functions (e.g., 
many components of education and health), which are usually delegated to the local 
level in larger countries
42, (iii) the prevalence of indirect taxes (collected by the cen-
tral government) in the tax structure of almost all countries (Section 3.7). 
                                                 
39 Social contributions are not separated from taxes in IMF GFS’s data presentation for 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.  
40 Different non-tax revenues including government fees, income from property and paid 
services etc. 
41 Here and below, data are provided only for countries covered by the IMF GFS (2007). 
42 In the group under consideration, countries with larger populations (Russia, Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan, Belarus) all have a share of central government below 70%, while smaller 
countries (with the exemption of Tajikistan) have a share of central government above 
70%. Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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Figure 5.3. Structure of GG budget expenditures in selected countries of the region, 
2006 












Central government Local governments
 
Source: IMF GFS 2007. 
 
Table 5.1. Shares of central government in GG expenditures in 2006, % 
  Belarus Georgia Kazakh-
stan 
Kyr-
gyzstan Moldova Russia Ukraine 
Total expendi-
tures  64 79 59 74 73 59 70 
General public 
services  66 44 58 81 40 70 71 
Defense  99 100 95  98  97 100  100 
Public order and 
safety  86 96 81 95 87 77 99 




4  0  0 49  11 8 12 
Health  24 91 17 88 97 45 26 
Education  21 84 20 36 35 22 36 
Social  protection  93 90 91 91 96 81 90 
Source: IMF GFS 2007. 
 
170.  As follows from Table 5.1, central governments provide almost 100% of defense 
services, and 75-100% of services in social protection and public order and safety. 
There is more variation in respect to other government functions: central govern-
ments spend 40-80% of GG resources allocated for general public services, 30-
100% of resources for economic affairs, 17-97% of resources for health and 21-
84% of resources for education. In all countries but Kyrgyzstan, central govern-CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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ments play a limited role in providing services in housing and community ameni-
ties.  
171.  Countries receiving significant foreign aid often establish special Public Invest-
ment Programs (PIP) where they consolidate aid resources for investment pro-
jects. By now PIP have been integrated in most cases into central government 
budgets; this allows for a more realistic assessment of the fiscal stance and debt 
sustainability outlook. It also facilitates the comprehensive accounting of both 
domestic and foreign financed investment expenditures and their prioritization in 
a general budget framework (Lorie, 2003). Still, PIP are often kept separately 
from regular budget expenditures and are implemented through different proce-
dures in order to provide donors with more control over the utilization of these 
resources (see Section 6.1). 
172.  In many countries of the region (Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, 
Ukraine), substantial central government resources (sometimes more than 30%) 
are channeled through extra-budgetary funds (Figure 5.4). On the other hand, in 
Georgia, according to the IMF GFS data, all central government resources are 
consolidated in the budget. 
 
Figure 5.4. Shares of extra-budgetary funds in central government expenditures, 
2006 












Budgetary central government Extra-budgetary funds
 
Note. For Albania data of 2004. 
Source: IMF GFS 2007. 
 
173.  Extra-budgetary funds usually have dedicated revenue sources
43 (in particular, 
social contributions) and often have a legal identity, with their budgets separated 
                                                 
43 This does not preclude them from receiving transfers from the central government budget, 
if dedicated sources are not large enough to cover all of the expenditure needs of these funds. Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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from the central government budget. Importantly, these funds may not be subject 
to the same level of scrutiny or accounting standards as the annual government 
budget. Pension funds are the largest extra-budgetary units (in terms of re-
sources). In some countries (e.g., Moldova), considerable resources are also con-
centrated in medical insurance funds. The insurance nature of payments from 
these funds is the main rationale to keep them separate from redistributive budget 
social expenditures. In practice, however, this rationale is often questionable as 
the majority of pension and other social security schemes have significant redis-
tribution mechanisms (e.g., minimum pension or unemployment benefit paid re-
gardless of an individual beneficiary’s contribution to the extra-budgetary fund); 
so they do not differ much from the regular budget. 
174. Another rationale for the creation of extra-budgetary funds is the intention of 
authorities to earmark some revenues for particular purposes (road construction, 
regional development etc.) that are considered important. While there could be 
situations when such earmarking may be useful in providing the right incentives for 
revenue mobilization (in the case of pension and health funds, in particular), the 
existence of extra-budgetary funds complicates the fiscal system and makes it less 
transparent, reduces the fungibility of government resources and inhibits the effi-
cient redistribution of resources within a GG budget. Countries of the region had a 
large number of various extra-budgetary units in the 1990s. In the 2000s, this num-
ber has been reduced everywhere, while many such units and funds continue to ex-
ist (e.g., in Croatia). For those earmarked extra-budgetary funds which are expected 
to stay unmerged with budget, the best international practice consists in ensuring 
that (i) publicly available information on the revenues and expenditures of these 
funds is comprehensive and transparent, (ii) financial linkages with the budget are 
clearly identified, and (iii) these funds are fully coordinated with the government 
budget when formulated, approved by parliament and implemented. 
175.  The countries which are dependent on oil and gas related revenues (Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan) established the so-called oil sta-
bilization funds, which accumulated windfall revenues in the periods of high 
prices to be spent in the periods when international prices collapse (like at the end 
of 2008 and 2009 – see Section 3.8). 
 
 
5.3.  Local government budgets 
 
176.  Taxes are one of the main sources of revenues of local governments; their share in 
total local government revenues in the analyzed countries varies from 31% in CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
 
CASE Network Reports No. 92  91 
Russia to 67% in Georgia with the group median being 52% (see Figure 5.5). 
These are mostly land and property taxes (which usually go the lowest level of 
government) and personal and corporate income taxes (which are often shared in 
some proportion between regional budgets and the central government budget). 
However, for all analyzed countries, tax collection alone is not sufficient to fi-
nance those functions, which are delegated to local governments, so they must 
receive large transfers from central governments
44, 45. 
 
Figure 5.5. Structure of local budget revenues in some countries of the region 











Taxes Inter-governmental transfers Other revenues
 
Source: IMF GFS 2007. 
 
177.  In countries such as Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Ukraine, intergovernmental 
transfers/ grants are larger than locally collected taxes. The share of these grants 
in total local revenues varies from 11% in Bosnia and Herzegovina to 58% in 
Russia (Figure 5.5). The group median is 44%, which is slightly less than the me-
dian share of taxes. Obviously, the relative size of transfers depends on the distri-
bution of functions between different levels of government and on the relative 
importance of individual taxes in these economies. For example, in Russia, GG 
receives a large part of its revenues from oil and gas related taxes, which naturally 
                                                 
44 In some countries, richer regions/municipalities collect more taxes than necessary for the 
provision of government services within these administrative-territorial units. In such 
situations, excessive resources are transferred in the opposite direction, i.e. from the local 
to central government. Usually these transfers are small and sporadic, but in some cases, 
local governments transfer a substantial share of their tax collections to the central gov-
ernment; for example, in Kazakhstan in 2006, this share exceeded 20%. 
45 In some countries there are also transfers between different levels of local governments 
(e.g., from the regional government to municipality level). Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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go to the federal budget; at the same time important expenditure responsibilities 
(in particular, primary and secondary education and housing and community 
amenities) are delegated to lower levels of government. In such circumstances, 
massive transfers from central to local budgets are necessary and unavoidable. In 
an opposite example, in Croatia, where the central government assumes many 
financing responsibilities in primary and secondary education, housing and other 
expenditure categories, the need in transfers from central to local budgets is not 
that large. It is worth noting that any further transfer of functions from central to 
local governments in the process of decentralizing social services (which is on the 
agenda of many countries) will have to be accompanied by a corresponding in-
crease in local taxes or, more realistically, in intergovernmental grants. 
178.  There are many types of intergovernmental grants in use (see Figure 5.6)
46. Grants 
can be either earmarked or non-earmarked. An earmarked grant is given under the 
condition that it can only be used for a specific purpose (e.g., payment of teach-
ers’ salaries or some types of social benefits). Non-earmarked grants can be spent 
similarly to local (non-earmarked) tax revenues. 
 
Figure 5.6. Types of intergovernmental grants 
 
179.  Both earmarked and non-earmarked grants can either be mandatory or discretion-
ary.  Mandatory grants (entitlements) are legal, rules-based obligations for the 
central government that issues the grant. This requires that both the size of the 
grant and the conditions under which it is given be laid down in a law or execu-
tive decree and that these conditions are both necessary and sufficient. Most 
grants that are given to sub-national governments on a regular basis are manda-
tory. The size of discretionary grants, and the conditions under which they are 
                                                 
46 Figure 5.6 and thematically associated paragraphs are based on Bergvall et al. (2006).  CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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given, are not determined by rules but decided on an ad hoc, discretionary basis. 
Discretionary grants are often temporary in nature and include, for example, 
grants for specific infrastructural projects or emergency aid to a disaster area.  
180.  Earmarked mandatory grants can be matching or non-matching. Matching grants 
complement sub-national contributions. Matching grants are dependent on norma-
tive or actual spending for services for which the grants are earmarked or on the 
local revenue collection related to these services. All mandatory earmarked grants 
that are not given complementarily to sub-national contributions are non-
matching. Note that mandatory earmarked grants may also be dependent on con-
tingencies other than sub-national contributions, for instance on local circum-
stances or performance indicators. In such cases, the grants are considered non-
matching. The decisive question is whether the decrease in sub-national spending 
will automatically lead to a decrease in the grant. 
181.  Non-earmarked mandatory transfers can be general purpose or block grants. A 
block grant is given by the grantor for a specific purpose (or purposes). However, 
since the grant is not earmarked, the grantee’s actual use of the grant is not con-
trolled. Instead, the output could be regulated through, for example, a set of mini-
mum standards that the sub-national government would have to provide. In this 
case, resources are transferred in the form of a grant to the sub-national govern-
ments to cover all or part of the cost for certain sub-national services. The criteria 
used to calculate the level and distribution of the grant are usually connected to 
the normative cost of providing the goods or services for the sector as a whole, 
using variables that a specific sub-national government cannot directly control. 
The rationale for this type of grant is to improve efficiency in the use of resources 
at the sub-national level, whereas the activity is financed, in part or fully, by the 
central government. If a sub-national unit is able to perform the activity at lower 
than normative costs, the grant will not be reduced for that unit as a consequence, 
thereby giving the sub-national government an incentive to fully explore the ad-
vantages of decentralized service provision. This kind of grant can be a means of 
moving away from earmarked grants. 
182.  Understanding the mechanics of local government grant financing may be 
important for the proper design of social service decentralization reforms. For 
example, the transition from the old system of institutionalized care for children 
without families (usually financed from the central budget) to community-based 
services for vulnerable families and children (financed at the sub-national level) is 
on the agenda of many countries of the region. This implies a resource transfer in 
the form of a grant from central to local budgets. The important function of child 
care should have a sound financial basis, so it is desirable to establish such grants 
as mandatory and not discretionary. This would ensure an uninterrupted flow of 
resources for these purposes not only in good years (in terms of revenue collec-Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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tion on a local level), but also during an economic downturn. If the commitment 
of local governments to deliver this type of services is firm, the grant could be 
non-earmarked; this would make the system simpler (a big advantage in itself). 
However, if the local governments suffer from chronic shortages of resources for 
implementation of nearly all of the functions they are responsible for (as is often 
the case, especially in low and lower-middle income countries), non-earmarked 
grant money is at permanent risk of being redirected to other purposes, which are 
perceived by a local government as having priority in given circumstances. In 
such a situation, grant earmarking becomes preferable. This solution would re-
quire the development of financing norms linked to some verifiable in-
put/output/outcome indicators of service delivery and establishing a control sys-
tem for this type of expenditures. 
183.  Local government spending by sector. While local governments control a much 
smaller part of GG resources than central governments (see set of Figures A.5.1 in 
the Statistical Annex and Table 5.1
47), their role is quite important in some coun-
tries (especially larger ones, see above) and some sectors. In particular, local gov-
ernments play an important role in spending on the social sector. As to be ex-
pected, local governments prevail in the provision of services in housing and 
community amenities (see Figure A.5.1a).  
184.  The provision of education services is traditionally divided between local 
governments (pre-primary, primary and secondary education
48) and the central 
government (tertiary education). As the number of students in mandatory primary 
and secondary education is usually much larger than in tertiary education, spend-
ing on primary and secondary education composes a larger part of total education 
spending (see also Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3). So, local governments normally 
spend more than half of the consolidated education budget (see Figure A.5.1b).  
185.  The situation is more diverse in the health sector (see Figure A.5.1c). Health 
services provision is centralized in Georgia and Moldova (with extensive use of 
extra-budgetary funds). Central government and central extra-budgetary funds 
play an important role in Russia, while in other countries the most resource-
consuming functions of primary and secondary health care are implemented by 
local governments (see also Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.3).  
186.  Finally, in social protection the largest share of resources belongs to pension 
funds, which are always in the structure of central government either as a part of 
the central government budget, or, more frequently, as an extra-budgetary fund. 
Other social protection services (e.g., benefits and social services for vulnerable 
                                                 
47 Shares of local governments in any expenditure category are always 100% minus respec-
tive shares of central government shown in this table. 
48 In Georgia, education services are mostly provided by central government. CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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population groups) are divided in approximately equal proportions between cen-
tral and local governments (see Figure A.5.1d). 
 
 
5.4.  Quasi-Fiscal Operations of Governments 
 
187.  All government functions consisting of implementing public policy through the 
provision of nonmarket services and income and wealth redistribution are consid-
ered fiscal activities
49. Separating these functions from the monetary and com-
mercial activities of government helps to establish clear accountability for the 
conduct of these very different activities and facilitates the assessment of the mac-
roeconomic impact of the fiscal activities of government. However, some fiscal 
activities are carried out by nongovernment public sector agencies whose primary 
activity is monetary or commercial. Such activities are referred to as being quasi-
fiscal to indicate that they are not the primary activities of these agencies and that 
their fiscal effects are not usually reflected in fiscal reports for the GG (as they 
would be, for instance, if the commercial or monetary institution were fully com-
pensated from the central government budget for undertaking a quasi-fiscal activ-
ity). In contrast to explicit fiscal activities, quasi-fiscal activities (QFAs) are often 
introduced by simple administrative decisions, are not recorded in budgets or 
budget reports, and typically escape legislative and public scrutiny. They are in-
troduced by governments to achieve a variety of objectives, such as promoting 
certain activities, redistributing income or collecting revenue. 
188.  The following types of QFAs are usually identified: (i) operations related to the 
financial system, including subsidized lending to the government and/or private 
sector, (ii) operations related to the exchange system, including multiple exchange 
rates, exchange rate guarantees and other arrangements, and (iii) operations re-
lated to the commercial enterprise sector including charging below commercial 
prices for goods and services, the provision of non-commercial services (e.g., so-
cial services) by commercial enterprises, pricing for budget revenue purposes and 
paying higher than commercial prices for inputs to suppliers. 
189.  The best international practice in this area is to replace QFAs with explicit fiscal 
operations, e.g., providing subsidies or compensations directly from a government 
budget. However, if, for political economy reasons, the government can not (or 
                                                 
49 The text in this and next paragraph is based on the GFS Manual (2001). Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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does not want to) eliminate QFAs, it is necessary
50 to assess and publicly report 
them in an accurate, timely and consistent manner. 
190.  QFAs are widespread in the region, with setting tariffs for electricity and gas 
below their cost recovery level being the most frequent practice (in almost every 
country – see Table 5.2). Although since 2002, the situation has generally im-
proved, yet the problem persists and creates long-term risks for the fiscal sustain-
ability of the countries. Moreover, fiscal difficulties and social vulnerabilities as-
sociated with the period of economic downturn may push governments to inten-
sify QFAs again. The most recent IMF country reports refer to QFAs of 2-4% 
GDP or more in the energy sectors of Albania, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Montenegro, Serbia, Tajikistan, and Ukraine. 
 
Table 5.2. Quasi-fiscal activities in electricity and gas sectors in 2002, % GDP 
Quasi-Fiscal Activities  Country 
Total  Electricity sector  Gas sector 
Armenia 0.6  1.1  -0.5 
Azerbaijan 11.6 9.8 1.8 
Georgia  5.7 5.5 0.2 
Kyrgyzstan 12.2  12.0 0.2 
Moldova  4.2 3.3 0.9 
Tajikistan 22.7  21.4  1.3 
Ukraine  8.4 5.3 3.1 
Uzbekistan  26.6 15.9 10.7 
Source: Saavalainen & Ten Berge (2006). 
 
191.  The use of central banks and public financial corporations for the implementation 
of QFAs was frequent in the 1990s in almost all countries. Later they disappeared 
in most countries. However, the National Bank of Tajikistan still provides mas-
sive resources for the cotton sector, the Croatian Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development supports different types of economic activities, and the National 
Bank of Belarus and many public and even private enterprises in this country are 
involved in extensive QFAs. The period of global financial crisis may serve as an 
excuse to return to these negative practices, especially if one wants to follow 
closely the recent experiences of certain leading central banks such as the US 
Federal Reserve Board or the Bank of England.  
192.  While the general scale of QFAs has somewhat decreased during the 2000s, the 
situation with measuring and reporting QFAs remains mostly unchanged. There is 
no government in the region that publishes public sector balance sheets explicitly 
                                                 
50 This requirement is included, for example, into the IMF’s Code of Good Practices on 
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showing QFAs; QFA estimates are never included in budget documentation for 
parliaments. In many countries, QFA estimates endorsed by both governments 
and international financial organizations do not exist. 
193.  Very often the use of QFAs is justified as a measure to protect socially vulnerable 
populations from utility price increases and as a way to stimulate employment. It 
should be noted that this way of social support is the least targeted and, therefore, 
the least effective for the purposes of poverty reduction. The main recipients of 
QFAs are always high- or middle-income people as they consume larger portions 
of subsidized electricity, gas and other goods and services and benefit from the 
support channeled through monetary and financial sector QFAs. 
 
 
5.5.  Budget processes 
 
194.  The performance of the PFM system depends, among others, on organizing the 
budget process. For the majority of the analyzed countries, a transition to a full-
fledged national budget process according to the standards used in developed 
countries proved an uneasy task. While some progress has been accomplished, 
there are still problems with fully implementing basic PFM reforms. Concerning 
more advanced reforms, the majority of countries are still in the early stages of 
their implementation.  
195.  Basic PFM reforms include establishing: (i) complete budget classification, (ii) 
complete budget coverage and capital budget integration, (iii) consolidated treas-
ury single accounts, and (iv) adequate budget controls.  
196.  Most of the analyzed countries introduced a full classification of government 
revenues and expenditures by economic, functional, organizational, program and 
funding codes. This facilitates the attribution of public finance transactions to in-
dividual policy areas and creates conditions for the analysis of the social-
economic effects of government revenue collection and spending policies. There 
are still problems with classification in some countries (e.g., Kosovo, Tajikistan) 
as PEFA assessments suggest (see Section 6.6 and Table A.5.1 in the Statistical 
Annex, indicator 5). It is worth noting that the existing classification is often un-
able to trace expenditures on many MDG-related issues (e.g., separating child- 
and mother health-related spending from other health expenditures, primary/basic 
secondary education spending from general secondary education expenditures) 
and some other important policy areas. 
197.  Progress in consolidating various types of government resources (extra-budgetary 
funds, PIP and QFA) into budget documentation going through legislative scru-Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
 
CASE Network Reports No. 92  98 
tiny and in introducing single treasury accounts is also visible, however, more 
should be done in this area (see Sections 5.2 and 5.4 Table A.5.1, indicators 6, 7, 
9). In particular, operations of the majority of extra-budgetary units and even 
some operations included in the government budgets (especially PIP-related) are 
not reflected in treasury accounts.  
198.  The improvement in budget control implies the elimination of systematic over-
spending or the accumulation of arrears. As PEFA reports and scores indicate, the 
predictability and regularity of payments has improved in comparison with 1990s 
but remains far from ideal (see Table A1, indicators 1-4, 16-18); both govern-
ments/ministries of finance and line spending units (ministries and agencies) face 
frequent within- and between-year fluctuations in cash flows, which result in dif-
ferent types of inefficiencies. This is partially caused by the limited technical ca-
pacity of many ministries/agencies (lack of reliable revenue and expenditure fore-
casting techniques) and governance problems (insufficient transparency of re-
source allocation) but has partial roots in unstable revenue flows. The sequestra-
tion of government expenditure, i.e., proportionally cutting expenditures across all 
expenditure programs, is not, therefore, an unknown phenomenon. Usually, 
budget legislation fully exempts some expenditure items such as the wage bill and 
social benefits from sequestration. However, in conditions where the wage bill 
comprises a very large part of total government spending, such arrangements sub-
stantially reduce the discretion power of governments and their ability to priori-
tize expenditure during the time of revenue shortfall (e.g., in time of economic 
crisis). 
199.  The advanced PFM reforms include, among others, (i) medium-term budgeting 
(MTB) and (ii) performance-oriented budgeting
51. The potential benefits of MTB 
are well known. MTB can improve fiscal control, financial discipline, allocative 
efficiency and the cost-effectiveness of service delivery due to a greater clarity of 
policy objectives, more predictability in budget allocation, increased comprehen-
siveness and the validity of budget information and enhanced accountability and 
transparency in resource use. In many countries, however, efforts to introduce 
MTB have ended up as a ritual, resource-consuming effort of little practical value. 
Very often, medium-term spending proposals are not reconciled with the re-
sources available during the budget period. As a result, the spending plans be-
come mere wish lists and have a limited impact on annual budget preparation or 
on medium-term resource allocation. Inefficient coordination with national or 
sectoral strategies, such as PIP, is another problem.  
                                                 
51 The discussion of these reforms provided below is based on Tandberg & Pavesic-
Skerlep (2008). CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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200.  A complete MTB system includes a number of different steps (see Figure 5.7). 
Most countries have taken a phased approach to the introduction process, which 
often takes several years. A medium-term macro-fiscal framework is perhaps the 
most essential building block for an MTB. To ensure that estimates are realistic, 
the macro-fiscal framework must be updated regularly and be fully reconciled 
with budgetary decisions. This is extremely difficult in the time of global finan-
cial crisis characterized by a far-reaching uncertainty in respect to fundamental 
macroeconomic trends.  
201.  The next step is often introducing multi-year expenditure ceilings with the 
purpose of increasing budget predictability for line ministries, while containing 
aggregate expenditures at an acceptable level. Initially, expenditure ceilings tend 
to be related to broad functional categories and are only indicative. In order to 
meet the objectives of enhancing predictability and fiscal control, the ceilings will 
need to be related to specific organizational entities, which can be held account-
able for not exceeding the limits, and to have a formal status in the budget proc-
ess. Unless the MTB ceilings are the starting points for negotiating budgets for 
the following years, they will tend to have a limited impact. Therefore line minis-
tries should be asked to develop medium-term spending plans that fit within the 
established expenditure ceilings. These spending plans should be based on rele-
vant government and sector strategies. They should identify the costs of different 
programs, policies and activities within the ministry’s area of responsibility, to 
allow the responsible minister to prioritize among the different policy options 
within the sector, and the cabinet to choose between proposals for new policies 
and activities in different sectors. The quality of a sector spending program will 
generally depend on whether the country has introduced performance-oriented 
budgeting (see below). To enable a rational MTB discussion, it is essential that 
sector spending programs separate the costs of existing policies from new spend-
ing initiatives. An MTB provides an important basis for the coordination of cur-
rent and capital spending. This is a weak spot of many budget systems, and budg-
ets often fail to recognize the costs required for the maintenance of existing capi-
tal and operational costs for new capital projects. 
202.  Practically all countries in the region have taken some steps towards MTB, but 
most of them are at early stages of this process (see Table A.5.1, indicator 12). 
The majority of countries prepare comprehensive macro-fiscal frameworks, which 
are updated at least twice a year. This is the strongest element of existing MTB 
systems. In countries which are actual or potential EU candidates, or IMF pro-
gram beneficiaries, macro-fiscal projections and the related budget estimates are 
more likely to be kept updated.  
 Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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Figure 5.7. Steps in medium-term budget system 
Existing policies vs. 
new spending 
initiatives
Current vs. capital 
costs
Medium-term macro-fiscal framework
Multi-year expenditure ceilings 
for line ministries




203.  Many countries prepare multi-year expenditure ceilings for budget processes, but 
in most cases, these are too general to have any strong disciplinary effects. In 
most countries ceilings are only indicative, either by definition or because they 
are allocated to broad functional areas and not to organizations that can be held 
accountable for meeting them. In most countries, the out-year ceilings are 
changed the following year without any explicit explanation, so they are of lim-
ited value for planning. There is considerable variation in the scope and quality of 
sector spending programs. In some countries, such as Albania and Macedonia, 
these have been key components of the MTB reforms. Moldova initially devel-
oped its national development strategy largely independent of sector spending 
plans for the MTB process but harmonization was improved in the second itera-
tion of the national plan. Some countries have also noticed progress in using the 
MTB to improve the coordination of current and capital spending. Although there 
is still much progress to be made, most have at least some indication of mainte-
nance and/or operational costs in their MTB frameworks.  
204.  For other MTB issues, progress has been very limited. Countries have great 
difficulties in separating the costs of existing policies from new spending propos-
als. This is not surprising, given that most budgets still focus on financing institu-
tions, not on policies. Because of this, MTB discussions tend to be fairly general: 
about total funding levels rather than specific priorities. In general, the MTB 
frameworks have had little impact on the specific budget negotiations, which con-
tinue to have a one year focus
52. The MTB remains a separate document in all 
countries and only a few countries update their MTBs to reflect budgetary deci-
sions.  
                                                 
52 Russia recently introduced a three-year budgeting system, however, the economic crisis 
and associated sharp drop in revenue and expenditure predictability forced the government 
to postpone the practical implementation of the MTB until the return to a stable economic 
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205.  The progress in the introduction of MTBs must be seen in light of a government’s 
objectives. If a country's main objective for introducing MTB is to establish a 
credible macro-fiscal framework and provide some indicative guidance to the 
budget process, many of the current MTB systems may be considered reasonably 
successful. However, if a country is aiming for a more complete system of MTB, 
in line with the objectives of improved fiscal control, financial discipline, efficient 
resource allocation and cost-effective service delivery, there is obviously a long 
way to go. In many countries, there seem to be significant discrepancies between 
the officially stated objectives and the objectives that are actually pursued. This 
may be because countries accept certain objectives as a result of pressures from 
donors and advisors, but then do little to actually implement them. In fact, the 
efforts to introduce MTB may have taken the focus away from critical weak-
nesses in the annual budget process. For example, in many countries, there con-
tinue to be significant discrepancies between spending ceilings and subsequent 
budget requests; budget discussions tend to be very general, have little policy fo-
cus, and be repeated from year to year. Without addressing these very basic is-
sues, attempts to introduce full-fledge MTBF may appear to be premature.  
206.  As for MTB, the potential benefits of a performance-oriented budgeting (POB) 
are well established and well understood. Better information about outcomes and 
effectiveness helps to allocate budget resources to the programs with the highest 
potential benefits, and helps to address equity concerns. Monitoring the cost-
effectiveness helps to reduce the costs of delivering specific government services 
and public goods. However, whereas the benefits are well understood, there is still 
considerable uncertainty about how to implement a POB. Many OECD countries 
established program classification structures in the late 1960s or early 1970s. A 
few of them have reached advanced stages of the process. Not surprisingly, ef-
forts to introduce POB in transition and developing countries have often met great 
difficulties.  
207.  For an advanced POB system to be effective, agencies must be given more 
freedom in determining how to meet their stated objectives and manage their 
budgets. For this, good reporting practices as well as appropriate internal control 
must be in place to prevent and detect fraud and error. In this system, control over 
the agencies does not relate to inputs used but concentrates on the activities car-
ried out and results achieved. It is important to emphasize that more freedom im-
plies more responsibility and accountability. Agencies should not be given more 
authority if there are no appropriate controls and accountability mechanisms.  
208.  A complete POB system includes a number of different steps (Figure 5.8). In turn, 
each step brings with it various complexities and challenges, and will depend, in 
most cases, on a successful completion of more basic reform steps. For instance, 
it is not possible to develop an effective performance (output or outcome) budget Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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in the absence of a well-functioning input budget. The first step is usually to in-
troduce a programmatic budget classification. The second step is to define indica-
tors that describe the inputs to each program and the related activities. Outcome 
and output indicators should be defined at the beginning of a program and set for 
the whole duration of the program. For many programs, the focus is on output 
indicators, since outcomes are usually difficult to measure. There may be long 
time lags between outputs and outcomes or it may be unclear to what extent an 
outcome can be attributed to a particular organization. Very often outcomes de-
pend on the work of several different organizations and external factors. Interme-
diate outcome and output indicators are used for monitoring progress in program 
implementation, as well as for the revision and adjustment of indicators. Once the 
program structure and related indicators have been established, it is important to 
ensure that all activities contribute to the established objectives.  
209.  Governments will often be involved in a number of activities that have a historical 
rationale, but limited impact on current program objectives. It is important to re-
view such activities to assess whether they should be discontinued or restructured 
to give a clearer contribution to specific objectives. Once performance informa-
tion (i.e., the relationship between input and output/ outcome indicators) is avail-
able, it can be used to support management decisions regarding the allocation of 
funds. At this stage, performance information is usually only one of the factors 
influencing funding decisions, and there is no one-to-one relationship between 
performance and funding. In order to use performance information consistently, 
the budget process should include explicit mechanisms for the collection of esti-
mates and results for budget program performance. The final and most advanced 
step is to create stringent funding decision rules based on performance indicators. 
Such mechanisms include purchaser-provider systems, where the central govern-
ment purchases specific services according to pre-determined prices, for instance 
health care services, from agencies and other providers. Even such systems are 
often combined with discretionary funding mechanisms. 
210.  Most countries in the region are in the early stages of developing a POB. Only a 
few of them are introducing elements of output-oriented budgeting and have de-
veloped mechanisms where the funds provided are directly related to the results 
achieved (like Kyrgyzstan in the health sector). Almost all of the analyzed coun-
tries have introduced programmatic budget classifications, but their quality varies 
considerably. In many cases programs are designed to describe an agency’s ac-
tivities rather than its operational objectives. As a result, there is often a signifi-
cant overlap between programmatic and organization classification. In addition, 
all the countries have developed some activity and input indicators. This is fairly 
easy to do because programs tend to be based on organizations. Accordingly, 
many activity and input indicators primarily describe the traditional activities of CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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these agencies. Some countries (e.g., Macedonia) have developed reasonably 
comprehensive indicators for outputs but there are few outcome indicators. In 
many countries the term “outputs” is used but the indicators related to this term 
often describe activities rather than outputs. 
 
Figure 5.8. Elements of a performance-oriented budgeting system 
 
 
211.  Due to the lack of well-defined output and outcome objectives and the organiza-
tional focus of the budget programs, a realignment between the different elements 
in the result chain is often lacking or unclear. It is often difficult to see whether 
and how current activities contribute to stated objectives. Even in countries with 
comprehensive program structures, some programs lack clearly stated objectives 
and indicators. Where objectives are defined, it may still be very unclear how the 
different activities contribute to achieving them. The lack of a clear result chain, 
with missing elements and unclear relationships, makes it difficult to define effi-
ciency indicators and to systematically assess program efficiency. There is anec-
dotal evidence that performance information may have some impact on decisions 
in a few countries. Line ministries are in principle required to include perform-
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vance and enforcement of such provisions is rather weak. Even when some in-
formation is available, it is in many cases ignored at the time of decision-making.  
212.  Common obstacles include capacity shortages (especially in line ministries), staff 
reluctance to adopt changes, underestimating time and resources required, and in 
many cases, the existence of more pressing priorities or more basic reforms to be 
put in place. As for MTB, there is considerable uncertainty about the purpose of 
the POB reforms in many countries. Often, this is very much an ad-hoc effort, 
sometimes driven by vague notions that POB is a desirable feature of a budget 
system. In many ways, the POB reforms themselves suffer from the same weak-
nesses as the budget programs that are to be defined through these reforms: un-
clear objectives, excessive activity focus and unclear result chains.  
213.  Many governments have problems in establishing a clear operational understand-
ing of basic POB concepts in budget organizations. As mentioned before, it is 
very common that outputs are confused with activities. It seems even more diffi-
cult to establish a clear and agreed upon understanding of concepts related to out-
comes and efficiency. For budget systems with a strong input and activity focus, 
shifting to an outcome focus represents a dramatic change in administrative cul-
ture and priorities. One generic challenge for POB systems is that officials are 
reluctant to take responsibility for results they do not control. It is important to 
establish a clear understanding of how and to what extent managers will be held 
accountable for results. For instance, while outcome indicators are useful for 
measuring the progress of a government program in the longer term, it is gener-
ally too crude a measure to use directly for the annual performance evaluation of 
a manager. The outcome indicators will have to be supplemented with indicators 
related to other parts of the result chain, to get a clear sense of the effectiveness of 
the organization and its manager. This performance management framework 
should also recognize that managers need to take risks in some areas, and that in 
some cases these risks will lead to negative results.  
214.  Some countries have attempted to strengthen output control while retaining 
traditional input controls. It is very difficult for managers to improve their effi-
ciency or effectiveness, if they do not have the authority to take decisions regard-
ing the allocation of resources or deployment of staff, and consequently they will 
be reluctant to accept any increased responsibility for the performance of their 
organizations. Effective mechanisms for accountability and control are also criti-
cal. When managers are given increased autonomy, it is essential to have well-
functioning accounting and reporting mechanisms, to ensure that they are held 
accountable for their results and for abiding by regulatory provisions, in a trans-
parent fashion.  CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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215.  It follows from the above discussion that many countries have embarked on POB 
reforms prematurely. Performance budgeting is difficult, much more so than tra-
ditional input budgeting. An absolute minimum requirement for introducing ele-
ments of output or outcome budgeting should therefore be the existence of a well-
functioning input budget system. 
 
 
5.6.  Policy frameworks 
 
216.  As mentioned above, modern budgeting systems which aim to increase the 
effectiveness and efficiency of government policies require the availability of a 
consistent national medium-term policy framework. Such a framework in the 
form of a national development strategy/ plan is expected to determine a coherent 
set of national development goals, tasks and policies, establish clear priorities and 
incorporate sectoral strategies ensuring their complementarily and excluding con-
tradictory and duplicating policy actions. An operational framework of this type is 
necessary for the introduction of the MTB, the POB and other innovations in the 
budget process. 
217.  At the end of the 1990s/early 2000s, the World Bank, the IMF and other interna-
tional development organizations began promoting medium-term strategic plan-
ning in partner countries in the form of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSP). The majority of the countries of the region prepared PRSPs with the sup-
port of their development partners. In the second part of the 2000s, many of them 
began to feel that the focus on poverty implied by the very title of PRSP did not 
match their actual/aspired status of middle-income countries and too narrowly 
defined their development priorities. So, the second generation of medium-term 
strategies often does not mention poverty reduction as such, but refers to a 
broader development agenda, while essentially keeping key featured of the PRSP. 
In most cases, PRSPs refer to medium-term country development strategies for 3-
5 years but some refer to strategies with horizons as long as 13-15 years. For ex-
ample, longer-term plans are the basis of Armenia’s (2008-2021) and Georgia’s 
(2003-2015) PRSPs. However, the financial crisis may outdate many of these pol-
icy frameworks which have been built on too optimistic macroeconomic assump-
tions.  Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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218.  The countries which did not embark on the PRSP process also have some 
strategic planning instruments of a medium-term or long-term nature. A summary 
of recent development strategies is provided in Table 5.3
53. 
 
Table 5.3. Poverty reduction strategy papers and national development strategies 
Country Document  and  date 
Albania  National Strategy for Development and Integration, 2008 
Armenia  Sustainable Development Program for 2008-2021, 2008 
Second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2008  
Azerbaijan  State Program on Poverty Reduction and Economic Development 2003-
2005, 2003 
Belarus  Program of Social-Economic Development for 2006-2010, 2006 
B&H  Medium-Term Development Strategy, 2004 
Croatia  Strategic Development Framework for 2006-2013, 2006 
Georgia  Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Program for 2003-2015, 
2003 
Kazakhstan  Development Strategy “Kazakhstan-2030”, 1997,  
Strategic Plan of Kazakhstan Development till 2010, 2001 
Kosovo No 
Kyrgyzstan  Country Development Strategy for 2007-2010, 2007 
Macedonia  Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2000 
Moldova  National Development Strategy for 2008-2011, 2008 
Montenegro  Development And Poverty Reduction Strategy, 2004 
Russia  Concept of Long-Term Social and Economic Development till 2020, 2008 
Serbia  Poverty Reduction Strategy 2004-2006, 2004 
Tajikistan  Second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2007-2009, 2007 
Turkmenistan  Strategy of Economic, Political, and Cultural Development of Turkmeni-
stan till 2020, 2003 
Ukraine No 
Uzbekistan  Welfare Improvement Strategy for 2008-2010, 2008 
Sources: World Bank, web-sites of the national governments. 
 
219.  Child-related policies are often mentioned in PRSP documents. This is so because 
children are generally considered one of the most vulnerable groups in transition 
societies and therefore concrete policies targeted at them are in line with national 
poverty reduction strategies or, in broader terms, in line with the MDGs. Chil-
dren’s issues are present in national development strategies explicitly or, more 
often, implicitly, as part of the social agenda within three major sectors: social 
protection, education and healthcare. Most countries admit that the struggle 
against poverty among children and youth is of particular importance because it 
contributes to breaking the trans-generational transmission of poverty and its vi-
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cious cycle among some parts of the population (Serbia and Montenegro PRSP, 
2004).  
220.  The cases in which child-related issues are dealt with explicitly include the 
Albanian PRSP, which contains the National Child Strategy referring to various 
aspects of children’s well-being with special attention to actions against child 
poverty, proper treatment of children in courts and penal institutions and educa-
tional and health issues. Georgia included the National Action Plan for Children 
for 2003-2007 in its PRSP (2003), with priority directions in the educational, so-
cial and cultural spheres. Uzbekistan devoted a special section to children’s issues 
recognizing the fact that children under the age of 15 make up nearly 41% of the 
total population. Therefore it puts a special emphasis on the implementation of the 
document “A World Fit for Children” which aims to strengthen the interaction 
between the different institutions involved in child-related processes, and the de-
velopment of local initiatives and the participation of local organizations.  
221.  Several countries have devoted substantial parts of their PRSPs to cross-cutting 
issues relating to children without explicitly referring to special institutions, 
strategies or systematic action plans. For example, Serbia put together a section 
on various issues related to poverty reduction among children and youth as well 
as Roma (with emphasis on education and health). The document also identifies 
main problem areas and recommendations of actions (including concrete ones, 
such as setting pilot projects). Similar issues are taken up in Montenegro’s Devel-
opment and Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP, 2004).  
222.  The sections on children and youth policies, either within a formalized plan or 
strategy or as a collection of policies such as those mentioned above, are gener-
ally not linked to any concrete financial commitments on the part of the Govern-
ment. They rely on future budgeting in sectors such as health, education, culture 
and sports or social protection. Therefore, they present general intentions and pri-
orities rather than any concrete action plan and timeframe. As such they are not 
likely to be binding for governments, especially since most proposals are defined 
in a rather vague manner making it impossible to monitor their progress and ac-
complishment.  
223.  Policies targeting children and youth are more accountable when they are part of 
national strategies for specific sectors such as education, health and social secu-
rity. While expenditures in these sectors do not finance only children’s needs, 
they may include some specific spending items targeting directly them. Moreover, 
public funding of education is usually dominated by the needs of primary and 
secondary education (see Section 4.2.3), both of which directly benefit children 
and youth. On the other hand, even if specific child-targeted policies cannot be 
singled out from total spending on health care or social protection (which is often Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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the case of national strategies) one may correlate attention given to these sectors 
(in terms of additional funds and reforms) with the improvement of children’s 
well-being.  
224.  Most strategic documents include so-called policy matrixes which present the 
detailed activities envisaged for their implementation in specific sectors such as 
energy, industry, education or waste management. The matrix contains a brief 
description of activities along with the timeframe and cost estimates of their im-
plementation. Together these actions constitute the national strategy. Sometimes 
they are already ongoing, in other cases - they are new. Some countries treat the 
total cost of these policies as the actual budget lines fully corresponding to budget 
expenditures (e.g. the cost of all education policies add up to total budget expen-
ditures on education). In this case national strategies look like the equivalent of 
future budget plans – however, whether they are going to be implemented remains 
an open issue. More often the total cost is an addition to the previously existing 
budget framework amounting to a fraction of the total budget (e.g. Serbia’s PRSP 
2004-2006 or Georgia’s EDPRP 2001-2003). However, there are countries that 
estimate the total cost of policies above the actual expenditures and thus seek ad-
ditional funding for their implementation (e.g. Albania’s NSDI in 2010-2013).  
225.  Most PRSP documents disaggregate the cost of national strategies into several 
parts according to the source of financing, i.e. the central government budget, the 
local budget, the public sector and external funding. A government’s spending 
commitments are generally formulated with regard to the total costs of strategies, 
although only public resources are controlled by public authorities while other 
sources may be significantly less predictable. Therefore the concrete amount 
pledged, as well as targets in terms of GDP have to be treated with caution, espe-
cially when the PRSP indicates that sources other than the state budget are in-
volved in financing.  
226.  It is very difficult to verify whether the commitments set in national strat-
egy/PRSP documents were actually implemented. PRSP progress reports (if avail-
able) are intended to monitor the indicators selected to reflect progress in specific 
sectors rather than prove whether financial commitments for certain areas have 
been met. This approach is reasonable taking into account that it is not spending 
as such that generates positive change but rather a coherent combination of well 
planned and implemented reforms, enhancing the efficiency of spending and 
proper incentive schemes as well as careful targeting of recipients of assistance. 
On the other hand, using actual ex-post expenditure data collected by the WHO or 
UNICEF to verify spending commitments may not be entirely accurate due to 
potentially different approaches adopted by governments and the aforementioned 
institutions in compiling data.  CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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227.  In spite of these problems we can attempt to verify how binding the PRSP 
commitments for governments were and look at countries’ actual spending and 
achievements. For example, Armenia’s Second PRSP (2008) included a useful 
overview of spending commitments set in the first PRSP (2003) along with actual 
achievements in the areas of health and education measured by standard PRSP 
indicators. The document clearly indicated that the country had done better on 
poverty reduction over 2004-2006 in terms of school enrolment rates and child 
and mother mortality rates compared to its first PRSP commitments and actually 
spent less than planned (0.2-0.4% of GDP less on education in 2004-2006 and 
0.7-1.1% of GDP less on health).  
228.  Tajikistan’s experience was less encouraging. Both progress reports (2004 and 
2006) indicated that most targets set in its 2002 PRSP were not met. Secondary 
school attendance rates fell to 88% in 2004. Poverty was the most frequently cited 
barrier to continuing education with 65% of families whose children failed to at-
tend school regularly experiencing financial difficulties (PRSP Progress Report 
2006). This happened in spite of the increase in official spending from 2.1% of 
GDP in 1999 to 2.6% in 2002 and 2.7% in 2004. Health sector statistics painted a 
mixed picture. While between 2001 and 2004 both infant mortality and maternal 
mortality decreased by 6.4 and 24.1%, respectively, PRSP progress reports admit-
ted that these rates might not appropriately reflect the situation, as they did not 
include unregistered births. Official health sector spending remained stagnant at 
around 0.9% of GDP during 2000-2004 down from 1.1% in 1999.  
229.  Georgia made firm commitments in its 2003 PRSP to increase spending on health 
care, education and child and family allowances. Progress reports published in 
2005 and 2006 allowed for the verification of some of the pledges made for 2004 
and 2005. The EDPRS predicted that the state budget would cover 65% and 22% 
of all expenditures related to health and education programs, respectively, over 
the period of 2003-2005, with the rest financed by local authorities, external fi-
nancing and the private sector (in various proportions). Actual state spending in 
2004 and 2005 was on average higher than planned in the health sector (by 
39.6%) and slightly lower than planned in education (-5.7%). Spending was seri-
ously under-executed in 2004 when it fell short of EDPRS commitments by -
11.5% jointly for both sectors but was increased in 2005, resulting in expenditures 
nearly 50% higher than planned. While the assessment of the Government’s 
commitments were not clear-cut, one has to acknowledge that faced with signifi-
cant under-spending on health and education in 2004, the authorities tried to make 
up for it with spending more in the following year which made it possible to pay 
accrued arrears and accelerate some programs. This may be cautiously taken as 
evidence of the disciplining role of spending commitments made in the EDPRS.  Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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230.  Serbia pledged to spend more on education in its 2003 PRSP, setting a goal of 4% 
of GDP in the medium term and specific goals for 2003-2005 at 3.8% of GDP. As 
the PRSP Progress Report (2006) suggests, actual spending fell short of these 
goals, reaching 3.5% or less during 2003-2005.  
231.  Azerbaijan committed to keeping spending on education constant at 3.5% of GDP 
during 2003-2005, however, spending fell to 3% in 2005 and then further to 2.7% 
in 2006
54. The country was more successful in raising expenditures on health 
from 0.8% in 2002 to 1% in 2005 - just 0.2 percentage point short of the PRSP 
commitment. Georgia fully met its PRSP target of raising spending on health (to 
1.7% in 2005) but spent significantly less than pledged on education (see Section 
4.2.2).  
232.  Sub-regional differences in how PRSPs treat children’s policies are not significant 
and result mainly from the different development level of the two sub-regions 
(see Table 2.6 in Section 2.6) The countries of the Western Balkans, which have 
on average a substantially higher level of GDP per capita when compared with the 
CIS, are trying to increase their otherwise relatively high school enrollment ratios 
or continue reducing child and maternal mortality rates by implementing more 
advanced programs not much different from those introduced in EU. On the other 
hand, CIS countries, in particular Central Asian ones, are choosing methods of 
improving health care and education coverage more appropriate to their develop-
ment level via programs focusing mostly on poverty reduction. One common 
component of all Western Balkan PRSPs relates to reducing the economic and 
social vulnerability of the Roma population and children and improving their ac-
cess to education and health care.  
233.  Generally, the review of a dozen PRSP documents suggests that the effectiveness 
of national strategies in targeting children’s needs and providing a sound back-
ground for POB is limited. On the one hand, they allow governments to elaborate 
their strategies in detail with references to various aspects of child wellbeing – 
poverty, education, health but also culture, sports, social empowerment and many 
others. The relatively open and broad-ranging form of those documents has both 
advantages (countries can take approaches that fit their specific situation best) and 
disadvantages (because it allows for omitting sensitive issues, or avoiding con-
crete commitments). Instead governments themselves decide on the final selection 
of issues to be tackled and measures to be taken. Consequently children’s issues 
are present in national PRSPs to very different extents with some countries com-
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mitting to specific spending levels on concrete programs (providing detailed out-
lines of the programs and responsible institutions) with others merely expressing 
intentions to improving the wellbeing of children and youth at a very high level of 
generality. In he case when specific commitments are made they are usually very 
hard to verify, either because PRSP progress reports are irregular or because they 
fail to provide sufficiently detailed information.  
234.  Summing up, while PRSPs potentially constitute a very good instrument for 
governments to express more interest and commitment to child welfare, in prac-
tice this opportunity has not been used very efficiently. In our view, the effective-
ness of the PRSPs in targeting children would be greatly improved if they were 
followed by obligatory progress reports published at regular intervals. They could 
be built into the PRSP process as an integral systemic part with a clear structure 
facilitating the monitoring of progress and verification of commitments made in 
the main document. 
 
 
5.7.  Budget reporting systems and transparency 
 
235.  Sound budgeting and financial management must be based on a broad set of 
comprehensive and transparent information. Providing timely and accurate report-
ing on budget revenues and expenditures, including donors’ annual and multi-
annual aid flows, is important to underpin sound planning and budgeting as well 
as to allow governments to be fully accountable to their parliaments and citizens 
on the use of domestic and external resources. Transparency rules include norms 
and regulations that establish the conditions under which budgets are prepared 
and presented to civil society.  
236.  Key dimensions of sound budgeting include: policy-based budgeting, comprehen-
siveness of budget coverage, transparency of fiscal and budget information, 
budget credibility (i.e., being realistic and implemented as planned), predictability 
and control of the use of public funds (internal audit) and external audit (for ex-
ample, by the legislature).  
237.  One of the most important budget documents is the government’s budget proposal 
(other documents include the pre-budget statement, enacted budget, mid-year re-
ports, end-of-year report, audit reports). This document is a government’s declara-
tion of the policies that are to be pursued during the upcoming budget year. The 
parliament’s approval of the government’s proposal suggests its concurrence with 
the executive’s chosen priorities (OBI, 2006).  Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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238.  According to OBI (2006), Croatia and Russia are the lead countries in the region 
in informing the public on the budget proposal, with 59 and 58 out of 100 scores. 
They are followed closely by Ukraine, Macedonia, Georgia, Serbia, and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. In these countries, citizens are informed through the media and 
press on budget proposals. In Montenegro, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Moldova, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, “some” information on the budget pro-
posal is released to the public. In Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Bela-
rus, only minimal budget information is provided to citizens and these countries 
perform rather poorly in terms of budget transparency. Data is not available for 
Kosovo.  
239.  Furthermore, governments often fail to give systematic budget information to the 
legislature. In most countries, even in top performing ones like Croatia, Russia 
and Ukraine, the proposal (or series of proposals forming the document) did not 
provide a comprehensive picture of the government’s fiscal position during the 
forthcoming year(s). The documents do not lay out the government’s policy goals 
and explain how the planned spending will assist in achieving them. Also the gov-
ernments do not disclose detailed information on the expected revenues, plans to 
borrow, payments arrears, etc. (OBI, 2006). Summing up, the budget process is 
still not satisfactory enough throughout the region. Russia and Croatia are the top 
performers in the region, followed by Ukraine and the Western Balkan countries. 
Moldova. Georgia, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are next in line. Kyr-
gyzstan lags behind. For countries like Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Bel-
arus, government accountability scores are very low while the data are not avail-
able for Kosovo (GIR, 2007, OBI, 2006).  
240.  The governments of Armenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Russia, 
Serbia, Montenegro and Ukraine issued pre-budget statements to disclose the 
overall spending and revenue levels during the budget formulation, prior to sub-
mission to the parliament. The pre-budget statement is presented and approved by 
the legislature, strengthening legislative oversight (OBI, 2006).  
241.  Mid-year reports on the budget execution are provided regularly to the parlia-
ments of Armenia, Albania, Croatia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Macedonia, 
Serbia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, and Moldova but even there they are usually ap-
proved without sufficient parliamentary discussion. Their timely availability al-
lows CSO and parliaments to raise important questions on the divergence from 
the policies approved in the budget. None of the analyzed countries provides a 
mid-year report to public (OBI, 2006).  
242.  An annual budget report should be issued by the government at the end of the 
year and it should be more then a mere financial statement. Rather it should serve 
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update on progress in achieving policy goals and improvements in outcomes that 
were laid out at the beginning of the year. Most countries provide only partial in-
formation in their annual reports, while reporting in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, and Russia is more detailed (OBI, 2006). There is no data on Tajikistan, Uz-
bekistan, Turkmenistan, Belarus and Kosovo.  
243.  In most countries, governments do not make information publicly available that is 
already produced for its internal use or for donors (OBI, 2006).
 Only in Georgia 
and Ukraine are attempts made to provide budget information in a form that a 
non-expert could easily grasp. Itemized budget spending is not usually accessible 
to the wider public (GIR, 2007).  
244.  In a few countries only, namely in Georgia, Albania, and Kazakhstan, parliaments 
hold public hearings regarding budget formulation. In Armenia, Bosnia & Herze-
govina, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Montenegro, Ukraine, Russia, and Croatia, citizens 
and CSO submit their proposals to their respective parliaments but these initia-
tives yield no results. In the remaining countries, the public has a very limited role 
in providing input to the budget formulation process.  
245.  Unless there is a strong demand for accountability, most PFM reforms will not be 
sustainable in the long run. Parliaments can play a critical role here as they ap-
prove budget allocations, oversee budget execution and control budget perform-
ance. They can mitigate the risk of excessive budgetary discretion by the execu-
tive power by reinforcing the countervailing mechanisms of government account-
ability and legislative scrutiny. They can also exert pressure on the executive to 
improve fiscal performance (Ackerman, 2005). In most countries, the legislature 
has formal power to amend the budget and oversee its implementation (GIR, 
2007).  
246.  The amount of time that the government gives legislature to work on a budget 
proposal determines the parliament’s ability to conduct the oversight function. 
Experience suggests that three months is the minimum time for a meaningful par-
liamentary budget process. In fact, many countries do not meet this criterion, ex-
cept for Russia and Kazakhstan (OBI, 2006). 
 
 
5.8.  Participation of civil society in national budget processes 
 
247.  The Western Balkan countries, Ukraine and Moldova have achieved notable 
progress in their relationships with civil society. Also, a number of advocacy 
groups that perform a watchdog function occasionally defy the government. On 
the other hand, in Belarus, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, trade unions remain Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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under state control; restrictions persist on civic engagement, so very few CSOs 
exist. Poor legal protection has left NGOs vulnerable to control and censorship by 
state authorities (WB, 2004). Russian NGOs still operate largely outside main-
stream society. In Central Asia, with the exception of Kyrgyzstan, freedoms of 
expression and association are still limited. Nevertheless, civic engagement is 
widely practiced at the community level in Central Asia. Some regional CSOs are 
building on resurgent traditional organizations, such as guilds, artisans’ associa-
tions, and religious foundations that maintain shrines, schools, and public welfare, 
often with government support. While strong traditional ties in rural areas may 
promote civil society initiatives, high levels of corruption and bureaucratization 
could undermine their effectiveness (Novikova, 2007).  
248.  As discussed in Section 5.7, access to budget information, participation in the 
formulation of national and local budgets and their monitoring remain weak 
across the region despite increased public interest stemming from concerns re-
lated to endemic corruption, ineffective public service delivery, and slow com-
munity-led development. CSOs may participate in the budget process in four 
phases: (i) budget preparation and formulation, (ii) budget analysis, i.e. evaluation 
of whether documents prepared during the first stage of budget cycle correctly 
address social development concerns, (iii)  expenditure tracking, i.e. verifying 
whether the funds allocated for particular programs have indeed been spent on 
these programs and (iv) performance monitoring when CSOs rate the final outputs 
of government agencies.  
249.  Accountability  means the  obligation of power holders to account for or take 
responsibility for their actions. It relies on civic engagement while the depth of 
involvement is frequently related to the level of institutionalization of relations 
between government and civil society. Accurate, timely, and comprehensive in-
formation is required during each stage of the budget cycle to ensure the account-
ability of government to citizens. Most countries in the world do not meet this 
standard (OBI, 2006).  
250.  The lack of independent media and of timely and accurate information about 
public policy offers limited incentives and resources for citizens to monitor and 
assess their government’s performance in spending or development initiatives 
(WB, 2004). Many countries recently introduced the practice of make budget 
documents available to the public through the Internet but in most of the analyzed 
countries, access to this communication channel remains limited and unequal. 
According to the World Factbook of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
12% of the population in Albania uses the internet, 6% in Armenia, 13% in Azer-
baijan, 25% in Bosnia & Herzegovina, 70% in Belarus, 9% in Georgia, 13% in 
Kazakhstan, 15% in Kyrgyzstan, 35% in Macedonia, 18% in Moldova, 40% in 
Montenegro, 20% in Serbia, 21% in Russia, 0.3% in Tajikistan, 8% in Uzbeki-CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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stan, 22% in Ukraine, 1.5% in Turkmenistan and 44% in Croatia. There is no data 
available for Kosovo.  
251.  “Right to information” laws have been introduced in many countries of the 
region: Albania, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Croatia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Macedonia, 
Moldova, Serbia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Georgia, while Ukraine stands out as a 
particularly good case. Constitutional guarantees exist in Kazakhstan, Russia and 
Tajikistan but actual access to information is restricted. Kyrgyz citizens have no 
right to appeal if access is denied. In Montenegro and Russia, there is no institu-
tional mechanism through which citizens can request public records. Generally, 
the laws appear adequate but, despite some improvement across the region, citi-
zens and CSOs face multiple difficulties in ensuring their implementation.  
252.  A number of countries improved their legislation to reflect citizens’ demands and 
interest in topics of their concern. The interest in improved service delivery means 
increased pressure to provide citizens with highly detailed information, such as 
expenditures in their local school districts or health centers (which is not included 
in a country’s budget information). Clearly, defining the procedures for ensuring 
the simultaneous release of public documents and information to interested parties 
is an important first step in maintaining sound financial management.  
253.  Most CSOs from the reviewed countries report a lack of commitment on the side 
of the executive (government) and legislature (parliament) to make full use of 
opportunities to engage and inform the public on the budget. For example, many 
parliaments fail to hold committee hearings on the budget.  
254.  CSO control functions remain weak. Budget documents consolidate a wide range 
of economic and financial information. However, CSOs in the region have rarely 
commissioned Participatory Public Expenditure Reviews, Expenditure Tracking 
Studies, report cards (surveys that focus on poor people’s experiences with public 
services). Participatory performance monitoring (PPM) thus remains well under-
utilized across the region, partly because of the lack of capacity and the fact that 
PPM is expensive for both local governments and CSOs. However, independent 
budget monitoring, according to the World Bank stocktaking exercise (Novikova, 
2007), is becoming increasingly popular and is likely to increase further. Some 
good examples include: “Increasing Budget for Education” in Albania, “Open 
Budget” in Kazakhstan, financing of NGOs by governments in Macedonia and 
Serbia, CSO monitoring of the government pro-poor policies in relation to spe-
cific vulnerable groups in Serbia. The latter have been integrated into the annual 
PRSP progress reports.  
255.  Good examples of CSO engagement mainly relate to their participation in the 
formulation and monitoring of local government budgets. They include budget 
hearings and civic participation in budget formulation and monitoring of expendi-Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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tures in relation to social welfare, health, education and allocations for CSO ac-
tivities at the local level. Budget transparency initiatives have been going on for 
years in Georgia, Armenia, Albania, Serbia, Bosnia, Russia and this is still the 
work in progress. The city of Obninsk in Russia has been one of the pioneers in 
the area. According to the OSCE (2007) survey, 14% of local budgets in Bosnia 
& Herzegovina are formulated with citizens’ input. Local budgeting processes 
and CSO inclusion have led to the increased activity of northern Azerbaijan mu-
nicipalities (Public Expenditure Management Seminars for Municipalities and 
Municipal Budget Transparency) to seek subsidiary funding for important public 
services. The Service Improvement Action Plan and Improving Local Self-
Governance in Central Asia and Local Budget Transparency and Accountability 
of Local Self-Government in Kyrgyzstan are two related programs. Others in-
clude: Budget Transparency Program in Georgia, Participatory Budgeting in the 
Municipality of Elbasan (Albania), Open Municipality Budget (Macedonia), 
Monitoring of Municipal Councils (parliaments)/B&H Local Governance Pro-
gram, Participatory Budgeting at Municipal Level (Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
Budget execution activities primarily focus on public education to improve 
budget literacy, transparency portals, budget hearings, public expenditure tracking 
surveys, and social audits.  
256.  There are less examples of national level activities.  The Economic Research 
Center in Azerbaijan regularly publishes brochures about the ongoing budget and 
releases brochures with information on specific areas of public expenditure (edu-
cation, social welfare). It also publishes budget related calendars, and ensures 
budget analysis for parliamentarians. In 2006, nine NGOs in Azerbaijan estab-
lished the National Budget Group to implement the permanent monitoring of the 
budget execution (Novikova, 2007). The Croatian Institute of Public Finance has 
been increasing the transparency of the budget execution through its Newsletter.  
257.  The anti-corruption initiatives in the budget monitoring process include: the 
Kyrgyz Parliamentarians Against Corruption in Kyrgyzstan, the Extractive 
Agency Transparency Initiative in Kazakhstan, Public Opinion Survey of Corrup-
tion in Tajikistan, Grant Programs Monitoring and Public Expenditure Monitoring 
Programs in Georgia. Budget Analysis Project in Armenia, Increasing Budget for 
Education National Revenue and Expenditure Analysis projects in Albania. Sub-
national initiatives are often used as an introduction into testing national policy 
proposals such as the Budget Dialogue Initiative in Kyrgyzstan and the support to 
NGOs initiative in Macedonia (Novikova, 2007). CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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6. Donors’ Instruments in PFM 
Reforms 
6.1.  Overview of Key Donor Instruments 
 
258.  An absolute majority of the countries in the region have received substantial 
donor assistance during the transition period in the 1990s and 2000s. Donors sup-
ported a broad program of reforms related to virtually all aspects of the economic, 
social and political development of these countries. The recipient governments 
played a decisive role in the design and implementation of these reforms. Gov-
ernment budgets and other components of public finance (e.g., extra-budgetary 
funds, SOE resources) were key instruments for reform. Therefore, donors need 
to pay a lot of attention to the PFM. 
259.  Donors aim to support recipient countries in their progress towards reaching 
MDGs, reducing poverty and achieving sustainable development. An effective 
and efficient PFM is an important pre-requisite for reaching these goals. For 
Western Balkan countries preparing for EU accession, an important donor goal is 
to support the process of harmonizing the countries’ national PFM systems with 
the acquis communautaire.  
260.  All donor interventions in the area of PFM can be grouped into three categories: 
(i) direct provision of resources for public expenditures through loans, grants and 
debt relief to governments; (ii) policy conditionality accompanying financial aid 
to support required reforms; (iii) technical assistance to governments in imple-
menting PFM reforms. On the other hand, donors have now realized that they also 
have to do their part in assisting with the development of an effective PFM in the 
recipient countries by aligning donor financing modalities and practices with re-
cipient country systems (see more on that in Section 6.7).  
261.  An important task of donor interventions is to support and not undermine 
domestic revenue mobilization for the purposes of a country’s social and eco-
nomic development. Donor resources have to augment government resources di-
rected to priority sectors and/or reforms and not replace domestic resources allo-
cated for these purposes. Therefore, additionality (support for actions which 
would not have taken place in the absence of donor resources) is a required fea-
ture of any donor intervention.  Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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262.  Frequently used modalities of handling donor resources include: (i) general 
budget support, in which the recipient government has nearly full discretion in 
managing donor money, as very loose or no restrictions on the allocation of these 
resources exist; (ii) sectoral budget support, in which the recipient government 
manages these resources but commits itself to spend them only/mostly within pre-
determined sector(s); an important form of sector budget support is the so-called 
Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp); (iii) direct donor control of spending, i.e. project 
implementation through PIUs, mostly used for investment and TA projects. 
263.  Different donors have different roles in and approaches to PFM reforms. The IMF 
is a key source of conditionality; its resources are not usually used for the direct 
financing of public expenditures (they go to central banks to increase their inter-
national reserves rather than to the government budget). The IMF is also a major 
source of expertise on PFM issues. The World Bank (and ADB for CCA coun-
tries) provides many kinds of support: resources for budgets, conditionality, in-
vestment loans, and technical assistance. The EC is a very important source of 
investments, technical assistance and budget support for Western Balkan coun-
tries and, to a somewhat lesser extent, to other countries of the region. For indi-
vidual country groups, the EC uses different instruments such as the Instrument 
for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) for actual and potential EU candidates, the 
European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) for the Western CIS 
and Caucasus countries, a separate arrangement (four cooperation spaces) for 
Russia (sometimes also considered in the ENPI framework), and the Development 
Cooperation Instrument (DCI) for Central Asian countries. Bilateral donors (the 
US, the UK, Netherlands, Japan, Switzerland and others) provide direct budget 
support, investment resources and technical assistance. Bilateral (especially 
smaller) donors often pool resources together with each other and larger players 
(e.g., provide resources for a Trust Fund managed by the World Bank, UNDP or 
other UN agencies).  
264.  Recently new donors—China and Russia—emerged in the region; they also 
strongly influence the public finance situations in some of the smaller CIS coun-
tries. They provide these countries with resources for public investments on IDA-
comparable terms (e.g., Chinese loans to Tajikistan for automobile road rehabili-
tation and energy projects or Russian loans to Kyrgyzstan for the construction of a 
hydropower station), direct budget support (e.g., Russian support to Armenia, 
Belarus and Kyrgyzstan) or debt restructuring on conditions close to those of IFIs 
(e.g., Russian debt-for-equity swaps with several CIS countries). The modalities 
of their support may differ from those of OECD countries (less or no policy con-
ditionality, but explicit or implicit political conditionality). These donors are not CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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active in the area of technical assistance in PFM issues. At the same time, Rus-
sia
55 serves as a source of technical expertise in many areas including PFM for 
many smaller countries of the region due to the common institutional and cultural 
background, similar incentive structures of the political elite, and therefore, ease 
of copying Russian policies and institutional arrangements. Apart from official 
donors (countries and international organizations), non-governmental donors are 
also important in some of the region’s countries. For example, the Armenian di-
aspora in Armenia and the Aga-Khan Development Network in Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan provide substantial funds for public investment projects, which are 
complimentary to government activities and obviously indirectly affect govern-
ment budget allocations (e.g., no need for government to allocate resources for 
school rehabilitation in a village, if the diaspora takes care of this). 
 
 
6.2.  Direct Budget Support 
 
265.  The WB and ADB provide direct budget support in the form of Development 
Policy Operations (DPO) and similar instruments
56 aimed to mitigate transition 
costs of structural reforms in targeted sectors. DPOs are usually accompanied by 
policy conditionality, which often includes conditions related to many sectors (in-
cluding the social sector) and cross-cutting issues. DPO conditionality can be 
used by reformers to overcome resistance against reforms. 
266.  Borrowing conditions from the WB group depend on a country’s income per 
capita status (see Section 2.6 and Table 6.1). Middle-income countries can borrow 
from the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which 
provides non-concessional loans. Low income countries are eligible for loans 
from the International Development Association (IDA)
57, which are deeply con-
cessional—interest-free loans and grants for programs aimed at boosting eco-
nomic growth and improving living conditions. Some countries belong to the low 
income group and are eligible for IDA loans, but due to their financial creditwor-
thiness, they are also eligible for IBRD loans (blend group). The ADB has a sys-
tem similar to that of the WB.  
                                                 
55 Also China, although to a much lesser extent 
56 In low income countries with PRSPs, DPOs may also be called Poverty Reduction Sup-
port Credits (PRSCs). Previously, this type of operation was known as Structural Adjust-
ment Credits (SAC). 
57 Currently IDA countries are those that had a per capita income in 2007 of less than USD 
1,095 and lack the financial ability to borrow from IBRD. Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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267.  Information on recent and planned WB DPOs is provided in Table 6.2. In the 
previous CAS/CPS cycle 10 out of 19 countries received direct budget support 
from the WB. In the current planning cycle this number has been reduced to 8 and 
the absolute value of the WB budget support was also reduced. While circum-
stances determining a government’s demand for/WB’s supply of budget support 
are individual for every country, it is possible to notice that the probability of 
DPO implementation is increased by two factors: 
•  relative natural resource scarcity and low share of windfall revenues in 
government budgets, and  
•  willingness/ability of the government to comply with policies promoted 
by the WB, which is higher for EU candidate and potential candidate 
countries and lower in post-conflict countries and countries with authori-
tarian regimes. 
 
Table 6.1. The World Bank’s income and lending categories 
Country  Income group  Lending category 
Albania Lower  middle  income  IBRD 
Armenia Lower  middle  income  Blend 
Azerbaijan Lower  middle  income  Blend 
Belarus  Upper middle income  IBRD 
Bosnia & Herzegovina  Lower middle income  Blend 
Croatia  Upper middle income  IBRD 
Georgia Lower  middle  income  Blend 
Kazakhstan  Upper middle income  IBRD 
Kyrgyzstan Low  income  IDA 
Macedonia Lower  middle  income  IBRD 
Moldova Lower  middle  income  IDA 
Montenegro  Upper middle income  IBRD 
Russia  Upper middle income  IBRD 
Serbia  Upper middle income  IBRD 
Tajikistan Low  income  IDA 
Turkmenistan Lower  middle  income  IBRD 
Ukraine Lower  middle  income  IBRD 
Uzbekistan Low  income  Blend 
Source: World Bank. 
 
Table 6.2. WB DPOs in two last cycles of country programming 
Latest completed CAS/CPS  Current CAS/CPS 
DPOs DPOs  Country  Period  Mil. 
USD
% of total 
WB lending 
Period  Mil. USD 
(planned)
% of total 
WB lending 
Albania 2002-2004 40  24  2005-2008 60  35 
Armenia 2003-2005 28  18  2006-2009 35  19 CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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Latest completed CAS/CPS  Current CAS/CPS 
DPOs DPOs  Country  Period  Mil. 
USD
% of total 
WB lending 
Period  Mil. USD 
(planned)
% of total 
WB lending 
Azerbaijan 2003-2005 20  11  2007-2010 0  0 




2005-2007 0 0  2008-2011 0  0 
Croatia 2005-2008 382  39  2009-2012 Some
58  Some 
Georgia 1998-2005 130  24  2006-2009 63  44 
Kazakhstan 2001-2003 0  0  2004-2007 0  0 
Kosovo 2006-2007 0  0  2008  0  0 
Kyrgyzstan 2003-2006 20  13  2007-2010 0  0 
Macedonia 2004-2006 60  36  2007-2010 75  34 
Moldova 2002-2004 0  0  2005-2008 0  0 
Montenegro 2005-2006 18  56  2007-2010 0  0 
Russia 2003-2006 0  0  2007-2009 0  0 
Serbia 2005-2007 102  27 2008-2011 100  29 
Tajikistan 2002-2004 0  0  2006-2009 20  17 
Turkmeni-
stan  No WB lending  No WB lending 
Ukraine 2004-2007 500  44  2008-2011 600  24 
Uzbekistan 2005-2007 0  0  2008-2011 0  0 
Source: World Bank. 
 
268.  The EC provides another significant source of budget support in the form of 
grants through the Sector Policy Support Programs (SPSP), which were previ-
ously called Food Security Programs (FSPs). FSPs evolved during the last decade 
from financing selected expenditure items, deemed to be critical for poverty re-
duction (the so-called expenditure targeting), towards general and sector budget 
support, which is expected to provide more sustainable results. In their current 
form, apart from budget support, SPSPs also include policy conditionality and 
technical assistance resources. In some cases, FSP/SPSP also incorporate NGO-
support programs (e.g., in Tajikistan). Typically, SPSP policy conditionality has a 
component related to PFM reform (very often this refers to the implementation of 
IMF programs in the country) and a component of structural reforms for a se-
lected sector (see SPSP-supported sectors and budget allocations in Table 6.3). 
The sector concentration of this conditionality is important as the SPSP resources 
are not very large in comparison with total government expenditures of the recipi-
ent countries. 
                                                 
58 To be determined in the process of CPS implementation. Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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Table 6.3. Sector policy support programs  
Country Supported  sector  Program dura-
tion, years 
Total EC contribution 
in FY2007, mil. EUR 
Armenia 
1) Vocational education and 
training, 
2) Food security 
3 19 
Georgia  1) PFM reforms,  
2) Food security  4 19 
Kyrgyzstan  Social protection  3    9 
Moldova Social  assistance  4  21 
Tajikistan Social  protection  5  18 
Ukraine Energy  3  87 
Source: European Commission. 
 
269.  Another instrument the EC uses for providing budget support is Macro-Financial 
Assistance (MFA). This supports general macroeconomic stability (unlike SPSP, 
which promotes sectoral reforms) in recipient countries and has macroeconomic 
conditionalities closely coordinated with those of the IMF and the WB. Recent 
recipients of MFA include Albania (2005-2006, €16 mil. grant plus €9 mil. loan), 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (2003-2006, €45 mil. grant plus €15 mil. loan), Georgia 
(2006, €22 mil. grant), Kosovo (pending, €50 mil. grant), Moldova (2007, €20 
mil. grant). The countries of the Western Balkans could also receive budget sup-
port in exceptional situations through the IPA. 
270.  Sometimes pooled budget support provided by different donors is implemented in 
the form of SWAp. Under this arrangement aid resources are used by the recipient 
government through its standard budget procedures, and this implementation mo-
dality, of course, greatly improves aid coordination and contributes to strengthen-
ing the capacity of the recipient government. Important preconditions of SWAp 
implementation are the adoption of clearly spelled out government sector devel-
opment strategy endorsed by all stakeholders and the availability of a PFM sys-
tem in the country, ensuring that fiduciary risks are not too high. The SWAp ar-
rangement is increasingly used in the LDCs. The only known example of SWAp 
in Europe and Central Asia is in the health sector in Kyrgyzstan. There are plans 
to utilize SWAp in the coming years in Kosovo (education), Kyrgyzstan (educa-
tion), Tajikistan (health and education) and Ukraine (social sector). 
 
 
6.3.  Debt Relief Operations 
 
271.  Some countries in the region experienced external public debt servicing problems 
(see Section 3.5) and applied for various forms of debt relief. Eleven countries CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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received debt relief from the Paris Club (see Table 7.4), some on concessional 
terms (Naples, Houston and some ad hoc arrangements – see Box 6.1). Most im-
portantly, the Paris Club treatments are conditional on the proper implementation 
of IMF programs by applicant countries. As debt repayment requires budget re-
sources, debt relief means releasing some resources for other purposes; in this 
sense it is an equivalent of budget support. 
 
Table 6.4. Debt relief received from the Paris Club 
The latest treatment  Country  Number of 
treatments 
Amount treated, 
USD million  Date Terms 
Albania 3  190  18.01.2000 Classic 
Armenia 0       
Azerbaijan 0      
Belarus 0       
Bosnia & Herzegovina  2  597  12.07.2000 Naples 
Croatia 1  861  21.03.1995 Classic 
Georgia 2  219  21.07.2004 Houston 
Kazakhstan 0       
Kyrgyzstan 2  657  11.03.2005 Ad  Hoc 
Macedonia 2  334  11.09.2000 Ad  Hoc 
Moldova 1  151  12.05.2006 Houston 
Montenegro 
Serbia 
1 4  324  16.11.2001 Ad  Hoc 
Russia  5  76 728  01.08.1999 Ad Hoc 
Tajikistan 0       
Turkmenistan 0      
Ukraine 1  578  13.07.2001 Classic 
Uzbekistan 0      
Source: Paris Club. 
 
272.  The only country of the region which benefited from the IFI’s debt relief options 
is Tajikistan. Its debt to the IMF in the amount USD 97.8 million had been can-
celled in the framework of MDRI at the end of 2005. In 2006-2007, the govern-
ment of Kyrgyzstan declined an offer of debt relief under the framework of the 
HIPC initiative; later the country was not eligible for HIPC treatment due to the 
improved debt situation. 
273.  Some countries also received debt relief from their creditors on a purely bilateral 
basis (e.g., Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan from Russia). This relief 
takes different forms: debt-for-equity swaps, debt cancelation, debt restructuring 
and rescheduling etc. 
 Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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Box 6.1. Concessional terms of debt relief 
Naples terms are only applicable to IDA countries. They imply a debt cancellation of 
67% eligible non-ODA credits; the remaining 33% are to be rescheduled (23 year repay-
ment period with a 6-year grace period and progressive payment) at the appropriate mar-
ket interest rate. ODA credits are to be rescheduled (40 year repayment period with a 16-
year grace period and progressive payment) at the original or a more favourable interest 
rate. The Naples terms also include the possibility for creditor countries to conduct, on a 
bilateral and voluntary basis, debt swaps with the debtor country. 
Houston terms are designed for lower-income countries (with a GDP per capita of less 
than USD 2,995) with high level of indebtedness (e.g., a debt to GDP ratio higher than 
50%) and with a large share of public debt (stock of official bilateral debt of at least 
150% of private debt). Non-ODA credits are rescheduled at the appropriate market rate 
over around 15 years with a 2-3 year grace and progressive payments increasing year by 
year. ODA credits are to be rescheduled (20 year repayment period with a maximum 10-
year grace period and progressive payment) at the original or more favourable interest 
rate. Houston terms also include the possibility for creditor countries to conduct, on a 
bilateral and voluntary basis, debt swaps with the debtor country.  
Ad hoc arrangements specially designed for the debtor country are usually less conces-
sional than the Naples terms, but more favourable than classic (non-concessional) terms. 
 
 
6.4.  Investment Operations 
 
274.  Lending to governments for PIP is the largest part of ODA. Development banks 
are major sources of concessional investment loans. Bilateral donors also provide 
resources for investment loans on conditions that are usually similar to those of 
development banks. The investment operations of the WB are summarized in Ta-
ble A.6.2 in the Statistical Annex. It shows that investment projects compose a 
larger part of total WB lending; almost every country in the region (apart from 
Turkmenistan) has borrowed resources for this purpose. Demand for WB invest-
ment lending has increased recently: 10 out of 19 countries expect to receive more 
(on a per annum basis) investment resources under current CAS/CPS than under 
previous one.  
275.  While a larger part of investment loans goes to the financing of production 
infrastructure projects (energy, roads, telecommunications etc.), social investment 
projects also compose a significant portion of donor investment loans. Their share 
in total investment lending of the WB (Table A.6.2) varies greatly by country and 
by period from 0% for Kazakhstan (the only country without social infrastructure 
projects) to 100% in Belarus and Uzbekistan in the previous planning cycle. Dur-
ing these two planning cycles, 14 countries borrowed/ planned to borrow to sup-
port education projects, 13 countries for water and utilities projects, 12 countries CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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for health projects, and 8 countries for social protection projects. There seems to 
be no general trend in absolute amounts of social investment lending. Some coun-
tries are increasing their borrowing and other countries are reducing it. However, 
in terms of the share of social projects in total WB investment lending, one can 
see a definite downward trend. In 10 out of 15 countries for which data are avail-
able, this share is smaller under the current CAS/CPS than under previous one. 
So, additional WB resources seem to go mostly to sectors other than the social 
sector. 
 








Albania IPA  2007-2012  498.0  26.1 
Armenia ENPI  2007-2010  98.4  8.2 
Azerbaijan ENPI  2007-2010  92.0  2.7 
Belarus ENPI  2007-2010  20.0  0.5 
Bosnia & Herzegovina  IPA  2007-2012  550.3  24.3 
Croatia IPA  2007-2012  910.2  34.2 
Georgia ENPI  2007-2010  120.4  6.8 
Kazakhstan DCI  2007-2010 44.0  0.7 
Kosovo IPA  2007-2012  565.1  49.6 
Kyrgyzstan DCI  2007-2010  55.0  2.6 
Macedonia IPA  2007-2012 507.3  41.5 
Moldova ENPI  2007-2010  209.7  13.8 
Montenegro IPA  2007-2012  201.4  55.9 
Russia ENPI  2007-2010  120.0  0.2 
Serbia IPA  2007-2012  1183.6  26.7 
Tajikistan DCI  2007-2010  66.0  2.4 
Turkmenistan DCI  2007-2010  22.0  1.1 
Ukraine ENPI  2007-2010  494.0  2.7 
Uzbekistan DCI  2007-2010  32.8  0.3 
Central Asia: regional coop-
eration programs  DCI 2007-2010  94.2  0.4 
Regional program – East  ENPI  2007-2010  223.5  0.3 
Western Balkans: regional & 
horizontal programs  IPA 2007-2012 887.4  6.3 
Source: European Commission. 
 
276.  The analyzed countries inherited a relatively well developed social infrastructure 
from the communist era (see Chapter 2 and 4). Therefore, for many of them, 
unlike in the majority of developing countries, the key problem is not building 
new physical infrastructure and human resources out of scratch but sustaining the Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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effective management of inherited resources in conditions of market economy and 
the disintegration of the previously uniform social systems of the Soviet Union 
and Yugoslavia. This makes institutional change and the retraining of human re-
sources the main areas of activities rather than investments into fixed capital. 
Therefore, donor investment projects in social sectors are similar to development 
policy operations.  
277.  The European Commission is one of the largest donors for the region (Table 6.5). 
EC support is split between country programs (70-90% of total funding) and re-
gional ones, which are separate for Western Balkans, ENPI-eligible countries and 
Central Asia. There is great variation of allocations by country: for EU candidate 
and potential candidates the EC provides 30-60 Euro per capita per annum (in-
cluding regional programmes in the Western Balkans), while for ENPI countries 
and Central Asia, the EC funding is limited to 0.5-14 and 0.7-3 Euro per capita 
per annum correspondingly. This difference reflects the difference in structure of 
the EC support: the share of investment projects in the Western Balkan countries 
is much higher than in the other two sub-regions where EC aid is mostly com-
prised of technical assistance and budget support. 
278. The US is another large donor for the region. It has different support channels; a 
large portion of official aid (especially technical assistance) goes through USAID. 
The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is a special facility endowed by the 
US government with significant resources to help eligible countries in the imple-
mentation of large development projects (see Table 6.6). The eligibility criteria for 
MCC funding are rather tough and require the demonstrated commitment of appli-
cant governments to the values of democracy and market economy. Eligible coun-
tries can conclude a multi-year compact with the MCC. For countries, which are not 
eligible for full funding yet, there is the so-called threshold program which supports 
institutional reforms, typically in the areas of governance and anti-corruption. 
 
Table 6.6. MCC programs in the region (as of end 2008) 
Country  Status  USD mn  Key components 
Albania Threshold  13.85 
Reduction of corruption and increase in transparency 
in tax policy and administration, government pro-
curement and business entry and registration 
Armenia  Compact  235.65  Rural road rehabilitation improved irrigation 
Georgia Compact  295.30  Regional infrastructure rehabilitation, enterprise de-
velopment 
Kyr-
gyzstan  Threshold  16.00  Judiciary and law enforcement reform 
Moldova Threshold  24.70  Anti-corruption  initiatives 
Ukraine  Threshold  45.00  Anti-corruption in public sector 
Source: Millennium Challenge Corporation. CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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279.  Unlike DPOs, which support regular budget expenditures, investment loans are 
intended to cover specific expenditures related to a given project only. This cre-
ates an incentive and the possibility to channel investment loans through PIP in-
stead of the regular budget (see Chapter 5). Keeping these resources outside the 
main body of expenditures and managing them via the Project Implementation 
Unit (PIU), which is jointly staffed by donors and governments, allow donors to 
have tighter control over the implementation of these multi-year, often expensive, 
projects and be more confident in producing intended outputs. However, the PIU-
based modality of project implementation weakens national PFM systems as it 
implies the existence of parallel expenditure management, procurement and moni-
toring systems. This makes the entire public finance system less transparent and 
accountable (see Section 5.7). 
 
 
6.5.  PFM-Related Conditionality 
 
280.  The provision of different types of donor resources for public expenditures is 
usually accompanied by policy conditions related to macroeconomic and struc-
tural policies with the aim of promoting reforms in recipient countries. As a large 
share of aid resources is channeled through the government budget, a substantial 
part of conditionality is related to PFM.  
281.  Very often the donors’ support to the budget is seen as a “carrot” which helps 
encourage domestic stakeholders to implement the required reforms and ensure 
concordance with conditions. This implies there are risks for the implementation 
of these reforms in absence of the “carrot” which are related to the existence of 
influential counter-reform-minded stakeholders. Therefore, conditionality is usu-
ally the most controversial component of donor aid. 
282. Among all types of donor conditionality, those imposed by the IMF are the very 
significant. They usually involve the key issues of monetary and fiscal policies and 
PFM. A country’s compliance with IMF conditionality signals to other donors (e.g., 
the EC or Paris Club) that the recipient government is prepared to manage donor 
resources with a reasonable degree of prudence. Therefore, the resource impact of 
IMF programs far exceeds the size of their resources as they often act as catalysts 
for the allocation of much larger funds provided by other donors. 
283.  During the transition period, almost all countries of the region implemented IMF 
programs (see Table 6.7). In fact, only Montenegro (during the very short period 
of its independence) and Turkmenistan never had such a program. 13 out of 18 
countries had three or more IMF programs between 1992 and 2008. Nine coun-Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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tries have IMF programs active as of 31 December 2008. Five smaller countries 
(Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova) spent more than ten years 
under IMF programs. This may be seen as an indicator of the heavy reliance of 
these countries on foreign aid (not necessarily of the IMF), for which IMF pro-
grams often (but not always) serve as an important pre-condition. Interestingly, 
Croatia had five arrangements with IMF and for the last three, the government did 
not draw a penny from the agreed upon credit line; some other countries also 
demonstrated similar behavior. On the other hand, resource-rich countries (Ka-
zakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) tended to minimize the use of 
IMF programs and repaid old IMF loans as soon as possible. 
 
Table 6.7. IMF Programs 
All programs in 














Albania 5  14  EFF/PR
GF  01.02.2006 31.01.2009 Yes 
Armenia 5 11  PRGF  18.11.2008 17.11.2011 Yes 
Azerbaijan 3  8  PRGF  06.07.2001 04.07.2005 No 
Belarus 2  1  Stand-by  31.12.2008 31.03.2010 Yes 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  2 5  Stand-by  02.08.2002 29.02.2004 No 
Croatia 5  9  Stand-by  04.08.2004 15.11.2006 No 
Georgia 5  11  Stand-by  15.09.2008 31.03.2010 Yes 
Kazakhstan 4  8  EFF  13.12.1999 19.03.2002 No 
Kyrgyz Re-
public  6 14  ESF  10.12.2008 09.06.2010 Yes 
Macedonia, 
FYR  5 9  Stand-by  31.08.2005 30.08.2008 No 
Moldova 5 12  PRGF  05.05.2006 04.05.2009 Yes 
Montenegro 0  0  …  No 
Russian Fed-
eration  4 6  Stand-by  28.07.1999 27.12.2000 No 
Serbia 3  5  Stand-by  17.11.2008 16.02.2010 Yes 
Tajikistan 4  8 SMP
59 01.06.2008 31.12.2008 Yes 
Turkmenistan 0  0  …  No 
Ukraine 6 8  Stand-by  05.11.2008 04.11.2010 Yes 
Uzbekistan 1  1 Stand-by  18.12.1995 17.03.1997 No 
Source: IMF. 
                                                 
59 The Government of Tajikistan has already expressed its intention to have a new PRGF 
arrangement after the completion of the Staff-Monitored Program. CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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284.  IMF conditionality consists of (i) quantitative targets and (ii) structural perform-
ance criteria and benchmarks. These conditions are always country- and time-
specific, but a substantial number of them relate to fiscal policy and PFM. Quanti-
tative targets, which are typical for the latest IMF programs in the region, estab-
lish ceilings/floors for: 
•  central/consolidated government budget deficit (ceiling), 
•  contracting or guaranteeing new non-concessional external debt by gov-
ernment and/or public enterprises (usually zero ceiling), 
•  external arrears (usually zero ceiling), 
•  tax revenues (floor). 
285.  In countries with weaker PFM systems, quantitative targets also impose limita-
tions on the domestic arrears of the central government, revenues and/or the ar-
rears of off-budget social security funds, the wage bill of the central government 
and the tax arrears of state-owned enterprises. 
286.  The structural performance criteria and benchmarks in the recent IMF programs 
are diverse but typically deal with tax policy and revenue administration, the 
quasi-fiscal operations of the government, extra-budgetary funds and the finances 
of public enterprises. Often, these structural conditions tend to provide a detailed 
regulation of PFM systems addressing tax structure, tax base definitions and tax 
rates, utility tariffs etc., going as far as trying to regulate government procurement 
systems, markets of government securities, the composition of civil servant sala-
ries, reduction in public employment and even the introduction of targeted social 
assistance systems, i.e., areas which are not usually seen as part of the IMF 
agenda. Obviously, the power of IMF conditionality creates incentives for other 
donors to press the IMF for the inclusion of issues from their agendas as condi-
tions into the IMF programs. Expectedly, however, these attempts at micro-
management by the IMF often cause discontent among governments. 
287.  Conditionalities set by other donors are mostly related to the implementation of 
structural reforms. These type of conditions also have numerous PFM implica-
tions. One area in which many donors are active is the establishment of better 
linkages between policies and government budgets. The introduction of MTEF, 
elements of POB, and new budget classifications are often included into the con-
ditionalities accompanying loans and grants of the WB, EC and other donors. 
New modalities of government service delivery promoted by donors have impor-
tant implications for the redistribution of responsibilities and resources from cen-
tral to local governments; therefore, intergovernmental fiscal relations are another 
major area of donor PFM-related conditionality.  
288.  Many sector policy reforms, in particular those in education, health and social 
protection, imply changes in financing mechanisms (e.g., transition to per capita Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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financing of services replacing traditional input-based methods), which are ad-
dressed by donor conditions accompanying structural adjustment and/or invest-
ment lending. The introduction of new PFM institutions (treasury, internal and 
external audit, integrated financial management systems etc.) is also frequently 
included in aid conditionality. All of these issues are very sensitive for the recipi-
ent governments. For them, meeting donor conditions is often associated with 
substantial domestic political costs. So, non- or partial compliance with the condi-
tionalities (for example, imitating the requested reforms), even at the expense of 
losing part of funds committed by donors (for example, in the case of the Social 
Sector Structural Adjustment Credit II and the Economic Management Structural 
Adjustment Credit in Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Consolidated Structural Ad-
justment Credit in Kyrgyzstan) is not a rare phenomenon.  
 
 
6.6.  Technical Assistance in PFM Issues 
 
289.  Countries of the region have received massive technical support for reforming 
their PFM systems. Major sources of technical expertise and technical assistance 
funding in the PFM area come from multilateral institutions (IMF, WB, ADB, 
OECD, EC) as well as bilateral donors such as USAID or DFID. Core areas of 
PFM receiving donor support are: the development of fiscal policy, tax policy and 
tax administration, debt management, fiscal decentralization, public enterprise 
finance and public-private partnerships, pension systems, budget formulation and 
execution, cash management, internal controls, accounting, auditing, legislative 
oversight, and fiscal transparency.  
290.  Donors employ a variety of TA activities directed at strengthening recipient 
government capacity in PFM. Typical activities include: diagnostics of the PFM 
situation and the identification of key problem areas to be addressed by govern-
ments, identification of international best practices and their implementation, sup-
port for the development of appropriate legislation and regulations governing 
PFM systems, support in designing and equipping PFM systems with modern 
methodologies and computer software and hardware, on-the-job training of gov-
ernment officials responsible for PFM issues, support in establishing transparent 
and accountable PFM systems with appropriate participation of parliaments and 
civil society etc. 
291.  Various international organizations codify international best practices in PFM. 
For example, the IMF and the WB developed standards and codes in the area of 
policy transparency (in respect to statistical data, fiscal, monetary and financial CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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policy), financial sector regulation and supervision and market integrity; they 
regularly publish country reports on the observance of standards and codes 
(ROSCs) in different PFM areas. These reports serve as an important diagnostic 
tool and source of advice for governments in improving their PFM systems. 
292.  In order to expose governments to best practices, donors support the participation 
of relevant government bodies in international professional organizations. These 
include, for example, the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions 
or International Federation of Accountants. Donors also support peer-learning 
initiatives like the Public Expenditure Management Peer-Assisted Learning pro-
ject, which unites PFM professionals from many countries of the region and is 
coordinated by Slovenia’s Center of Excellence in Finance. This initiative serves 
for peer learning and benchmarking in four communities of practice (treasury/IT 
directors, external auditors, internal auditors, budget practitioners). 
293.  SIGMA — the Support for Improvement in Governance and Management in 
Central and Eastern European Countries is another example of an initiative spe-
cially designed to upgrade governance, including PFM systems. It is a joint initia-
tive of the OECD and the EC funded by the EC. SIGMA currently serves actual 
and potential EU candidates and is expanding its activities to Eastern EU 
neighbor countries. SIGMA offers beneficiary countries access to a network of 
experienced public administrators, comparative information, and technical knowl-
edge connected with the Public Management Service. SIGMA aims to assist 
beneficiary countries in their search for good governance to improve administra-
tive efficiency and promote the adherence of public sector staff to democratic 
values, ethics and respect for the rule of law; help build up indigenous capacities 
at the central government level to face the challenges of internationalization and 
of EU integration; and support initiatives of the European Union and other donors 
to assist beneficiary countries in public administration reform and contribute to 
the coordination of donor activities. SIGMA currently works in five technical ar-
eas: Public Administration Development Strategies; Policymaking, Coordination 
and Regulation; Budgeting and Resource Allocation; Public Service Manage-
ment; and Audit and Financial Control. In addition, the Information Services Unit 
disseminates published and online materials on public management topics. One 
example is the book “Managing Public Expenditure. A Reference Book for Tran-
sition Countries” prepared jointly by SIGMA and the ADB. 
294.  PFM diagnostics is an important technical assistance area for donors. There is a 
number of different international budget indicators (CPIA, Open Budget Index, 
Global Integrity Report, etc.) which use different dimensions, samples and meth-
odologies. The Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) Program 
is a recently developed PFM diagnostics tool. It started in December, 2001 and it 
is jointly financed by the WB's Development Grant Facility, the EC, DFID, the Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, the Royal Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the IMF. The Steer-
ing Committee, comprised of members of these agencies, is managing the Pro-
gram. The Secretariat implements the PEFA work program and is located in the 
WB office in Washington, DC. This program produced the PEFA PFM Perform-
ance Measurement Framework incorporating a country PFM performance report 
and a set of qualitative indicators (see below).  
295.  There are 31 indicators in the PEFA framework covering seven key PFM areas: 
(i) budget credibility, (ii) transparency and comprehensiveness, (iii) policy-based 
budgeting, (iv) predictability and control in budget execution, (v) accounting, re-
cording and reporting, (vi) external scrutiny and audit, and (vii) donor practices. 
Some of these indicators have several (up to four) dimensions. Performance on 
each indicator/dimension is measured by expert assessment on a four-point ordi-
nal scale from A (highest score) to D (lowest score). 
296.  To date, many countries either already went through PEFA assessment or they are 
in the process of its implementation (see Table 6.8). PEFA assessment reports 
have been prepared by consultant teams funded by different donors in close col-
laboration with the governments. 
 
Table 6.8. PEFA assessment status as of 29 August 2008 
Country PEFA  status 








Kosovo Published,  2007 
Kyrgyzstan Published,  2006 
Macedonia Published,  2007 
Moldova  Published, 2006 
Update almost completed 
Montenegro Commenced 
Russia No 
Serbia Published,  2007 
Tajikistan Published,  2007 
Turkmenistan No 
Ukraine Published,  2007 
Uzbekistan No 
Source: www.pefa.org. CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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297.  The results of the PEFA assessments completed so far are provided in Table A.5.1 
in the Statistical Annex. Median scores lie in the range from B to C indicating 
average quality of PFM systems. While the PEFA methodology has not been de-
signed for inter-country comparisons, one can still note that there is a trend of 
higher PEFA ratings for middle-income countries than for low income countries, 
i.e., the level of country economic development seems to be positively associated 
with the quality of PFM systems. A review of the indicators’ median scores re-
veals the most typical PFM problem areas in the analyzed countries. The accuracy 
of aggregate revenue outturn forecasting seems to be generally satisfactory (me-
dian score A). The lowest scores (D or D+) have been assigned to “Effectiveness 
of payroll controls,” “Timeliness of the presentation of audited financial state-
ments to the legislature,” “The scope, nature and follow up of external audit re-
ports,” “Legislative scrutiny of external audit reports” and all three indicators re-
lated to donor practices. These low scores indicate that external scrutiny of budg-
ets and (sic!) donor practices are the most problematic areas of PFM.  
298.  The multiplicity of donors in the PFM area and multiplicity of issues to be 
reformed simultaneously exert major pressure on recipient governments. As a 
result, the progress in PFM reforms is often incomparable with the resources allo-
cated by donors to promote them. Donor coordination of TA is therefore crucial 
for effectively reforming PFM systems in the region. 
 
 
6.7.  Donor Coordination in the PFM Sphere 
 
299.  A growing understanding of problems in development aid both on the donor and 
recipient side resulted in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness adopted at the 
High Level Forum in Paris in 2005.
60 The Declaration covers a broad set of ac-
tions aimed at improving the effectiveness of development aid through the promo-
tion of:  
•  Ownership—partner countries exercise effective leadership over their 
development policies and strategies and co-ordinate development ac-
tions; 
•  Alignment—donors base their support on partner countries’ national de-
velopment strategies, institutions and procedures; this, among other 
things, implies joint donors’ and partner countries’ work on strengthen-
ing PFM capacity and national procurement systems; 
                                                 
60 http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html. Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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•  Harmonization—donors’ actions are better harmonized, transparent and 
collectively effective;  
•  Management for results—managing resources and improving decision-
making for results; 
•  Mutual accountability—donors and partners are accountable for devel-
opment results. 
300.  Many countries in the region claimed their adherence to the Declaration. These 
include Albania, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Serbia, Montenegro, Tajikistan 
and Ukraine. Almost all donor organizations active in the region also adhered to 
the Paris Declaration.  
301.  The Paris Declaration also introduced a set of indicators measuring progress in 
aid effectiveness on a national level but monitored internationally. There are 12 
indicators (one splits into two sub-indicators) with quantified targets on each of 
them time-bound to 2010. Several of them are directly related to PFM issues (see 
Table A.6.1 in the Statistical Annex). 
302.  The OECD organized a survey of three recipient countries in the region to 
establish baseline values for indicators. Table 6.9 suggests that these countries 
and donors have yet to go a long way forward to achieve the targets of the Paris 
Declaration. The distance between actual values and targets is especially striking 
for use of countries’ PFM and procurement systems (indicators 5a and 5b) and for 
utilization of program-based approaches (indicator 9). 
 





3. Government's budget estimates of aid flows as a share 
of aid disbursed by donors for government sector, %  32 70 70 
5a. Aid for government sectors disbursed using country 
PFM systems as a share of total aid for government sec-
tors, % 
14 3 25 
5b. Aid for government sectors disbursed using country 
procurement systems as a share of total aid for government 
sectors, % 
6 2  25 
6. Number of PIUs parallel to country structures  57  85  43 
7. Aid disbursements released according to agreed sched-
ules in annual or multiyear frameworks as a share of all 
donor disbursements recorded by governments, % 
49 66 67 
8. Untied aid as a share of total bilateral aid as reported to 
the DAC, %  59 97 81 
9. Program-based aid as a share of total aid disbursed, %  5  12  16 
Source: OECD Survey. 
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303.  To implement the Declaration, donors undertake various coordination initiatives 
including joint programming (e.g., Joint Country Support Strategy in Kyrgyzstan 
or Tajikistan), joint portfolio reviews (e.g., the WB and ADB), common analyti-
cal activities (PEFA), the establishment of a multi-donor trust fund for the imple-
mentation of a national development strategy (e.g., in Albania). Yet, the degree of 
donor coordination is insufficient as suggested by the values of the Paris Declara-
tion’s indicators in Table 6.9 and the PEFA ratings on donor practices in Table 
A.5.1. Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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7. Concluding Remarks 
304.  The period covered by this study (2003-2007) can be described as the golden era 
of rapid economic growth in all the emerging market economies, including the 
Western Balkan and CIS countries. These years and those preceding them created 
a macroeconomic room for meeting numerous development challenges: reducing 
poverty and inequality, improving the quality and coverage of public services, 
upgrading infrastructure, and advancing more complex and sophisticated reforms, 
including those in the PFM sphere. Unfortunately, this unique window of oppor-
tunity was used by policymakers in the analyzed countries only partly and not 
always in the most effective way. 
305.  The extreme poverty (income below poverty line at 1.25 USD a day) was reduced 
everywhere but it remained substantial in Central Asia (except Kazakhstan) and in 
some other low-income CIS countries (when a higher poverty threshold below 
2.15 USD a day was used). The zone of economic and social vulnerability (be-
tween 2.15 and 4.30 USD a day) decreased somewhat in the European part of CIS 
but remained substantial in all other countries except Croatia and Belarus. Income 
inequalities, on average, did not decrease.  
306.  The economic boom also helped to restore basic equilibrium in public finances, 
mostly by a substantial increase in government revenues. The high fiscal deficits 
were largely eliminated, and some countries (mostly exporters of hydrocarbon 
resources) managed to accumulate the sovereign reserve funds serving as a buffer 
for bad times. Public debt to GDP ratios systematically decreased in all countries 
as result of low primary fiscal deficits or surpluses, rapid economic growth, ap-
preciation of national currencies, low international interest rates and - in some 
cases - debt reduction.  
307.  Higher revenue flows also led to an increase in public expenditures (in nominal 
and real terms) in many sectors, including healthcare, education, social assistance, 
water supply and other basic infrastructure. Nevertheless, higher expenditures 
have not been automatically translated into better outcomes for individual poli-
cies. The available indicators of public health, coverage and quality of education, 
access to improved water sources and sanitation, etc. have shown negligible im-
provements. This means that both targeting and prioritization of public resources 
and quality of governance in these sectors remain unsatisfactory. Reforms aimed 
at improving spending targeting and efficiency of public services have been often CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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incomplete and ineffective and therefore easily resisted by powerful interest 
groups. In political economy terms, the interests of the public sector workers and 
management dominated those of the clients, especially from low-income groups 
in the population (as well as in children and youth who do not have a political 
voice).  
308.  The same concerns social policy and social transfers. Here most of available 
public resources have been spent to support the PAYG pillar of the public pension 
system and satisfy the interests of a growing number of relatively young pension-
ers who have benefited from early retirement opportunities and continued em-
ployment in an informal sector. Population ageing makes this lobby even more 
powerful. Another substantial part of the public resources have been absorbed by 
various social entitlements, both in cash and in in-kind form, granted to broad 
categories of population. These entitlements are narrowly targeted and provide 
little economic benefit to the most vulnerable groups of the population. The above 
distortions can help to explain why rapid economic growth in the region contrib-
uted so little to poverty reduction and almost nothing to inequality reduction
61.  
309.  As a result, one may say that the phenomenon of the post-communist welfare 
state in the Western Balkans and the European part of the CIS (without the Cau-
casus) is both premature (given the low level of economic development of these 
countries) and inefficient because it does not help to reduce poverty and inequal-
ity (and sometimes even increases them). It is true that this kind of welfare state 
was largely inherited from the communist era but very little has been done in the 
twenty years following the collapse of the previous economical and political re-
gime to correct these distortions (often they were even increased by populist poli-
cies). In countries which managed to decrease social expenditures this happened 
spontaneously as a result of high inflation/ hyperinflation in 1990s or in the civil 
wars and collapse of the government’s capacity to meet social commitments 
rather than through conscious, well-designed and consequently implemented re-
forms.  
310.  An insufficient level of fiscal decentralization creates another obstacle to improv-
ing social assistance targeting and the quality of public services on a local level. 
Most of the countries analyzed in this study are highly centralized with a limited 
role of sub-national governments (apart from the Russian Federation and Bosnia 
& Herzegovina). Even if a country records a relatively high share of sub-national 
                                                 
61 Obviously, social policy (or broadly speaking -public expenditure policy) is not the only 
factor determining both a degree of poverty and income inequality. Many other economic, 
social and institutional factors play role here: general level of country’s economic devel-
opment, resource endowment, wealth distribution, social stratification, ethnic differences, 
openness and competitiveness of markets, etc.  Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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budgets in GG (the examples of Belarus and Kazakhstan) it does not mean neces-
sarily the actual devolution of power. First of all, in many countries, regional and 
local authorities are not democratically elected but dependent on personal deci-
sions made at the central level of government. Second of all, sub-national budgets 
have very little autonomy in determining both revenue sources (earmarked discre-
tional grants and individually negotiated shares in government taxes) and expen-
diture priorities.  
311.  The “fear of decentralization” has many roots. First of all, there are some 
economic and technical factors such as the high shares of pension expenditure and 
revenue from indirect taxation which favor centralization (see Section 5.2 for a 
detail analysis). Second of all, centralization is a quite obvious by-product of au-
thoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes with strong presidents who are reluc-
tant to share power with anybody. Third of all, in the former USSR there is a con-
tinuous tradition of a strong “vertical power” scheme with very little room for 
horizontal cooperation, local/ regional autonomy and initiatives. Fourth of all, in 
some countries (even in those considered to be democracies) decentralization is 
suspected as the potential step towards territorial disintegration or ethnic-based 
separatism. Whatever the reason may be for this fear, its consequences are highly 
negative for both the quality of public services and social policy, citizen participa-
tion, government accountability and transparency, which can be more easily exe-
cuted on a local level than on a national level.  
312.  The decade of the 1990s was marked by rapid changes in the region: economic 
transition from a centrally planned to a market economy (the first stage of this 
process was completed in most countries in the early 2000s), political transition 
from an authoritarian regime to a democracy (not successful everywhere, in sev-
eral CIS countries a reversal of early democratic reforms can be observed) and 
collapse of two multi-ethnic federal states – former USSR and former Yugoslavia 
(accompanied by numerous ethnic conflicts and wars). The economic and social 
costs of these changes were quite substantial, especially in the former USSR. So 
the following almost-decade of rapid economic growth can be considered as a 
post-transitional recovery and catching-up.  
313.  On the other hand, the period of rapid economic growth was accompanied by a 
slowing pace of structural and institutional reforms (as demonstrated, for exam-
ple, by EBRD or WGI scores). Many of them had a crucial importance for the 
quality of public services, social justice and anti-poverty effectiveness of both 
social policy and public social services. Apart from the well-known phenomenon 
of reform “fatigue” after the heroic period of the 1990s, the political economy 
factor must be mentioned again: in good economic times governments have little 
incentive to undertake reforms and many of them involve quite substantial politi-
cal costs. In addition, the centralization drift observed in a substantial part of the CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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CIS region has not helped in crucial governance reforms such as building a pro-
fessional, stable and merit-based civil service, independent and professional judi-
ciary, eliminating systemic roots of corruption, increasing accountability and 
transparency of government operations, and increasing the role of civil society, 
etc.  
314.  The Western Balkans region has been in quite a different situation in this respect: 
after a politically turbulent decade in the 1990s, the prospects of an EU member-
ship (although quite distant for all countries but Croatia) created a strong incen-
tive to build and upgrade democratic institutions, protect civil liberties, resolve 
ethnic conflicts, strengthen the rule of law and start various institutional reforms 
(even if progress in many spheres like fighting corruption and organized crime 
remains unsatisfactory). However, the positive impact of EU acquis is limited and 
many important sectors (such as healthcare, education, social policy, local ser-
vices, etc) remain largely beyond the legal and institutional harmonization efforts 
associated with the EU accession.  
315.  There is a certain hope that both the European Neighborhood Policy and the 
Eastern Partnership offered by the EU to European CIS countries (including Cau-
casus) may push them in the same direction as their Western Balkan neighbors. 
However, one may doubt whether the set of incentives offered by these two pol-
icy frameworks (largely overlapping each other) can be comparable with that as-
sociated with the EU membership prospect.  
316. Nevertheless, many countries continued or even initiated new reform measures 
related to various technical aspects of governance which were not so strongly de-
pendent on key political and institutional reform trends. This related, among other 
things, to the budget process as described in Section 5.5. Several countries of both 
major sub-regions noticed at least some progress in such important areas as budget 
classification and statistics, budget reporting standards, consolidation of extra-
budgetary funds and PIP into the government budget, limiting QFA, extending the 
horizon of macroeconomic and budget planning, making a budget process more 
transparent and open to public discussion and scrutiny. The new reporting standards 
and information dissemination practices promoted by the IMF after the series of 
1990s financial crises and other donor initiatives (like PEFA), technical assistance 
and aid conditionality played an important role in stimulating this process.  
317.  Generally, the analyzed group of countries looks very heterogeneous in terms of 
its economic, social and political/ geopolitical characteristics. The main dividing 
line seems to be between the Western Balkan and the CIS sub-regions with the 
differences related to historical and institutional legacies (former Yugoslavia vs. 
former USSR), geographical location and geopolitical interest (Western Balkans 
being closer to the economic center of Europe and having the EU membership Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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prospect), and a higher level of economic and social development. However, both 
sub-regions are also internally heterogeneous in almost every characteristic men-
tioned above – level of development, geography, history, institutional tradition or 
even the chance for an EU membership in the case of the Western Balkan sub-
group (Croatia being close to completing EU membership negotiations, all the 
other countries facing quite distant prospects of EU accession). Generally, the 
intra-sub-regional differentiation is much deeper in the case of CIS than the West-
ern Balkans.  
318.  If one looks at various specific characteristics, indicators and processes (like the 
level of economic development, the degree of poverty, the progress in various 
institutional reforms, the public health indicators, etc.) as we do in this study, the 
picture becomes even more blurred with various ad hoc groupings going across 
sub-regional boundaries. In addition, many tendencies, problems, challenges and 
institutional obstacles are common for the entire region. Taking into consideration 
data constraints, all this speaks in favor of regional cross-country analysis rather 
than the sub-regional approach. The only important element of sub-regional spe-
cifics relates to the EU membership prospect in the Western Balkans. However, 
as mentioned above, this is a factor which has a limited and a rather indirect im-
pact on the fiscal policy, PFM, social services and social policy, i.e. the main sub-
jects of analysis in this report.  
319.  As mentioned before, the analysis of this study covers the period of rapid 
economic growth which ended in the middle of 2008 with a global financial crisis 
hitting the entire region. Depending on the structural characteristics and existing 
vulnerabilities, economies of the region have been affected through many conta-
gion channels such as weaker global demand (trade channel), fall of commodity 
prices, global liquidity squeeze (credit channel), troubles of “mother” financial 
institutions in developed countries, increasing risk aversion, increased exchange 
rate volatility and decreasing demand for labor migrants.  
320.  Although data for the fist two quarters of 2009 are preliminary and incomplete, 
and any macroeconomic forecasts involve a high degree of uncertainty and poten-
tial errors, it is quite obvious that the crisis has a very serious character and is go-
ing to quite radically change the macroeconomic and social picture presented in 
this study. While the authors of this study do not pretend to be able to predict the 
eventual depth and length of the crisis both in the region and in individual coun-
tries, some scenarios seem to be more probable than others: 
•  Most of the analyzed countries can expect a negative growth in 2009 and 
perhaps also in 2010. In some countries such Ukraine and Russia the ex-
pected depth of recession is quite large. Whenever the crisis ends (in CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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2009, 2010 or later) the return to high rate of economic growth (of a 
magnitude recorded before 2008) is unlikely to happen soon.  
•  Simultaneously with the output decline, several countries will experience 
a continuously high inflation caused by depreciation of national curren-
cies and high international food prices. 
•  A substantial part of the gains in poverty reduction recorded up until 
2008 may be easily reversed, especially in countries most seriously af-
fected by the recession and high inflation.   
•  The fiscal situation in all the countries will deteriorate quite dramati-
cally, imposing heavy constraints on various government expenditure 
programs. Due to political constraints and institutional weaknesses, a re-
duction of expenditure can have a mechanical and a quite chaotic charac-
ter (across-the-board sequestration, building up payments arrears). Due 
to huge uncertainties about the future, the horizon of macroeconomic and 
fiscal planning may be shortened and the previous effort to move to-
wards a multi-year fiscal planning may be frozen or reversed.  
•  The crisis situation may push politicians to restart various abandoned 
and frozen reforms, including those related to social policy and public 
services. However, most of these reforms require time to bring about re-
sults, so even if they are undertaken they will not help to meet the cur-
rent crisis challenges.  
321.  In the light of new economic and social challenges brought by the financial crisis 
the old debate on most effective but fiscally affordable social policy instruments 
(especially those related to family and children wellbeing) must be revisited. 
While being aware of all administrative difficulties related to the effective func-
tioning of the addressed social assistance based on means testing the authors of 
this study believe this is the best strategy to concentrate scarce public resources 
on support to the socially most vulnerable households. To make this system work-
ing effectively the eligibility criteria for receiving benefits should be in many 
cases revised and administrative procedures – simplified. The role of civil society 
and the strength of informal safety nets (family, kinship, and community support 
structures) is also important.  
322. The choice of the specific forms and criteria of social assistance programs should be 
determined by local conditions, including cultural and socio-economic factors, in-
come level and resources available for this purpose. Their effectiveness in alleviat-
ing child poverty should be evaluated based on household budget surveys.  
323.  The international organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank, regional 
development banks and UN agencies as well as the European Union may play an 
important role in providing emergency aid to countries of the region and helping Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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them to work out effective anti-crisis policies. They can also create incentives and 
provide support to more fundamental economic and institutional reforms assum-
ing there is an interest in the recipient countries. The future of bilateral develop-
ment aid is less clear as individual developed countries will face increasing fiscal 
constraints.  
324.  The potential entry points of UNICEF involvement should not be limited to social 
policy instruments supporting more or less directly family and children (like child 
benefits or mean-tested social assistance) or public services such as education, 
healthcare or water supply. These are important areas and instruments determin-
ing family and children well-being but the prospects to improve their functioning 
depends, to a large extent, on governance and institutional reforms such as greater 
transparency and accountability of government, modernization of civil service, 
decentralization, including building a genuine system of local and regional self-
government, etc. In the PFM area the key although uneasy reform tasks concern 
lengthening fiscal planning horizon and gradual movement toward POB (the 
measures which can allow better expenditure targeting and decrease volatility in 
expenditure allocation), increasing budget transparency and creating real room for 
civil society involvement into a budget process. Finally, in the area of expenditure 
reform limiting a wasteful character of many public pension systems and elimina-
tion of various kinds of subsidies, quasi-subsidies, and broad based benefits in 
kind can create a fiscal room for more effective interventions related to family 
and children basic needs. All the above questions require further analytical and 
diagnostic work both on regional and individual countries levels.  
325.  In summary, the analyzed countries still face a large agenda of policy reforms in 
the forthcoming years which would guarantee them long-term fiscal sustainability 
and upgrade their PFM system, including better quality of public services and 
better prioritization and targeting of social programs. They cannot be limited to a 
fiscal and PFM sphere defined narrowly but they must involve a broadly defined 
governance sphere. Only such reforms can help in the sustainable eradication of 
poverty and helping the most economically vulnerable (and at the same time usu-
ally the most politically powerless) groups of the population, including children 
and youth from poor families.  
326.  The economic and social shock brought by the financial crisis should be a subject 
of further analytical monitoring to allow good understanding of new challenges 
and working out correct policy responses. The same concerns concrete policy in-
struments and institutional solutions which can help improve well-being of fami-
lies and children. CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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Statistical Annex 
Table A.2.1. Location characteristics 









Albania 1  1  1  1.90 
Bosnia & Herzego-
vina
2  1 1 1  1.90 
Croatia 1  1  1  1.90 
Montenegro 1  1  1  1.90 
Russia 1  1  1  1.90 
Georgia 1  0  1  0.75 
Moldova
1 1  0  1 0.75 
Ukraine 1  0  1  0.75 
Macedonia 1 1 0  0.71 
Belarus 1  0  0  -0.44 
Serbia 1  0  0  -0.44 
Armenia 0  0  0  -1.66 
Azerbaijan
3 0  0  0  -1.66 
Kazakhstan
3 0  0  0  -1.66 
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 0  -1.66 
Tajikistan 0  0  0  -1.66 
Turkmenistan
3 0  0  0  -1.66 
Uzbekistan 0 0 0  -1.66 
Note. * 1 – border with the EU; ** 1 – border with Western Europe; *** 1 – existence of 
access to the sea.  
1 Moldova has a very small access to Black Sea with only one small commercial port.  
2 Bosnia and Herzegovina has very small access to the Adriatic Sea without any 
commercial port.  
3 Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have access to the Caspian Sea, which is 
landlocked. 
Source: De Melo et al. (1997), own estimates. 
 
Table A.2.2. Institutional heritage 






Albania 47 2  2.46 
Croatia 46/47 1  1.43 
Bosnia & Herze-
govina  47 1  1.43 Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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Macedonia 47  1  1.43 
Montenegro 47  1  1.43 
Serbia 47  1  1.43 
Moldova 51  0  0.98 
Russia 74/72  2  0.17 
Azerbaijan 70/72  0  -1.08 
Georgia 70/72 0  -1.08 
Armenia 71/72  0  -1.08 
Kazakhstan 71/72  0  -1.08 
Kyrgyzstan 71/72  0  -1.08 
Tajikistan 71/72  0  -1.08 
Turkmenistan 71/72  0  -1.08 
Uzbekistan 71/72  0  -1.08 
Belarus 72/72 0  -1.08 
Ukraine 74/72 0  -1.08 
Note. * Data on the number of years spent under central planning is taken from De Melo et 
al. (1997), and differences in this indicator between (i) Croatia and other post-Yugoslav 
countries and (ii) between FSU countries refer to the methodology of the mentioned paper. 
In order to eliminate differences in principal components, we take the number of years 
under central planning in Croatia as 47 years, and as 72 years in FSU countries. ** 2 – 
independent state prior to 1989, 1 – countries of former Yugoslavia and Russia, 0 – new 
independent states. 
Source: De Melo et al. (1997), own estimates. 
 
 
Table A.2.3. Countries affected by armed conflicts and internal unrest 
With armed conflicts/ internal unrest on 
their territory (1) 
Without armed conflicts/ internal unrest 
on their territory (0) 
Albania (1997)  Belarus 
Armenia (1988–1994)  Montenegro 
Azerbaijan (1988–1994) Kazakhstan 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995)  Turkmenistan 
Georgia (1992–1993, 2008)  Ukraine 
Croatia (1991–1995)   
Macedonia (2001)   
Kyrgyzstan (1990)   
Moldova (1992)   
Russia (1993, 1994–1996, 1997, 1998–
2005, 2008)   
Serbia (1991-1995, 1998-1999)   
Tajikistan (1992–1997)   
Uzbekistan (1989, 2005)   
Source: Spoor (2003), http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstatx.htm, own observations. 
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1.00               Institutional 
heritage  --           
0.78  1.00           Location 
(0.00) --             
0.53 0.55 1.00           Develop-
ment 1  (0.02)  (0.02
)  --          
0.59 0.58 0.97 1.00         Develop-
ment 2  (0.01)  (0.01
)  (0.00) --        
0.65 0.67 0.44 0.47  1.00      
Reforms 
(0.00)  (0.00
)  (0.07) (0.05) --     
0.23 0.34 0.44 0.55 0.53  1.00     Years under 
market 
economy  (0.35)  (0.17
)  (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) --   
0.04 -0.25 -0.17  -0.08  0.12  0.17  1.00    Armed con-
flict dummy  (0.88)  (0.31
)  (0.49) (0.75) (0.63) (0.50) --   
-0.41  -0.28 0.00 0.01  -0.46  -0.06 -0.05 1.00  Natural re-
source en-
dowment  (0.09)  (0.25
)  (1.00) (0.97) (0.06) (0.80)  (0.85
)  -- 
Note. Probabilities are in parentheses. Significant correlations (at least 10%) are marked in 
bold. 
Source: own estimates. Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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Table A.3.1. Poverty under USD 1.25 a day poverty line 
Economy 
Survey years: (1) 
the earliest close 
to the beginning 
of the period 
















Western Balkans*  0.21 0.29  0.04  0.07 0.02  0.04 
Albania  2002 (1); 2005 (2) 0.57 0.85  0.09  0.17 0.03  0.07 
Bosnia & Her-
zegovina 
2001(1); 2004 (2)  0.00 0.16  0.00  0.07 0.00  0.06 
Croatia  2001 (1); 2005 (2) 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 
Macedonia  2002 (1); 2003 (3) 0.55 0.30  0.16  0.09 0.09  0.05 
CIS (Europe)  1.26 0.61  0.31  0.17 0.13  0.08 
Armenia  2002 (1); 2003 (2) 14.97 4.74  3.06  0.88 1.04  0.32 
Azerbaijan  2001 (1); 2005 (2) 3.15 0.03  0.54  0.01 0.17  0.01 
Belarus  2002 (1); 2005 (2) 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 
Georgia  2002 (1); 2005 (2) 15.1 13.44  4.73  4.36 2.32 2.22 
Moldova  2002 (1); 2004 (2) 17.08 8.14  3.99  1.68 1.33  0.59 
Russia  2002 (1); 2005 (2) 0.32 0.16  0.06  0.04 0.02  0.02 
Ukraine  2002 (1); 2005 (2) 0.51 0.1  0.16 0.04  0.11  0.04 
CIS (Centr. Asia)  29.11 23.21  8.15  6.56  3.26 2.69 
Kazakhstan  2002 (1);2003 (3)  5.15 1.15  0.89  0.17 0.26  0.05 
Kyrgyzstan  2002 (1); 2004 (2) 34.03 21.81  8.77  4.43  3.04 1.21 
Tajikistan  2003 (1); 2004 (2) 36.25 21.49  10.33  5.06  4.00 1.74 
Turkmenistan  1998 (1); 2003 (2) 18.91 11.72  4.78  2.49  1.71 0.78 
Uzbekistan  2002 (1); 2003 (2) 42.33 38.81  12.39  11.79 5.16 5.11 
Notes. * Data on Serbia and Montenegro are currently missing in PovcalNet database. 
Headcount: % of population living in households with consumption or income per person 
below the poverty line. Poverty Gap: mean distance below the poverty line as a proportion 
of the poverty line. Squared poverty gap (SPG): mean of the squared distances below the 
poverty line as a proportion of the poverty line. 
Source: PovcalNet database (http://go.worldbank.org/A8URN8FWB0). 
 
Table A.3.2. Poverty at USD 2.15 a day poverty line 
Economy 
Survey years: (1) the 
earliest close to the 
beginning of the pe-




















Western Balkans*   3.34  3.01  0.61  0.60  0.19  0.20 
Albania  2002 (1); 2005 (2)  11.68  10.2  2.01  1.97  0.54  0.61 
BIH  2001(1); 2004 (2)  0.00  0.90  0.00  0.22  0.00  0.11 
Croatia  2001 (1); 2005 (2)  0.18  0.00  0.07  0.00  0.06  0.00 
Macedonia 2002(1);2003(3) 4.00  2.54  0.88 0.52  0.34 0.19 
CIS (Europe)  7.41  3.31  1.76  0.81  0.68  0.34 
Armenia  2002 (1); 2003 (2)  52.15  34.88 16.07  8.21  6.72  2.85 CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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Economy 
Survey years: (1) the 
earliest close to the 
beginning of the pe-




















Azerbaijan  2001 (1); 2005 (2)  22.66 0.46  5.33  0.06  1.84  0.02 
Belarus  2002(1); 2005 (2)  1.18  0.59  0.37  0.22  0.25  0.18 
Georgia  2002 (1); 2005 (2)  37.86 33.75 13.86  12.39  7.07  6.4 
Moldova 2002(1);  2004(2)  44.65 33.22 15.19  9.49  6.86  3.84 
Russia 2002(1);  2005(2)  4.95  2.11  0.88  0.37  0.26  0.12 
Ukraine 2002(1);  2005(2)  4.67  0.66  0.92  0.15  0.34  0.07 
CIS (Central Asia)  60.70 51.48 24.17  19.78  12.18  9.87 
Kazakhstan 2002(1);2003(3) 24.81 12.94 6.54  2.68 2.33  0.83 
Kyrgyzstan 2002  (1);  2004(2)  71.06 56.8  27.94  19.44  13.77  8.60 
Tajikistan 2003(1);  2004(2)  73.17 55.98 29.77  19.31  15.24  8.81 
Turkmenistan  1998(1); 2003 (2)  45.94 35.18 16.43  11.16  7.68  4.69 
Uzbekistan  2002 (1); 2003 (2)  79.36 74.62 33.83  31.47  17.72  16.57 
Notes and sources are the same as in Table A.3.1. 
 
Table A.3.3. Poverty at USD 4.30 a day poverty line 
Economy 
Survey years: (1) 
the earliest close 
to the beginning 
of the period ana-




















Western  Balkans*  18.63  17.66 5.7  5.27 2.42 2.22 
Albania  2002  (1);  2005  (2) 58.21 48.47 18.56 15.65  7.86  6.79 
BIH  2001 (1); 2004 (2)  3.56  11.64  0.78  2.68  0.34  0.97 
Croatia  2001 (1); 2005 (2)  2.41  0.37  0.48  0.14  0.18  0.12 
Macedonia 2002  (1); 2003 (3)  23.35  19.32 7.01  5.37  2.99 2.15 
CIS  (Europe)  35.03 22.51 11.21  6.3  4.95  2.61 
Armenia  2002  (1);  2003  (2) 89.33 83.43 46.01 36.25 27.17 18.86 
Azerbaijan  2001  (1);  2005  (2)  67.2  56.15 26.14 10.25 12.89  2.6 
Belarus  2002 (1); 2005 (2)  13.84  7.25  3.16  1.56  1.21  0.61 
Georgia  2002 (1); 2005 (2)  76.01  71.24  36.6  33.32  21.86  19.7 
Moldova  2002  (1);  2004  (2) 82.27 77.07 41.16 33.81 24.54 18.33 
Russia  2002 (1); 2005 (2)  29.37  19.68  8.66  5.24  3.45  1.99 
Ukraine  2002 (1); 2005 (2)  39.71  15.25  10.89  3.05  4.25  0.96 
CIS  (Central  Asia)  87.03 80.32 50.51 44.25 33.29 28.36 
Kazakhstan  2002 (1); 2003 (3)  66.98 49.87  27.1  17.13 13.99 7.82 
Kyrgyzstan  2002  (1);  2004  (2) 94.86 89.74 57.42 48.58 38.22 29.98 
Tajikistan  2003  (1);  2004  (2) 95.32 90.25 58.93 48.64 39.88 29.99 
Turkmenistan  1998(1);  2003  (2)  80.71 72.62  41.5  33.81 25.35 19.31 
Uzbekistan  2002  (1);  2003  (2) 96.37 95.03 62.46 59.94 43.49  41.2 
Notes and sources are the same as in Table A.3.1. Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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Table A.3.4. Inequality 
Gini coefficient  Income/Consumption distribution: Shares by deciles 
Economy 
Survey years: (1) 
the earliest close to 
the beginning of 
the period ana-





n by the low-





























Albania  2002 (1); 2005 (2)  28.15  33.03  3.86  22.38  5.80  3.24  25.87  8.00 
BIH  2001 (1); 2004 (2)  28.03  35.78  3.80  22.84  6.00  2.77  27.41  9.90 
Croatia  2001 (1); 2005 (2)  31.10  28.99  3.41  24.60  7.20  3.60  23.06  6.40 
Macedonia  2002 (1); 2003 (3)  38.75  38.95 2.36  29.25 12.40 2.39  29.53 12.40 
CIS (Europe) 
Armenia  2002 (1); 2003 (2)  35.66  33.80  3.32  29.86  9.00  3.65  28.94  7.90 
Azerbaijan  2001 (1); 2005 (2)  36.50  16.83  3.09  29.39  9.50  6.11  17.49  2.90 
Belarus  2002 (1); 2005 (2)  29.73  27.92  3.43  23.48  6.80  3.60  22.04  6.10 
Georgia  2002 (1); 2005 (2)  40.31  40.78  2.04  30.55  15.00  1.92  30.60  15.90 
Moldova  2002 (1); 2004 (2)  36.87  35.60  2.77  28.18  10.20  2.98  28.16  9.40 
Russia  2002 (1); 2005 (2)  35.70  37.51  2.74  26.83  9.80  2.57  28.35  11.00 
Ukraine  2002 (1); 2005 (2)  28.28  28.21  3.72  22.64  6.10  3.78  22.54  6.00 
CIS (Central Asia) 
Kazakhstan  2002 (1); 2003 (3)  34.95  33.85 2.94  26.81 9.10 3.05  25.85 8.50 
Kyrgyzstan  2002 (1); 2004 (2)  31.67  32.93  3.65  25.02  6.90  3.56  25.93  7.30 
Tajikistan  2003 (1); 2004 (2)  32.62  33.61  3.37  25.71  7.60  3.21  26.40  8.20 
Turkmenistan  1998(1); 2003 (2)  40.77  ..  2.46  31.75  12.90  ..  ..  .. 
Uzbekistan  2002 (1); 2003 (2)  34.55  36.72  3.17  28.23  8.90  2.85  29.47  10.30 
* Data on Serbia and Montenegro are currently missing in PovcalNet database; ** Ratios of disposable incomes/consumption of the highest 
decile of the population to those of the lowest decile of the population for corresponding survey years. 
Source: PovcalNet database (http://go.worldbank.org/A8URN8FWB0). CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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Table A.3.5. GG budget balance, % of GDP (sources other than GFS) 
Country  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Western Balkans 
Albania*** -4.5  -5.1    -3.5   -3.3   -3.5  
Bosnia & Herzegovina***  0.7   1.6   2.4   2.9   1.3  
Croatia***  -5.5   -4.1   -3.8   -2.2   -1.8  
Kosovo***  2.1   -4.5   -3.1   2.5   7.2  
Macedonia*** -1.1    0.0    0.3   -0.5   0.6  
Montenegro***   -2.4   -2.6   -2.3   2.7   7.1  
Serbia***  -1.1   0.9   0.7   -1.5   -1.9  
CIS Europe 
Armenia (Central Gov)°    -1.1  -1.7  -2.6  -2.3  -2.3 
Azerbaijan°    -0.8  1.0  2.7  3.1  10 
Belarus (Central Gov)    -1.4°  0.0°  -0.6°  1.4*  0.4* 
Georgia°    -1.6  -0.2 -2.4 -2.3 -2.5 
Moldova    0.7°  0.8°  1.5°  0.2*  -0.3* 
Russia (Central Gov)    1.7°  4.2°  7.5°  8.3*  6.8* 
Ukraine    -0.9°  -4.4°  -2.4°  -1.4*  -2.0* 
CIS Central Asia 
Kazakhstan** 2.7  2.5  5.8  7.2   4.7  
Kyrgyzstan**    -4.7 -4.4 -3.4 -2.1 -0.4   
Tajikistan**  -1.8 -2.4 -2.9  1.7  -6.2 
Turkmenistan** -1.3  1.4  0.8  5.3  3.9 
Uzbekistan**  0.1 0.6 1.2 5.2 5.1 
Memorandum items 
European Union
1     -1.6  -1.0 
New EU members
1       -3.3  -2.3 
Notes. ° Final data for 2003 - 06, estimates for 2007 (DG ECFIN, 2007a). 
* Final data, GG balance (REO-EU, 2008). 
** Final data for 2003 - 06, estimates for 2007 (REO-MECA, 2008). 
*** Final data: DG ECFIN (2008). 
1 Weighted average - GG balance weighted by PPP GDP. 
 
Table A.3.6. Institutional sources of balancing GG net cash flows, % of GDP 
Country/ item  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006  2007 
Croatia 
Net cash inflow from financing activities -3.14 -3.85 -3.89 -2.80 -1.80  -1.12 
Domestic -0.42 -0.87 -1.97 -4.58 -3.20  -1.66 
GG  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Central  bank  -0.13 0.60 -0.50 0.11 -0.37 -0.07 
Other depository corporations  0.55  -0.24 -1.79 -4.87 -2.10  -0.83 
Financial corporations not elsewhere classified  -0.05 0.20  -0.01 0.00  -0.01  -0.01 
Nonfinancial corporations  -0.84 -1.58 0.20  0.08  -0.77  -0.78 
Households and nonprofit institutions serving 
households  0.05 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.05 0.03 
Foreign -2.72 -2.98 -1.91 1.79  1.40  0.55 Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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Country/ item  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006  2007 
GG  0.17 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.19 0.14 
International organizations  -0.39 -0.38 -0.04 -0.01 -0.42  0.07 
Financial corporations other than international 
organizations -2.49 -2.76 -2.04 1.65  1.63  0.33 
Other  nonresidents  0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
Armenia 
Net cash inflow from financing activities    -0.65 -0.79 -0.72 -0.26   
Domestic   1.13  0.45  -0.71 0.13   
GG    0.00 0.00 0.00     
Central bank    1.46  0.28  -1.06    
Other depository corporations    -0.46 0.03  0.35     
Financial corporations not elsewhere classified    0.00  0.00  0.00     
Nonfinancial  corporations    0.13 0.14 0.00     
Households and nonprofit institutions serving 
households    0.00 0.00 0.00     
Foreign     -1.79 -1.24 -0.01 -0.39  
GG    0.57 0.58 0.37     
International organizations    -2.74 -1.74 -0.39    
Financial corporations other than international 
organizations    0.00 0.08 0.00     
Other  nonresidents    0.39 0.00 0.00     
Georgia 
Net cash inflow from financing activities      0.80  1.40  1.70  0.31 
Domestic        1.09 1.10 1.30 0.51 
GG      0.25 0.01 0.14 0.01 
Central  bank      0.36 0.60 0.76 0.05 
Other  depository  corporations      0.09 0.28 0.20 0.12 
Financial corporations not elsewhere classified      0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Nonfinancial  corporations      0.38 0.22 0.20 0.33 
Households and nonprofit institutions serving 
households      0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Foreign       -0.29 0.30  0.40  -0.20 
GG     0.00  0.30  0.09  -0.20 
International organizations      -0.29 0.00  0.30  0.00 
Financial corporations other than international 
organizations      0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Other  nonresidents      0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Moldova 
Net cash inflow from financing activities      0.34  1.39  -0.46  -0.17 
Domestic     -1.54 1.25  -0.98  0.03 
GG     1.26  1.56  -0.83  0.58 
Central bank      -1.85 0.00  0.26  0.30 
Other depository corporations      -0.71 -0.53 -0.41  0.07 
Financial corporations not elsewhere classified      -0.23 0.21  0.00  0.00 
Nonfinancial corporations      0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.91 
Households and nonprofit institutions serving 
households      0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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Country/ item  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006  2007 
Foreign       1.88  0.14  0.51  -0.20 
GG      0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
International organizations      0.24  -0.10 -0.37  -0.71 
Financial corporations other than international 
organizations      1.63 0.21 0.85 0.00 
Other  nonresidents      0.00 0.03 0.03 0.51 
Ukraine 
Net cash inflow from financing activities  0.53  0.01  -3.41 -1.33 -1.01  -0.25 
Domestic -0.07 0.60  -3.03 -0.92 -0.14  0.23 
GG -0.26 -0.63 -2.85 -4.71 -0.07  -0.29 
Central  bank  0.43 0.95 -0.17 3.46 -0.50 0.56 
Other  depository  corporations  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Financial corporations not elsewhere classified  -0.17 0.00  -0.34 0.27  0.43  -0.21 
Nonfinancial  corporations  -0.10 0.22 0.35 0.16 0.03 0.11 
Households and nonprofit institutions serving 
households 0.02  0.05  -0.03 -0.10 -0.03  0.07 
Foreign   0.60  -0.58 -0.38 -0.41 -0.87  -0.49 
GG  0.31 0.11 0.32 0.33 0.26 0.17 
International organizations  0.35  0.17  -0.05 -0.33 0.11  0.06 
Financial corporations other than international 
organizations  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Other nonresidents  -0.08 -0.86 -0.65 -0.40 -1.24  -0.71 
Source: IMF Government Finance Statistics Online. 
 Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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Table A.4.1 GG expenditures by economic type, % GDP 






































2007  6.9 3.0  ..  2.6 0.4 0.0 1.5  8.4 6.5 
2006  7.2 2.9  ..  2.8 0.4 0.0 1.5  7.4 6.7  Albania  
2005  7.5 3.3  ..  3.2 0.5 0.0 1.3  7.2 5.5 
2007  11.7  10.3 ..  0.5 1.7 0.0  13.9  2.6 3.4 
2006  11.6  10.4 ..  0.6 1.6 0.0  12.7  2.6 2.6 
Bosnia & 
Herzego-
vina  2005  10.8  9.5  ..  0.6 1.3 0.0  13.1  2.3 2.1 
2007  11.3  5.5  ..  2.0 2.7 0.6  17.7  3.3 4.0 
2005  11.5  4.7  ..  2.2 2.6 0.6  18.4  3.5 3.9  Croatia  
2003  12.1  4.8  ..  2.0 2.5 0.3  19.3  3.0 4.9 
2007  7.3 5.1  ..  0.8 0.9  ..  7.9  8.9 4.3*  Mace-
donia¹  2006  7.6  4.2 .. 1.0 ..  ..  ..  17.9 3.0* 
2007  12.7  7.4 .. 1.1  0.5 ..  11.8  3.2 7.4* 
2005  13.4  4.8 .. 1.2  0.7 ..  13.2  2 4.6*  Montene-
gro  
2003  13.9  3.7 .. 1.0  1.5 ..  14.1  4.8 2.7* 
Serbia    2007  12.1  7.2 .. 0.8  2.7 0  17.6  0.9 4.6 
Eastern Europe 
2007  10.4  9.9  ..  0.4 8.1 0.1  12.7  2.1 6.3 
2005  10.9  8.2  ..  0.4 5.9 0.2  13.1  2.9 7.0  Belarus  
2003  10 9.1  ..  0.5 5.0 0.3  13.4  2.5 5.8 
2007  9.3 7.8  ..  1.2 3.2 0.0  11.4  2.3 6.7 
2005  7.9 6.4  ..  1.3 2.1 0.0  11.0  4.7 3.7  Moldova  
2003  9.5 3.1  ..  2.1 0.0 0.0 8.5  4.3 4.2 
2007  8.7 6.9 3.2 0.5 4.7 0.1 9.7  1.9 5.2 
2005  7.6  5.8 .. 1.1 2 0.0  9.3  2.2 3.8  Russia  
2003  8.2 7.1  ..  1.8 5.2 0.0  10.3  0.3 5.4 
2007  10.4  6.6  ..  0.6 2.9 0.0  17.2  2.9 1.8 
2005  9.9 6.7  ..  0.8 2.3 0.0  19.4  2.3 1.4  Ukraine  
2003  9.8 7.1  ..  1.0 2.4 0.1  13.6  1.7 2.4 
Caucasus 
2007  4.0 6.7  ..  0.3 0.4 0.0 4.6  1.0 6.0 
2005  4.1 7.7  ..  0.4 0.5 0.0 5.1  0.3 3.0  Armenia  
2003  1.3 9.2  ..  0.7 0.9 0.0  4 0.8 5.3 
2007 4.0  6.9  ..  0.1 0.6²  ..  4.8³ 0.6 10.3** 
2005 4.6  5.7  ..  0.1 2.3²  ..  5.1³ 0.3 4.1**  Azerbaijan  
2003 4.4  5.6  ..  0.2 5.5²  ..  6.1³ 0.6 4.4** 
2007  4.1 9.4  ..  0.6 1.6 0.1 5.5  4.5 3.2 
2005  4.7 4.9  ..  1  3.8 0.0 4.8  1.6 2.1  Georgia  
2004  4.8 4.4  ..  1.6 2.2 0.0 5.6  0.2 3.6 CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
 







































2007  3.4 6.4  ..  0.3 0.5 0.0 3.7  0.9 5.0 
2005  3.6 6.3  ..  0.4 0.6 0.0 4.3  5.7 4.2  Kazakhstan 
2003  3.7 6.5  ..  0.8 0.5 0.0 4.9  1.5 4.1 
Kyrgyzstan  2006  7.8 6.4  ..  0.8 0.6 0.1 2.9  1.4 2.3 
2004  3.4 5.6  ..  0.7 2.1 0.0 1.8  5.4  12.2  Tajikistan  
2003  3.3 5.3  ..  1.2 2.2 0.0 2.1  2.2  11.6 
Notes: ¹ Central government, ² SOCAR energy-related subsidies, ³ Total transfers, * Capital 
expenditures, ** Investment expenditure, excludes government investment in the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. Text in italics indicates that data are in whole or in part 
provisional or preliminary. 
Sources: Data on Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Belarus, Moldova, 
Russian Federation, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan: IMF 
GFS online database (www.imfstatistics.org/gfs/); GDP: IMF WEO database; data on 


















































2007 5.6 1.2 1.6 5.3 0.0 1.3 2.5 0.3 3.2 7.9 
2006 6.4 1.3 1.8 4.5 0.0 1.7 2.4 0.4 3.2 7.8  Albania  
2005 7.0 1.0 1.7 3.2 0.0 1.7 2.6 0.4 3.2 7.5 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina  2002 5.5  4.3  4.2  3.0 ..  .. 6.1 .. 5.6  15.3 
2007 3.7 1.5 2.7 8.0  ..  4.0 5.9 1.7 4.7  14.9 
2006 3.3 1.5 2.6 8.0  ..  3.8 6.1 1.5 4.6  15.7  Croatia  
2005 2.8 1.5 2.6 7.3  ..  3.8 6.1 1.4 4.7  16.4 
Serbia    2007 3.9 2.4 2.5 6.0 0.4 2.0 6.2 1.1 3.8  16.0 
Eastern Europe 
2007 6.7 1.3 2.1  11.6  0.6 2.2 4.5 1.2 5.8  13.5 
2006 3.6 1.3 2.3  10.0  0.6 3.0 4.7 1.6 6.3  13.5  Belarus  
2005 4.9 1.1 2.2 9.4 0.6 2.9 4.8 1.5 6.3  13.4 Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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2007  5.2 0.5 2.4 5.6 0.2 1.4 4.9 1.1 8.0  12.6 
2006  1.9 0.5 2.7 3.7 0.2 2.3 7.1 1.1 8.2  13.3  Moldova  
2005  4.7 0.4 2.3 4.1 0.1 1.9 4.2 0.8 7.3  11.4 
2006  4.7 2.6 2.7 2.2 0.1 2.4 4.1 0.7 3.9 8.3  Russia  
2005  3.5 2.7 2.9 3.5 0.1 2.2 3.9 0.8 3.6 8.7 
2007  3.3 1.3 2.3 5.9 0.3 0.9 4.0 0.8 6.1  18.8 
2006  3.7 1.0 2.4 5.1 0.3 1.6 3.9 0.8 6.2  20.2  Ukraine  
2005  3.3 1.3 2.3 5.9 0.3 0.9 3.9 0.8 6.1  18.7 
Caucasus 
2007  4.2 4.5  ..  3.9  ..  1.1 1.5 0.7 3.1 4.8  Armenia  
2005  5.0 4.2  ..  2.0  ..  1.4 1.4 0.8 2.7 4.6 
2007p 1.7 3.0 1.6 9.3  ..  0.3 1.0 0.4 2.7 2.2  Azerbaijan  
2005  1.3 2.3 1.6 4.3  ..  0.3 0.9 0.4 3.0 2.4 
2007  0.3 8.8 4.3 2.1 0.5 2.9 1.5 1.0 2.7 4.8 
2006  0.9 5.2 2.8 3.4 0.0 3.3 1.6 1.0 3.0 5.0  Georgia  
2005  0.9 3.4 2.5 3.3 0.0 2.3 1.8 0.9 2.5 5.4 
Central Asia 
2007  1.9 1.3 1.9 3.4 0.1 1.6 2.3 1.0 3.5 3.9 
2006  4.1 1.0 1.8 2.8 0.1 1.4 2.3 0.8 3.4 4.3  Kazakhstan  
2005  7.1 1.0 2.0 2.7 0.1 1.5 2.4 0.8 3.4 4.5 
Kyrgyzstan    2006  3.8 1.5 1.7 1.9 0.0 1.2 2.7 0.7 5.6 3.2 
2007p 0.6*  .. ..  2.4  .. .. .. .. ..  8.1 
2005  0.6*  .. ..  3.2  .. .. .. .. ..  8.1  Uzbekistan  
2003  0.6*  .. ..  3.3  .. .. .. .. ..  8.2 
Notes: IMF GFS - Cash basis; Croatia - Accrual basis; Azerbaijan: Central Government; * 
Public authorities and administration. 
Source:  Data on Albania, Serbia, Belarus, Moldova, Russian Federation, Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan: IMF GFS database online, www.imfstatistics.org/gfs/; GDP - 
IMF WEO database; data on Armenia: IMF (2008f); data on Azerbaijan: IMF (2008d); 
data on Bosnia & Herzegovina: WB (2005c); data on Croatia: WB (2008c); data on 
Uzbekistan: IMF (2008g). 
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Albania   2007  23.6  10.2 ..  9.0 1.3 0.0 5.0  28.7  22.2 
B&H  2007  26.5  23.2 ..  1.2 4.0 0.0  31.5  5.8 7.8 
Croatia    2007  24.0  11.7 ..  4.3 5.8 1.3  37.5  6.9 8.5 
Serbia    2007  26.3  15.7 ..  1.7 6.0 0.0  38.3  2.1 10 
Eastern Europe 
Belarus    2007  20.8  19.8  ..  0.8 16.2 0.3 25.3  4.3 12.6 
Moldova    2007  22.3  18.6 ..  2.8 7.6 0.0  27.2  5.5 16 
Russia    2007  21.2  16.9 7.8  1.2 11.5 0.2 23.7  4.6 12.7 
Ukraine   2007  24.6  15.6 ..  1.3 6.8 0.1  40.5  6.8 4.3 
Caucasus 
Armenia    2007  17.4  28.9 ..  1.4 1.6 0.1  20.1  4.5 26 
Georgia   2007  14.2  32.3 ..  2.0 5.4 0.4 19  15.7  11 
Central Asia 
Kazakh-
stan   2007 17 31.6  ..  1.3  2.5  0.1 18.3  4.5 24.7 
Kyrgyzstan 2006  34.6  28.8  ..  3.6  2.7  0.3  13.1  6.5  10.4 
Tajikistan    2004  10.8  17.9 ..  2.3 6.8 0.0 5.9  17.4 39 
Source: IMF GFS Online database. 
 












































Albania   2007 19.0  4.0 5.3  18.1  0.0 4.4 8.4 1.1  11.1  27.1 
Serbia    2007 8.5 5.3 5.4  13.1  0.8 4.4  13.6  2.4 8.2  34.9 
Belarus   2007 13.4  2.5 4.3  23.2  1.1 4.5 9.0 2.3  11.5  27.0 
Moldova    2007 12.4 1.2  5.7 13.4 0.6  3.4 11.7 2.5 19.1  30.0 
Russia    2006 14.6  8.0 8.4 6.8 0.3 7.4  12.7  2.2  12.2  26.0 
Ukraine   2007 7.7 3.0 5.2  13.5  0.7 2.0 9.1 1.9  14.0  42.9 
Georgia   2007 0.9 30.5  14.7 7.2  1.6 10.1 5.3  3.6  9.3 16.8 
Kazakhstan  2007 9.3  6.4  9.3 16.9 0.6  7.7 11.6 4.7 17.6  19.4 
Kyrgyzstan  2006 16.9  6.5 7.7 8.5 0.0 5.5  12.0  3.2  24.8  14.2 
Source: IMF GFS Online database. Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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Table A.4.5. Components of health care funding 
Private expenditure on 
health as % of total ex-
penditure on  health 
External resources for 
health as % of total ex-
penditure on health 
Private prepaid plans 
as % of private expendi-
ture on health 
Out-of-pocket expenditure 
as % of private expenditure 
on health 
Social security expendi-
ture on health as % GG 
expenditure on health 
Country 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2001 2002  2003  2004 2005 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
West Balkans 
Albania  61.5 63.9 62.4 59.4 59.7  5.2  2.8 3.8 2.4 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.8 99.8  94.3 96.2 97.0 22.0 25.6 26.6 28.1 30.1
B&H  45.7 37.4 31.4 41.1 41.3  2.3 1.8 0.7 1.1 0.6 ... ... ... ... ... 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 96.5 97.5 97.8 97.6 97.8
Croatia  18.6 25.8 17.9 19.3 18.7  0.4  0.5 0.4 0.1 0.0 24.3 33.0 7.5 6.0 6.4 75.7 67.0 92.5 94.0 93.6 97.7 97.7 98.0 97.9 97.9
Kosovo  ...  40.4 40.4 40.3 47.8  … 14.9 10.6 4.8 4.4 ... ... ... ...  … ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Montenegro  27.7 27.9 25.3 27.7 24.5  ...  ...  ... 1.0 1.9 ... ... ... ... ... 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 98.8 98.8 98.8 98.8 98.8
Serbia  34.0 29.3 27.6 28.4 28.1  1.2  0.5 0.6 1.3 0.5 ... ... ... ... ... 85.3 85.3  85.3 86.4 86.7 92.4 92.3 87.0 91.5 92.7
Macedonia  28.0 28.6 27.6 29.2 29.6  1.0  2.3 0.6 1.4 1.0 ... ... ... ... ... 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 97.3 97.4 97.8 97.5 96.1
European CIS 
Belarus  27.4 28.9 26.3 26.6 24.2  0.2  0.1  … … … 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 64.3 69.4 69.7 68.3 69.0 5.0 2.9 4.0 2.2 2.4
Moldova    51.3 48.2 49.0 43.2 44.5 30.1  7.3 2.7 4.8 2.6 ...  3.6 3.3 1.1 0.8 96.9 92.5 93.4 96.0 96.4 0.0 0.0 1.2 70.2 75.9
Russia  41.3 41.0 41.2 40.4 38.0  0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 11.3 10.0 10.2 8.7 8.2 73.7 75.2 79.7 82.2 82.4 39.5 40.5 39.6 39.4 42.0
Ukraine  49.7 47.0 43.8 43.2 47.2  0.5  0.5  0.5 0.7 0.6 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.1 90.1 90.6 89.8 90.5 84.8 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.6
Caucasus 
Armenia  76.3 75.6 73.8 70.0 67.1 16.6 10.5  11.1 6.7 12.7 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 80.8 88.0 90.1 98.2 89.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Azerbaijan  81.0 82.9 79.5 78.0 75.2  3.8  1.5  1.6 1.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 78.5 80.4 80.7 80.8 84.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Georgia  82.0 83.7 85.0 84.6 80.5 10.7 14.2 7.8 6.5 5.1 1.1 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.9 88.0 85.0  90.8 91.7 95.6 43.0 46.2 64.1 62.8 45.4
Central Asia 
Kazakhstan  43.0 46.2 44.6 39.6 35.8  0.6  1.4  0.8 0.9 0.5 ... ... ... ... ...  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Kyrgyzstan  58.9 60.4 62.1 60.3 60.5  8.1 16.0  9.1 15.3 7.6 ... ... ... ... ... 90.6 91.0 93.0 94.6 95.0 10.1 11.9 13.4 19.9 16.6
Tajikistan  79.3 79.8 79.6 78.6 77.2  7.9 7.8  14.6 9.7 11.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.2 98.9 97.5 97.2 96.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Turkmenistan 27.7 32.1 30.4 33.4 33.3  0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1
Uzbekistan  55.0 55.3 55.2 53.9  52.3 1.2 2.4 4.8 3.1 3.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 97.2 97.1 97.1 97.1 97.1 ... ... ... ... ...
Notes. For Kosovo, Private expenditure on health = Out of pocket expenditure 
Source: Calculated based on WHO online database (http://www.who.int/whosis/database). Data for Kosovo are from WB (2008d); GDP & budget for 2002-
2004: Fact Sheet Kosovo (May 2003), www.unmikonline.org. 
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2006 USD  As % of direct aid to education  %  As % of GG education expenditures 











































































2005 21  4  17  9.5  0.0  71.4  19.0  19  7.8 1.5 7.8 0.7  -  5.5  Albania 
2006 42  10  45  16.7 28.6  40.5  14.3  23  14.8 3.5 14.8 2.5  4.2  6.0 
2005  34  3  14  2.9  35.3  55.9  5.9  8        Bosnia & Her-
zegovina  2006  31  2 9  3.2  9.7  83.9  3.2  5       
2005  13  0 2  0.0  7.7  84.6  7.7  2        Croatia 
2006  19  0 1  0.0  0.0  94.7  5.3  1       
2005  16  4  37  16.7  0.0  83.3  0.0  26         Macedonia 
2006  19  5  50  26.3  5.3  63.2  5.3  28        
Eastern Europe 
2005 8  1  1  0.0 0.0  87.5 12.5  7 0.4  0.0  0.4 -  - 0.3  Belarus 
2006  23  0  0 0.0  0.0  100.0  0.0  1 0.9 - 0.9 -  - 0.9 
2005 10  1  3  0.0  0.0  90.0  10.0  7 4.1  0.4  4.1 -  - 3.7  Moldova 
2006 30  12  64  39.3 21.4  35.7  3.6  40  10.9 4.4 10.2 4.0  2.2  3.6 
2005  31  0  0 0.0  0.0  96.8  3.2  1 0.6 - 0.6 -  - 0.5  Ukraine 
2006 66  1  0  0.0  0.0  98.5  1.5  1 1.0  0.0  1.0 -  - 1.0 
Caucasus 
2005  7  1 9  0.0  16.7  66.7  16.7  17         Armenia 
2006  38  6  47  0.0  27.3  51.5  21.2  16        
2005  9  5 8  40.0  0.0  40.0  20.0  52         Azerbaijan 
2006 6  0  0  0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0  2             Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
 




2006 USD  As % of direct aid to education  %  As % of GG education expenditures 










































































2005 11  4  11  16.7 0.0  66.7  16.7  37  6.3 2.3 3.5 0.6  -  2.3  Georgia 
2006 46  12  35  12.5 9.4  71.9  6.3  28  19.7 5.1 13.7 1.7  1.3  9.9 
Central Asia 
2005 10  3  3  0.0  0.0  50.0  50.0  29 0.5  0.1  0.5 -  -  0.2  Kazakhstan 
2006 11  1  1  0.0  9.1  72.7  18.2  8 0.4  0.0  0.4 - 0.0  0.3 
2005  19  13  29  57.9  0.0  21.1  21.1  69         Kyrgyzstan 
2006 21  11  25  28.6 0.0  23.8  47.6  53 13.3  7.0  13.3  3.8  -  3.2 
2005  15  10  14  57.1  7.1  21.4  14.3  62         Tajikistan 
2006  18  12  18  68.8  25.0  6.3  0.0  67        
2005 3  0  1  0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0  11              Turkmenistan 
2006 1  0  1  0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0  16             
2005  13  2 1  7.7  30.8  38.5  23.1  19         Uzbekistan 
2006  26  12  5  38.5  26.9  26.9  7.7  44        
Sources: 2009 Education For All Global Monitoring Report. Overcoming inequality: why governance matters. Oxford Univ. Press, 2008 
(http://www.unesco.org/education/gmr2009/press/efagmr2009_Annex4_Aidtables.pdf); Own calculations based on public education expenditure data (IMF GFS 
database), exchange rates and CPI data (IMF WEO database). 
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Table A.4.7. Public expenditure per student by level of education, PPP USD 
Country Year  All levels  Primary  Secondary  Tertiary 
Western Balkans 
Albania 2002  532.2  348.6  536.6  1640.1 
2002  2663.4  2168.1 2634.9 3615.3  Croatia 
2003  2855.4  2275.9 2923.6 3545.7 
Macedonia 2002      1460.5 
European CIS 
2004 1609.6  993.8  1661.6  2000.3 
2005  1997.1  1185.3 2117.3 2369.0 
2006  2442.1  1401.9 2634.7 2833.9 
Belarus 
2007       2007.7 
2006       1053.1  Moldova 
2007  1188.7  1029.0 1254.2 1199.3 
2003       1174.2 
2004       1164.4  Russia 
2005       1493.1 
2002 855.7  457.1  665.2  1682.7 
2003 975.2  566.3  824.2  1641.8 
2004 1104.3  637.0  961.3  1712.9 
2005 1330.0  789.9  1276.2  1817.0 
Ukraine 
2006 1552.5  993.2  1521.5  1954.4 
Caucasus and Central Asia 
2003  348.8  234.6 410.2 392.8 
2005  386.2  274.0 438.5 447.2 
2006  436.4  315.8 485.2 539.7 
Azerbaijan 
2007       855.7 
2002  671.9  749.5 617.7 709.4 
2004  607.0  745.7 581.7 461.0  Kazakhstan 
2005  687.8  856.9 676.5 488.7 
Kyrgyzstan  2002  188.0  109.2 205.8 300.1 
2002 100.4  81.0  98.7  274.7 
2003 96.5  79.6  103.1  152.9 
2004 115.4  94.6  129.2  123.6 
2005  162.0  134.5 174.6 217.4 
2006      186.5 
Tajikistan 
2007       217.3 
Sources: own calculations based on per capita GDP PPP from IMF WEO database. Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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Table A.4.8. Public expenditures on education, economic classification, % of total  
Primary, secondary and post-secondary education 
(ISCED levels 1-4)  Tertiary education (ISCED levels 5-6) 
  

















2002  10.3 89.7 15.1 74.6  8.7  91.3 30.2 61.1 
2003  8.5 91.5  17.2  74.3 7.0  93.0 24.6 68.4  Croatia 
2004  5.7 94.3  18.1  76.2 2.5  97.5 26.3 71.2 
Macedonia 2002       1.1 98.9 9.8 89.1 
Eastern Europe 
2004  5.1 94.9  27.7  67.3 5.5  94.5 40.1 54.4 
2005  5.1 94.9  25.5  69.5 5.8  94.2 38.9 55.3 
2006  5.3 94.7  23.9  70.8  11.6 88.4 35.1 53.3 
Belarus 
2007       8.7  91.3 37.5 53.8 
2006       0.0 100.0  33.3 66.7  Moldova 
2007  8.3 91.7      12.7 87.3 31.8 55.4 
Caucasus 
2002  1.4 98.6  30.5  68.1 0.4  99.6 41.8 57.7 
2003       0.5  99.5 36.2 63.2 
2005  2.8 97.2  27.7  69.6 1.4  98.6 38.2 60.4 
2006  2.0 98.0  24.5  73.5 0.6  99.4 40.5 58.9 
Azerbaijan 
2007       0.9  99.1 46.5 52.6 
Central Asia 
2002  3.7 96.3  30.2  66.1  20.1 79.9 39.9 40.0 
2004  4.4 95.6  31.2  64.5  22.5 77.5 38.9 38.6  Kazakhstan 
2005  6.2 93.8  13.7  80.1  17.5 82.5 28.4 54.0 CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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Primary, secondary and post-secondary education 
(ISCED levels 1-4)  Tertiary education (ISCED levels 5-6) 
  
















2006       14.0 86.0 44.4 41.6  Kazakhstan 
2007       15.4 84.6 43.3 41.3 
2005       6.9  93.1 32.4 60.8  Kyrgyzstan 
2006       7.3  92.7 28.5 64.2 
Note. Figures in italics are UIS estimates. 
Source: UNESCO Institute of Statistics database, http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/. 
 Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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Table A.4.9. Structure of health and education expenditures (based on functional 
classification), in%  



















2005  …  …  … 0.00 …  11.04 
2006 …  …  2.69  14.47  54.32  11.39  Belarus 
2007 …  …  2.50  17.08  61.22  12.01 
2002 22.97  60.50  n.a.  …  …  21.30 
2003 0.00  0.00  n.a.  …  …  0.00 
2004  0.21  0.26  99.53 15.81 66.09 18.10 
2005  0.29  5.62  94.09 15.57 56.84 27.59 
2006  0.35  3.15  96.50 16.80 61.92 21.28 
Moldova 
2007  0.47  3.01  96.52 18.70 56.72 17.28 
2002 …  …  …  67.94  6.55  17.49 
2003 …  …  …  64.09  6.30  18.49 
2004 …  …  …  66.28  6.04  19.03 
2005 …  …  …  14.71  47.16  22.85 
Russia 
2006 …  …  …  14.03  69.57  16.40 
2002  9.00 77.44 4.90  …  …  … 
2003  8.87 74.60 5.55  …  …  … 
2004  9.80 70.95 5.28 10.96  38.69  32.31 
2005  10.68 74.57  5.25  10.72 41.46 30.08 
2006  11.00 74.02  5.38  11.03 41.89 29.86 
Ukraine 
2007  10.89 72.54  5.01  11.49 42.30 29.36 
2002  … 22.90 …  3.20  82.12  9.81 
2003  14.75 20.35 64.90 79.03 12.58  8.38 
2004  15.25 36.33 48.41 78.84 12.84  8.32 
2005  …  31.62 68.38 73.30 11.53 11.48 
2006  …  30.62 69.38 73.42 11.93 14.65 
Kazakhstan 
2007  …  32.73 67.27 72.40 14.24 13.35 
Kyrgyzstan  2006  51.97  22.29  6.60 6.61 8.97  17.90 
Notes. Russia - accrual basis, all other countries - cash basis. Due to data omissions sums 
of distinct sub-sector expenditure the shares do not necessarily constitute 100%.  
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Table A.4.10. Progress towards achievement of Millennium Development Goals - 
notes 
Indicator achieved:    
Early achievers: the MDG target not yet achieved but is estimated to be 
achieved at least within two thirds of the remaining period from the last meas-
urement until 2015    
On track: the MDG target is estimated to be achieved from two thirds of the 
time remaining to one and one third of the time remaining until 2015    
Slow: the time gap for achieving is more than one third of the time remaining 
after 2015    
Regressing: the indicator is moving in the wrong direction    
No progress, or deterioration since 2000:    
Notes. Data for the latest year available, mostly 2006. 
Averages for "Developed Regions” comprise Europe (except CIS countries), Australia, 
Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the United States. "Developed Regions" include 
transition countries in Europe unless the latter are presented separately as “Transition 
countries of South-Eastern Europe”, which groups includes: Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia  
* CIS average, ¹ Estimated data, ² Modeled data 
Source: For all countries, based on own analysis of available time series (1) MDG 
Database, United Nations Statistics Division (http://data.un.org/Data.aspx); 2) MDG 
Indicators, http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx; Regional averages: Statistical Annex: 
Millennium Development Goals, Targets and Indicators, 2008 
(http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Static/Data/Stat%20Annex.pdf); for CCA based 
on: ADB (2007). 
 Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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Total net enrolment ratio in primary education 96.4 93.6 98.9 97.2 .. 89.9¹ 90.6 93.7 90.6 90.7 85.4 90.3 92.8 99 93.5 97.3 93.9
Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach last 
grade of primary 97 89.9 99.7 98.2 .. 99.2 97 98.7 98 99.4 97.3 100 96.4 100 98.6 98.7 .. 98.6 100.9
Children under five mortality rate per 1,000 live births¹  6 17 15 6 17 15 13 19 16 24 24 88 32 17 29 41 68 51 43 47
Infant mortality rate (0-1 year) per 1,000 live births¹ 5 15 13 5 15 13 12 16 14 20 21 73 28 15 26 36 56 45 38 40
Proportion of 1 year-old children immunized against 
measles¹  93 97 90 96 94 88 93 97 96 99 98 92 96 95 99 99 97 87 99 95 95
Maternal mortality ratio per 100,000 live births  9 92² 3 7 10 14 .. 18 22 28 18 76² 82² 66² 51* 140² 150² 170² 130² 24 ..
Births attended by skilled health personnel, % .. 99.8 99.6 99.9 99 92.1 98 100 99.5 99.4 99.8 97.8 99.7 99 99 99.8 97.6 83.4 99.5 99.9 97
Contraceptive use among currently married women 15-
49 years old, any method, percentage 67.3 75.1 35.7 13.5 58.3 55.3 72.6 67.8 72.8 67.5 53.1 55.4 47.3 63.4 50.7 47.8 37.9 61.8 64.9 54.5
Adolescent birth rate, per 1,000 women 23.6 16.1 15.5 13.6 22.2 29 22.1 29.2 28.1 29.5 25.4 44 41.1 28.1 28.6 25.8 27.3¹ 19 25.5¹ 28.9
Antenatal care coverage, at least one visit, %  .. 97.1 98.9 81 .. 99.4 88.8 93.2 70 94.3 .. 99.9 96.9 77.1 99.1 99 98
People living with HIV, 15-49 years old, percentage¹ 0.3 .. 0.2 0.4 1.1 1.6 0.1 0.2 0.1 1.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1
Number of existing TB cases per 100,000 population 
(excluding HIV infected)² 15 26.2 57.1 63.9 33.1 44.8 84 70.9 153.7 124.9 113.7 80.5 87.3 84.2 118 142.1 137 298 78.2 144.6 140
Number of deaths from TB per 100,000 population 
(excluding HIV infected)² 2 3.4 7.4 6.4 5 4.9 11 8.2 18.8 17 14.5 10.2 10.3 9.2 15 17.4 17.9 39.2 9.5 16.9 17
Patients successfully treated from TB under directly 
observed treatment short course (DOTS), % 73 76.8 96.5 84.4 89.3 83 73.1 62 28 57.6 72.5 59.1 72.6 59 71.1 84.7 86.2 81.1 80.5 75
   Total, percentage 99 97 99 99 100 100 90 97 97 98 78 99 97 96 89 67 88 88
   Urban, percentage 100 97 100 100 100 100 96 100 97 99 95 100 99 99 99 93 98 98
   Rural, percentage 97 97 98 98 99 99 85 88 97 96 59 97 91 91 83 58 82 79
   Total, percentage 99 97 95 99 89 93 79 87 93 91 80 93 88 97 93 92 96 93
   Urban, percentage 1 0 0 9 8 9 9 9 9 9 2 9 18 59 39 79 6 9 09 4 9 4 9 7 9 4 9 5 9 7 9 5
   Rural, percentage 96 97 92 98 81 97 73 70 83 81 70 92 75 98 93 91 85 92
Proportion of population using an improved sanitation facility¹
Target 6.A: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS 
Target 6.C: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases
Target 7.C: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation
Proportion of population using an improved drinking water source¹
Target 2.A: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling
Target 4.A: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate
Target 5.A: Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio 
Target 5.B: Achieve, by 2015, universal access to reproductive health
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Figure A.5.1. Shares of different government levels in GG expenditures, 2006 
(a) Housing and community amenities 







Budgetary central govenrment Central extra-budgetary units Local governments
 
Source: IMF GFS 2007. 
 
(b) Health 







Budgetary central govenrment Central extra-budgetary units Local governments
 
Source: IMF GFS 2007. 
 Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
 
CASE Network Reports No. 92    172 
(c) Education 







Budgetary central govenrment Central extra-budgetary units Local governments
 
Source: IMF GFS 2007. 
 
(d) Social protection 







Budgetary central govenrment Central extra-budgetary units Local governments
 
Source: IMF GFS 2007Source: IMF GFS 2007. 
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Table A.5.1. PEFA ratings 
Indicator \ Country  Albania Kosovo  Kyr-
gyzstan 
Mace-
donia  Moldova Serbia  Tajiki-
stan  Ukraine Median 
score 
Budget Credibility 
1. Aggregate expenditure outturn compared 
to original approved budget  B B D A A A B B B 
2. Composition of expenditure outturn com-
pared to original approved budget  D D A A C C C B C 
3. Aggregate revenue outturn compared to 
original approved budget  B A A A A A A A A 
4. Stock and monitoring of expenditure pay-
ment arrears  D D+ D  A D+  C+  C+  B+ C 
Transparency and Comprehensiveness 
5. Classification of the budget  A  D+  C  A  C  C  D  A  C 
6. Comprehensiveness of information in-
cluded in budget documentation  C C B … A B A A B 
7. Extent of unreported government opera-
tions including those funded by donors  D+ C+ … … B+ B+ C+ D+ C+ 
8. Transparency of intergovernmental fiscal 
relations  C+ A- C+ …  A B+  B  B+ B+ 
9. Oversight of aggregate fiscal risk from 
other public sector entities  C+ C+ D+ …  C  C  C  D+  C 
10. Public access to key fiscal information  B  B  C  …  A  B  D  B  B 
Policy-Based Budgeting 
11. Orderliness and participation in the an-
nual budget process  A B+ B … B+ A  B B+  B+ 
12. Multi-year perspective in fiscal planning, 
expenditure policy and budgeting  C D  D+  …  B+  C  D+  C C 
Predictability and Control in Budget Execution Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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Indicator \ Country  Albania Kosovo  Kyr-
gyzstan 
Mace-
donia  Moldova Serbia  Tajiki-
stan  Ukraine Median 
score 
13. Transparency of taxpayer obligations and 
liabilities  … B+ C  …  A  B  C  C C+ 
14. Effectiveness of measures for taxpayer 
registration and tax assessment  … C … …  B+ B D+ C C 
15. Effectiveness in collection of tax pay-
ments  … B B+  …  B+  D+  …  D+ B 
16. Effectiveness of cash flow planning, 
management and monitoring  C+  B+ D B+ A C+  D+  D+  C+ 
17. Recording and management of cash bal-
ances, debt and guarantees  B A  B+  A B B  C+  B B 
18. Effectiveness of payroll controls  B+  D  …  C+  D+  C+  D+  D+  D+ 
19. Competition, value for money and con-
trols in procurement  D+ C+ C+ D+  B  C+  C  D+  C 
20. Effectiveness of internal controls  B C+  D+ B C+ C C+  C+  C+ 
21. Effectiveness of internal audit C+  C  D  C  C+  C+  D+  C+  C 
Accounting, Recording and Reporting 
22. Timeliness and regularity of accounts 
reconciliation  B B … A B  B+  B A B 
23. Availability of information on resources 
received by service delivery units  D D D C B B C B C 
24. Timeliness, quality and dissemination of 
in-year budget execution reports  C+ B+ C+ C+ C+ B+ C+ C+ C+ 
25. Timeliness of the presentation of audited 
financial statements to the legislature  B+ A  D C+ D  D D+  D+  D+ 
External Scrutiny and Audit 
26. The scope, nature and follow up of exter-
nal audit reports  C+  D+ D  B C+ D D+  D+  D+ CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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Indicator \ Country  Albania Kosovo  Kyr-
gyzstan 
Mace-
donia  Moldova Serbia  Tajiki-
stan  Ukraine Median 
score 
27. Legislative scrutiny of the annual budget 
law  B+ B+ D+ B+ B+ C+  C  B+ B+ 
28. Legislative scrutiny of external audit re-
ports  C+  D D C  D+  D D  D+  D 
Donor Practices 
D1. Predictability of direct budget support  D  …  C+  D  …  D  D+  …  D 
D2. Financial information provided by do-
nors for budgeting and reporting on project 
and programme aid 
C … … C D D+  D+ D  D+ 
D3. Proportion of aid that is managed by use 
of national procedures  D …  … D D D D D D 
Median  score  C+  C+ C  B  B C+ C C+   
Source: Country PEFA reports. Marek Dabrowski (Ed.), Roman Mogilevskiy (Ed.)
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Table A.6.1. PFM-related indicators and targets of the Paris Declaration 
No. Indicator   Meaning and measurement 
method  Target for2010 
2  Reliable coun-
try systems 
Number of partner countries 
that have procurement and 
public financial management 
systems that either (a) adhere 
to broadly accepted good 
practices or (b) have a reform 
programme in place to achieve 
these 
(a) Public financial management – 
Half of partner countries move up at 
least one measure (i.e., 0.5 points) on 
the PFM/IRAI scale of performance 
(b) Procurement – One-third of 
partner countries move up at least one 
measure (i.e., from D to C, C to B or B 
to A) on the four-point scale used to 
assess performance for this indicator 
3 




Percent of aid flows to the 
government sector that is re-
ported on partners’ national 
budgets 
Halve the gap – halve the proportion 
of aid flows to government sector not 
reported on government’s budget(s) 
(with at least 85% reported on budget) 
5a 




Percent of donors and of aid 
flows that use public financial 
management systems in partner 
countries, which either (a) ad-
here to broadly accepted good 
practices or (b) have a reform 
program in place to achieve 
these 
- At least, 90% of donors use partner 
countries’ PFM systems 
- At least, a one-third reduction in 
the % of aid to the public sector not 
using partner countries’ PFM systems 
5b 
Use of country 
procurement 
systems 
Percent of donors and of aid 
flows that use partner country 
procurement systems which 
either (a) adhere to broadly 
accepted good practices or (b) 
have a reform program in 
place to achieve these 
- At least, 90% of donors use partner 
countries’ procurement systems 
- At least, a one-third reduction in 
the % of aid to the public sector not 









Number of parallel project 
implementation units per 
country 
Reduce by two-thirds the stock of 
parallel project implementation units 
7  Aid is more 
predictable 
Percent of aid disbursements 
released according to agreed 
schedules in annual or multi-
year frameworks 
Halve the gap – halve the proportion 
of aid not disbursed within the fiscal 
year for which it was scheduled 
8  Aid is untied  Percent of bilateral aid that is 






Percent of aid provided as 
program-based approaches 
66% of aid flows are provided in the 
context of program-based approaches 
Source: Paris Declaration. CHALLENGES AND TRAJECTORIES OF FISCAL POLICY AND PFM REFORM… 
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Table A.6.2. Investment operations of the World Bank, mil. USD 
Latest completed CAS/CPS 
Investment operations 












Albania 2002-2004 164  124  66.2  19 19 5.2  23 
Armenia 2003-2005 159  131  15        15 
Azerbaijan 2003-2005 183  163 55.9  18    10  27.9 
Belarus 2002-2004 8.5  8.5  8.5         
BIH 2005-2007 132  132  48  10  16    22 
Croatia 2005-2008 990  608  249  85      164 
Georgia 1998-2005 533  403  121  26 37    18 
Kazakhstan 2001-2003 105  105           
Kosovo 2006-2007 21  21          
Kyrgyzstan 2003-2006 155  135  30  15  15     
Macedonia 2004-2006 166  106  10    10     
Moldova 2002-2004 100  100  59    16  11  12 
Montenegro 2005-2006 32  14  5  5       
Russia 2003-2006 1086  1086  505  100  80  125  200 
Serbia 2005-2007 374  272  25    25   
Tajikistan 2002-2004 83  83  55  20  35     
Turkmenistan No  WB  lending 
Ukraine 2004-2007 1140  640  186  87    99   
Uzbekistan 2005-2007 55  55  55  15  40     
  Current CAS/CPS 
Albania 2005-2008 170  110  55        35 
Armenia 2006-2009 186  151  30  15  15     
Azerbaijan 2007-2010 1260 1260 515  85    10  420 
Belarus 2008-2011 163  163  …        … 
BIH 2008-2011 200  200  …  …    …  … 
Croatia 2009-2012 630  …  127  100  27     
Georgia 2006-2009 143  80  15 15       
Kazakhstan 2004-2007 443  443           
Kosovo 2008  12  12  10  10     
Kyrgyzstan 2007-2010 129  129  25  15      10 
Macedonia 2007-2010 220  145  25      25   
Moldova 2005-2008 90 90 40  10  10  10  10 
Montenegro 2007-2010 69  69  10         
Russia 2007-2009 600  600           
Serbia 2008-2011 350  250  15  15    
Tajikistan 2006-2009 120 100 55  15  25    15 
Turkmenistan No  WB  lending 
Ukraine 2008-2011 2500  1900  253      113 140 
Uzbekistan 2008-2011 373  373  240  25  70    145 
Source: World Bank. 